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Standard Provisions
The following Standard Provisions are part of Division's Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Form GMMS 1012).

PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT
The purpose of this Agreement is to promote a

This mutual dependence requires a spirit of coopera-

relationship between Division and its Dealers which

tion, trust and confidence betweea Division and its

encourages and facilitates cooperation and mutual effort

dealers To facilitate attainment of cooperation, trust and

to satisfy customers, and permits Division and its dealers

confidence, and to provide Division with the benefit of

to fully realize their opportunities for business success

dealer advice regarding many decisions which affect

Division has established a network of authorized dealers

dealer business operations, Division has established

operating at approved locations to effectively sell ind

mechanisms to obtain dealer input in the decision-

service its Products and to build and maintain consumer

naking process These mechanisms are descnbed in

confidence and satisfaction in Dealer and Division Con-

Division's Dealer Sales and Service Agreement.

sequently, Division relies upon each Dealer to provide

This Agreement (1) authorizes Dealer to sell and

appropriate skill, capital, equipment, staff and facilities

service Division's Products and represent itself as a

to properly sell, service, protect the reputation, and sat-

Division Dealer; (n) states the terms under which Dealer

isfy the customers of Division's Products in a manner that

and Division agree to do business together, (lii) states the

demonstrates a caring attitude toward those customers

responsibilities of Dealer and Division to each other and

At the same time, Dealer relies upon Division to provide

to customers, and (IV) reflects the mutual dependence of

sales and service support and to continually strive to

the parties in achieving their business objectives "

enhance the quality and competitiveness of its Products

ARTICLE 1. APPOINTMENT \ s \L THORIZED DEALER
Division appoints Dealer as a non-exclusive dealer of

and the obligation to market and service those Products in

Division Products Dealer has the right to buy Products

accordance with this Agreement and related documents

ARTICLE J. hi VI I K OPERATOR
This is a Personal Services Agreement, entered into in

exercising full managerial authority over Dealership

reliance on the qualifications of Dealer Operator identi-

Operations Dealer Operator will have an unencumbered

fied in Paragraph Third, and on Dealer's assurance that

ownershigjnterest in Dealer of at least 15 percent atall

Dealer Operator will provide personal services by

times A Dealer Operator must be a competent business
Article! Dealer Operator

01S

pefSori,' an effective manager, must have demonstrated a

the ability to manage a dealership. The experience

pi

fly

paring attitude toward customersL and should have a

necessary may vary with the potential represented by

Successful „ record ^as a merchandiser of automotive

each dealer location.

nctond services or otherwise have demonstrated

ARTICLE 3. DEALER OWNER
Division enters into this Agreement in reliance on the

and beneficially, the percentage stated in the Dealer

qualifications of dealer owner(s) identified in the Dealer

Statement of Ownership, unless a change is made in

Statement of Ownership. Division and Dealer agree each

accordance with Article 12.

dealer owner will continue to own, both of record

ARTICLE 4. AUTHORIZED LOCATIONS
4J

Dealer Network

Planning

4.2

Area of Primary

Responsibility

Because Division distributes its Products through a

Dealer is responsible for effectively selling, servicing

^ A o f authorized dealers operating from approved

and otherwise representing Division's Products in the

tocationsf those dealers must be appropriate in number,

Area designated in a Notice of Area of Primary

located properly, and have proper facilities to represent

Responsibility. Division retains the right to revise

and service Division's Products competitively and to

Dealer's Area of Primary Responsibility at Division's

^permit each dealer the opportunity to achieve a reason-

sole discretion consistent with dealer network planning

able return on investment if it fulfills its obligations

objectives. If Division determines that marketing condi-

fiiffif fo Deafer Agreement, Through such a dealer

tions warrant a change in Dealer's Area of Primary

network, the Division can maximize the convenience of

Responsibility, it will advise Dealer in writing of the

Customers in purchasing Products and having them

proposed change, the reasons for it, and will consider any

Serviced. As a result, customers, dealers, and the

information the Dealer submits. Dealer must submit such

^Division all benefit.

information in wnting within 30 days of receipt of notice

To*maximize the effectiveness of its dealer network,

of the proposed change If Division thereafter decides

Division agrees to monitor marketing conditions and

the change is warranted, it will issue a revised Notice of

Strive, to the extent practicable, to have dealers appropri-

Area of Primary Responsibility.

ate in number, size and location to achieve the objectives
itated above. Such marketing conditions include Division's sales and registration performance, present and

(/4.3 ] Establishment

of Additional

Dealers

future demographic and economic considerations, com-

division reserves the right to appoint additional

petitive dealer networks, the ability of Division's exist-

dealers but Division will not exercise this right without

ing dealers to achieve the objectives stated above, the

first analyzing dealer network planning considerations

opportunities available to existing dealers, and other
appropriate circumstances.

Prior to establishing an additional dealer within
Dealer's Area of Primary Responsibility, Division will

advise D

in writing and gi

change, and solid'

dealer thirty days to

tier's views on th^" Ap§slL If^

present relevant information before Division makes a

after such review with Dealer, Division Uwwermines a

final decision. Division will advise Dealer of the final

change in Premises or location is appropriate, the Dealer

decision, which will be made solely by Division pursuant^

will be allowed a reasonable time to implement the

to its business judgment^othing in this Agreement is

change. Any such changes will be reflected in a new.

intended to require Dealer's consent to the establishment

Location and Premises Addendum or other-Written^

of an additional dealer.

agreement executed by Dealer and Division. '

%

*

^ Neither the appointment of a dealer at or within three

KJL. Nothing herein is intended to require the consent or

miles of a former dealership location as a replacement for

approval of any dealer to a proposed relocation of any *

the former dealer nor the relocation of an existing dealer

other dealer.

will be considered the establishment of an additional
Dealer for purposes of this Article 4.3. Such events are

4.4.3

within the sole discretion of Division, pursuant to its

Dealer agrees to provide Premises at its approved

business judgment.
44

location(s) that will promote the effective performance
and conduct of Dealership Operations/and the x Divk;

Facilities
4 4 1

sion's image and goodwill. Consistent with Division's

I ocation

dealer network planning objectives and Division's inter-

Dealer agrees to conduct Dealership Operations only

est m maintaining the stability and viability of its

from the approved location(s) within its Area of Primary

dealers, Dealer agrees that its facilities will be sized in

Responsibility. The Location and Premises Addendum

accordance with Division's requirements for "that*

identifies Dealer's approved location(s) and facilities

location.

("Premises"). If more than one location is approved,

Division agrees to establish and maintain a^ clearly

Dealer agrees to conduct from each location only those

stated policy for determining reasonable dealer facility

Dealership Operations authonzed in the Addendum for

space requirements and to periodically re-evaluate those -

such location
4 42

Size

requirements to ensure that they continue- to be
reasonable

Change in I turn
Premises

If Dealer wants to make any change in location(s) or

4.4.4

Dealership Image and Design

Premises, or in the uses previously approved for those

The appearance of Dealer's Premises is important to

Premises, Dealer will give Division written notice of the

the image of Dealer and Division, and can affect the way

proposed rhinge

together with the reasons for the

customers perceive Division's Products and its dealers

proposal, for Division's evaluation and final decision in

generally. Dealer therefore agrees that its Premises will

light of dealer network planning considerations. No

be properly equipped and maintained/ and that the

change m location or in the use of Premises, including

interior and exterior retail environment and signs will

addition of an\ other vehicle lines, will be made without

compl> with any reasonable requirements Division may

Division^ prior written authorization.

establish to promote and preserve the image of Division

Before Division requires any changes in Premises, it

and its dealers.

will consult with Dealer, indicate the rationale for the

Division will monitor developments in automotive and;

3

Article 4. Authorized Locations

mi

other retailing to ensure that Division's image and

under this Agreement requires that the dealership be

facility requirements are responsive to changes in the

reasonably equipped to communicate with customers

marketing environment.

and the Division and to properly diagnose and service

Division will take into account existing economic and

Products. Accordingly, Dealer agrees to provide for use

marketing conditions, and consult with dealers as

in the Dealership Operations any equipment reasonably

descnbed in Division's Dealer Sales and Service Agree -

designated by Division as necessary to Dealer's effective

ment, in establishing such requirements

performance under this Agreement Division will make
such designations only after having consulted with

44.5

Dealership

Equipment

Effective performance of Dealer's responsibilities

dealers as described in Division's Dealer Sales and
Service Agreement

ARTICLE 5. DEALER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROMOTE, SELL,
AND SERVICE PRODUCTS
5.1

Responsibility
5.1.1

to Promote and Sell

or part is not warranted by General Motors or, in the case

Dealer agrees to effectively, ethicall/ - ^ o f a service contract, the coverage is not provided by

and lawfully sell and promote the purchase, lease and use

/ General Motors or an affiliate.

©

of Products by consumers located in its Area of Primary
Responsibility. To achieve this objective, Dealer agrees
to:

Dealer is authorized to sell new Motor

Vehicles only to customers located in the United States
(a)

maintain an adequate torce of trained sales

personnel;

Dealer agrees that it will not sell new Motor Vehncles for
resale"or|principal use outside the United States Dealer

(b) t explain to Product purchasers the items

also agrees not to sell any new Motor Vehicles which

which make up the purchase price and provide

were not originally manufactured for sale and distnbu-

purchasers with itemized invoices;

tion in the United States

(c)

not charge customers for services for which
5.1.3

Dealer is reimbursed by General Motors;

Division will conduct general adver-

include in customer orders only equipment

tising programs to promote the sale ot Products for the

or accessories requested by customer or required by

mutual benefit of Division and Dealers Division will

law; and

make available to Dealer advertising and sales promotion

(e)

materials from time to time and advise Dealer of any

(d)

ensure that the customer's purchase and

delivery experience are satisfactory.

applicable charges

aler modifies or sells a modified new Motor
Vehicle, or installs any equipment, accessory or part not
supplied by General Motors, or sells any non-General

/fs.2j

Responsibility
5.2.1

to Service

Dealer agrees to maximize customer

Motors service contract for a Motor Vehicle, Dealer will

satisfaction byjiroviding courteous, convenient, prompt

disclose this fact on the purchase order and bill of sale,

efficient and quality service to owners of Motor Vehi-

indicating that the modification, equipment, accessory

cles, regardless of from whom the vehicles were

purchased.

service will bt

5,2.5

rformed and ad-

Di

>n will make availal

Dealer

ministered in a professional manner and in accordance

current service and parts manuals, bulletins, and techni-

with all applicable laws and regulations, and this

cal data publications relating to Motor Vehicles.

Agreement, including the Service Policies and Procedures Manual, as amended from time to time.

5.3

Customer

Satisfaction

Dealer and Division recognize that appropriate care.
for the customer will promote customer satisfaction with

Dealer agrees to maintain an adequate

Division's Products and its dealers, which is critically

service and parts organization as recommended by

important to our current and future business success.

Division, including a competent, trained service and

Dealer therefore agrees to conduct its operations in^a

parts manager(s), trained service and parts personnel

manner which will promote customer satisfaction with

and, where service volume or other conditions make it

the purchase and ownership experience. Division agrees

advisable, a consumer relations manager.

to provide Dealer with reasonable support to assist

5.2.2

Dealer's attainment of customer satisfaction. At its
discretion, Division will monitor the satisfaction of5.2.3

Dealer and Division will each provide

Dealer's customers, and report the results to Dealer Any

the other with such information and assistance as may

written response from Dealer concerning a customer

reasonably be requested by the other to facilitate compli-

satisfaction report issued to Dealer will become a part of

ance with applicable laws, regulations, investigations

the report.

and orders relating to Products.
5.4

Business

Planning

To enable Dealer to most effectively meet its obliga5.2.4

To build and maintain consumer confi-

tions under this Agreement, and to enable Division to

dence in, and satisfaction with, Dealer and Division,

effectively support Dealer's efforts, Dealer agrees to

Dealer will comply with Divisional procedures for the in-

develop and implement a Business Plan if such is

vestigation and resolution of Product-related complaints.

required by Division.

ARTICLE 6. SALE OF PRODUCTS TO DEALERS
(^J/

Sale of Motor Vehicles to Dealer

ponent availability and production capacity, sales

Division will periodically furnish Dealer one or more

potential in Dealer's Area of Primary Responsibility,

Motor Vehicle Addenda specifying the current model

varying consumer demand, weather and transportation

types or series of new Motor Vehicles which Dealer may

conditions, governmental regulations, and other condi- JJ

order under this Agreement. Division may change a

tions beyond the control of General Motors. Division ~

Motor Vehicle Addendum by furnishing a superseding

reserves to itself discretion in accepting orders and

one, or may cancel an Addendum at any time.

distributing Motor Vehicles, and its judgments and

Division will endeavor to distribute new Motor

decisions are final. Upon written request, Division will

Vehicles among its dealers in a fair and equitable

advise Dealer of the total number of new Motor Vehicles, \

manner. Many factors affect the availability and dis-

by series, sold to Dealers in Dealer's Zone of B r a n c h y

tribution of Motor Vehicles to dealers, including com-

during the preceding month.

Article 6. Sale of Products to Dealers
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6.2

Sale of Parts and Accessories to Dealer

6.4

Inventory

New, reconditioned or remanufactured automotive

6.4.1

Motor Vehicle

Inventory

parts and accessories marketed by General Motors and

Dealer recognizes that customers expect Dealer

listed, in current Dealer Parts and Accessories Price

to have a reasonable quantity and variety of current

Schedules or supplements furnished to Dealer are called

model Motor Vehicles in inventory^Tlccordingly, Dealer

Parts and Accessories.

agrees to order and stock and Division agrees to mnkft

Orders for Parts and Accessories will be submitted

available, subject to Article 6 1, a mix of models and

and processed according to written procedures estab-

series of Motor Vehicles identified in the Motor Vehicle

lished by General Motors or other designated suppliers.

Addendum in quantities adequate to enable Dealer
to fulfill its obligations in its Area of Primary

6.3

Prices and Other Terms of Sale
6.3.1

Responsibility,
6.4.2

Motor Vehicles

Prices, destination charges, and other terms of sale
applicable to purchases of new Motor Vehicles will be
those established according to Vehicle Terms of Sale
Bulletins furnished periodically to Dealer.
Prices, destination charges, and other terms of sale

Parts and

Accessories

Dealer agrees to stock sufficient Parts and Accessories
made available by General Motors to perform warranty
repairs and policy adjustments and meet customer
demand.
6.5

Warranties on Products

applicable to any Motor Vehicle may be changed at any

General Motors warrants new Motor Vehicles and

time. Except as otherwise provided in writing, changes

Parts and Accessories (Products) as explained in docu-

apply to Motor Vehicles not shipped to Dealer at the time

ments provided with the Products or in the Service

the changes are made effective.

Policies and Procedures Manual
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW,
THE WRITTEN GENERAL MOTORS WARRANTIES ARE THE ONLY WARRANTIES APPLICABLE TO PRODUCTS. WITH RESPECT TO DEALr
ERS, SUCH WARRANTIES ARE IN LIEU OF ALL
OTHER WARRANTIES OR LIABILITIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FIT-'
NESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR ANY
LIABILITY FOR COMMERCIAL LOSSES BASED
UPON NEGLIGENCE OR MANUFACTURER'S
STRICT LIABILITY EXCEPT AS MAY BE PRO^
VIDED UNDER AN ESTABLISHED GENERAL
MOTORS PROGRAM OR PROCEDURE. GENERAL
MOTORS NEITHER ASSUMES NOR AUTHORIZES
ANYONE TO ASSUME FOR IT ANY OTHER
OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY IN CONNECTION
WITH PRODUCTS, AND GENERAL MOTORS
MAXIMUM LIABILITY IS TO REPAIR OR REPLACE THE PRODUCT

/'T'Dealer will receive written notice of any price increase
before any Motor Vehicle to which such increase applies
is shipped, except for initial prices for a new model year
\ or for any new model or body type. Dealer has therightto
' cancel or modify the affected orders by delivering
* written notice to Division within 10 days after its receipt
\^of the price increase notice.

6.3.2

Parts and

Accessories

Prices and other terms of sale applicable to Parts and
Accessories are established by General Motors according to the Parts and Accessories Terms of Sale Bulletin
furnished to Dealer.
Prices and other terms of sale applicable to Parts and
Accessories may be changed by General Motors at any
time. Such changes apply to Parts and Accessories not
shipped to Dealer at the time changes become effective

ART LE 7. SERVICE OF PRODT ~TS
7.1

Service for Which Division Pays
7.1.1

7.1 A

New Motor Vehicle Pre-Delivery
Inspections and Adjustments

Because new vehicle delivery condition is critical to

Payment for Pre-Delivery
Adjustments, Warranty^
Campaign and Transportation
Damage Work

customer satisfaction, Dealer agrees to perform speci-

For Dealer's performance of services, pre-delivery

fied pre-delivery inspections and adjustments on each

inspections and adjustments, warranty repairs, special

new Motor Vehicle and verify completion according to

policy repairs, campaign inspections and corrections,

procedures identified in the Service Policies and Pro-

and transportation damage repairs, Division will pro-

cedures Manual.

vide or pay Dealer for the Parts and other materials
required and will pay Dealer a reasonable amount for

7.L2

labor. Payment will be made according to policies in the

Warranty and Special
Policy Repairs

Service Policies and Procedures Manual. Dealer will not

Dealer agrees to perform (i) required warranty repairs

impose any charge for such service on owners or usgrs

on each qualified Motor Vehicle at the time of pre-

except where a deductible or pro-rata charge applies.

delivery service and when requested by owner, and (ii)
special policy repairs approved by Division. When the
vehicle is returned to the owner, Dealer will provide
owner a copy and explanation of the repair document
reflecting all services performed.

w j )

Parts, Accessories, and Body Repairs^
721
Warranty and Policy Repairs

Dealer agrees to use only genuine GM or General
Motors approved Parts and Accessories in performing

<f7l3)
7.1.3 J

Campaign Inspections
and Corrections

Division will notify Dealer of suspected unsatisfactory conditions on Products and issue campaign instruc-

warranty repairs, special policy repairs, and any other
repairs paid for by Division, in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Service Policies and fro-*
cedures Manual.

tions. Dealer agrees to inspect and correct suspected
unsatisfactory conditions on Products in accordance with
the instruction^Dealer will also determine that campaign inspections and corrections have been made on

\7.2.2)

Representations and Disclosures
as to Parts and Accessories

In servicing vehicles marketed by General Motors,

new and used Motor Vehicles in its inventory prior to

Dealer agrees to disclose the use of non-General Motors

sale, and follow up on Products on which campaigns are

parts and accessories as set forth in Article 5.1.1.'

outstanding.
Division may ship, and Dealer agrees to accept,
unordered parts and materials required for campaigns

(Y2 3y Body Repairs

Upon campaign completion, Dealer will receive credit

Dealer agrees to provide quality body repair service

for excess parts and materials so shipped if they

for Motor Vehicles. Dealer can provide this service

are returned or disposed of according to Division's

through its own body shop, or by arrangement with an

instructions.

alternate repair establishment.

Article 7. Service of Products
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72A

„ Tools and Equipment

Dealer agrees to provide essential service tools as

necessary to fulfill its responsibilities to properly

required by Division and other tools and equipment as

diagnose and service Products.

ARTICLE 8. TRAINING
Properly trained personnel are essential to the success

requirements and pay any specified training charges.

of Dealer and Division, and to providing customers with

Division will consult with dealers as descnbed in

a satisfactory sales and service experience. Division

Division's Dealer Sales and Service Agreement prior to

agrees to make available or recommend to Dealer

determining the training courses or programs from

product, sales, service and parts, accounting and busi-

which an individual Dealer's requirements under this

ness management training courses for Dealer personnel.

Article may be established. Specific minimum service

Division will make such training available as conve-

training requirements will be descnbed in Division's

niently in time and location as practical circumstances

Service Policies and Procedures Manual.

permit. Division will assist Dealer in determining

Division will make available personnel to advise and

training requirements and periodically will require that

counsel Dealer personnel on sales, service, parts and

Dealer have personnel attend specific courses. Dealer

accessories, and related subjects.

agrees to comply witji any such reasonable training

ARTICLE 9.)REVIEW OF DEALER'S SALES AND
SERVICE PERFORMANCE
5 p Dealer's performance of its obligations is essential

performance. Division and Dealer will use the review

to the effective representation of Division's Products,

process to identify areas in which improvements or

and to the reputation and goodwill of Dealer, Division,

changes are necessary so that Dealer can take prompt

and other Division dealers. Periodically, Division

action to achieve acceptable performance.

will review various aspects of Dealer's sales and service

ARTICLE 10. CAPITALIZATION
The Capital Standard Addendum reflects the mini-

To avoid damage to goodwill which could result if

mum net working capital necessary for Dealer to conduct

Dealer is financially unable to fulfill its commitments^

Dealership Operations. Dealer agrees to maintain at
least this level of net working capital. Division will issue

Dealer agrees to have and maintain a separate line of
7*1
credit from a financial institution available to finance its

a new Addendum if changes in operating conditions or

purchase of new vehicles. The amount of the line of

Divisional guidelines indicate capital needs have
changed materially.

.m

credit will be sufficient for Dealer to meet its obligation^
under Article 6.4.

ARTI .E 11. ACCOUNTS AND RI ORDS

HI

Uniform Accounting

System

112

A uniform accounting system facilitates an evaluation

Examination

of Accounts

and Records

of Dealer business management practices and the impact

Dealer agrees to permit any designated representative

of Division's policies and practices. Division therefore

of Division to examine, audit, and take copies of any of

agrees to maintain, and Dealer agrees to use and

the accounts and records Dealer is to maintain under the

maintain records in accordance with, a uniform account-

accounting manual and this Agreement. Dealer agrees to

ing system set forth in an accounting manual furnished to

make such accounts and records readily available at its

Dealer.

facilities during regular business hours. Division agrees
to furnish Dealer with a list of any reproduced records*

Dealer also agrees to timely submit true and accurate
applications or claims for payments, discounts or

113

Confidentiality

of Dealer Data

allowances; true and correct orders for Products and

Division agrees not to furnish any personal or finan-

reports of sale and delivery; and any other reports or

cial data submitted to it by Dealer to any non-affiliated

*• • -

statements required by Division, in the manner specified

entity unless authorized by Dealer, required by law, or

by Division, and to retain such records for at least two

pertinent to judicial or administrative proceedings, or to

years.

proceedings under the Dispute Resolution Process.

ARTICLE 12. CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP

The parties recognize that customers and authorized

successor dealer to be established if this Agreement

dealers, as well as shareholders and employes of General

expires or is terminated because of death or incapacity.

Motors, have a vital interest in the continued success and

Division will execute the Addendum provided Dealer is

efficient operation of Division's dealer network. Accor-

meeting itsobligations under tHIs Agreement and under

dingly, Division has the responsibility of continuing to

any Dealer Agreement which Dealer may have with

administer the network to ensure that dealers are owned

other Divisions of General Motors for the conduct of

and operated b\ qualified persons able to meet the

Dealership Operations at the approved location; and the

requirements of this Agreement.

proposed dealer operator is, and will continue to be,
employed full-time by Dealer or a comparable automo-

12.1

Succession Rights Upon Death

tive dealership, and is already qualified or is being

or Incapacity

trained to qualify as a dealer operator; and provided all

12.1.1
r

Successor

Addendum

other proposed owners are acceptable.

Dealer can apply for a Successor Addendum designat-

Division may refuse to enter into a Successor Adden-

ing a proposed dealer operator and/or owners of a

dum with Dealer if Division has previously notified
9

Article 12. Changes in Management and Ownership

Dealer it does not plan to continue Dealership Operations
at the approved location, except for renewal of an

(c)

all outstanding monetary obligations of

Dealer to General Motors have been satisfied; and

existing Successor Addendum where the same proposed
^dealer operator continues to be qualified.

(d)

Dealer has not been previously notified

^ Upon expiration of this Agreement, Division will,

that Division may discontinue Dealership Opera-

upon Dealer's request, execute a new successor adden-

tions at that location.

dum provided a new and superseding dealer agreement
is executed with Dealer, and Dealer, the proposed dealer
operator and dealer owners are then qualified as described above.

12.1.4

Term of New Dealer

Agreement

The dealer agreement offered a successor dealer will
be for a three-year term

Division will notify the

successor dealer in writing at least 90 days prior to the
12.1.2

Absence of Successor

Addendum

If this Agreement expires or is terminated because of
death or incapacity and Dealer and Division have not

expiration date whether the successor dealer has performed satisfactonly and, if so, that Division will offer a
new dealer agreement.

executed a Successor Addendum, the Dealer Operatoi
or, if there is not a remaining Dealer Operator, the
remaining dealer owners may propose a successor dealer
tp continue the operations identified in this Agreement
The proposal must be made to Division in writing at least
30 days prior to the expiration or termination of this
Agreement, including any deferrals.

12.1.5

Limitation

on Offers

Dealer will be notified in wnting of the decision on a
proposal to establish a successor dealer submitted under
Article 12 1 within 60 days after Division has received
from Dealer all applications and information reasonably
requested by Division Division may condition its offer
of a dealer agreement on the relocation of dealership
operations to an approved location by successor dealer

12.1.3

Successor Dealer

Requirements

Division will accept a proposal to establish a successor

within a reasonable time

Division's offer of a new

dealer agreement under this Article 12 1 will automat-

dealer submitted by a proposed dealer operator under

ically expire if not accepted in wnting by the proposed

this Article 12.1 provided:

successor dealer within 60 days after it receives the offer.

(a)

the proposed successor dealer and the

.proposed dealer operator are ready, willing and
>able to meet the requirements of a new dealer
agreement at the approved location(s);

12.1.6

Cancellation

of Addendum

Dealer may cancel an executed Successor Addendum
at any time pnor to the death of a Dealer Operator or
Dealer Owner, or the incapacity of Dealer Operator.

Division approves the proposed dealer

Division may cancel an executed Successor Addendum^

operator and all proposed owners not previously

only if the proposed dealer operator is no longer

approved for the existing Dealership Operations;

qualified under Article 12.1 1.

(b)

122

ler Changes in

considered a r

nership or

proposal, and the t"' " period for

Division to respond shall recommence.

Management
If Dealer proposes a change in Dealer Operator, a
change in ownership, or a transfer of the dealership

122*5

Division's prior written approval is not

business or its principal assets to any person conditioned

required where the transfer of equity ownereKip or

upon Division's entering into a dealer agreement with

beneficial interest to an individual is (a) less than ten

that person, Division will consider Dealer's proposal and

percent in a calendar year; and (b) between existing

not arbitrarily refuse to approve it, subject to the

dealer owners previously approved by Division where

following:

there is no change in majority ownership or^oting
control. Dealer agrees to notify Division within 30 days

12 2 J

Dealer agrees to give Division prior

of the date of the change and to execute a new Dealer

written notice of any proposed change or transfer

Statement of Ownership.

described above. Dealer understands that if any such
change is made prior to Division's approval of the

122.6

proposal, termination of this Agreement will be war-

any proposed changes in management or ownership

ranted and Division will have no further obligation to

under this Article unless Dealer makes arrangements

consider Dealer's proposal.
1222

Division is not obligated to approve

acceptable to Division to satisfy any indebtedness of
Dealer to General Motors.

Division agrees to consider Dealer's

proposal, taking into account factors such as (a) the
M2.3 j Right of First Refusal to Purchase

personal, business, and financial qualifications of the

12.3 J

proposed dealer operator and owners, and (b) whether

Creation and Coverage

If Dealer submits a proposal for a change of ownership

the proposed change is likely to result in a successful
dealership operation with acceptable management, cap-

unTtef^Si^

g> right of first

italization, and ownership which will provide satisfac-

refu^aLia-puftrfia&e the diiAldisl'iip as&e$s regardless of

tory sales, service, and facilities at an approved location,

whether the proposed buyer is qualified to be a dealer. If

while promoting and preserving competition and cus-

Divkieircho^sesToexercise this right, it will do so in its

tomer satisfaction.

written respnnt.fr to'Dealers proposal. Division will
have a reasonable ppp™+y«"»y *<* i ^ p ^ the assets,

122.3

including real estate, before making its decision.

Division will notify Dealer in writing

of Division's decision on Dealer's proposal within 60
days after Division has received from Dealer all applica-

1232

Purchase Price and Other Terms

tions and information reasonably requested by Division.

ofSale

If Division disagrees with the proposal, it will specify its

(a)

reasons.

Bona Fide

Agreement

If Dealer has entered into a bona fide written buy/sel
agreement, the purchase price andjather terms of sal<
12 2 A

Any material change in Dealer's pro-

will be those *»•*forthIn sugh agr^m^nf and any relate*

posal, including change in price, facilities, capitaliza-

documents, unless Dealer, and Division agreeto othe

tion, proposed owners, or dealer operator, will be

terms.

11

Article 12. Changes in Management and Ownersh

Upon Division's request, Dealer agrees to provide all

123A

Assignment

documents relating to the proposed transfer If Dealer

Division's rights under this section may be assigned to

refuses to provide such documentation or state in writing

any third party ("Assignee") If there is an assignment,

that such documents do not exist, it will be presumed that

Division will guarantee full payment of the purchase

the agreement is not bona fide.

pnee by the Assignee. Division shall have the opportunity to discuss the terms of the buy/sell agreement with

(b)

Absence of Bona Fide
Agreement

In the absence of a bona fide written buy/sell
agreement, the purchase price of the dealership assets

a potential Assignee
Division's rights under this Article are binding on and
enforceable against any Assignee or successor in interest
of Dealer or purchaser of Dealer's assets

will be determined by good faith negotiations by Dealer
and Division. If agreement cannot be reached within a
reasonable time, the price and other terms of sale will be

12,3,5

Transfer Involving

established by arbitration according to the rules of the

Family Members and

American Arbitration Association.

Dealer

Management

When the proposed change of ownershipjnyolves a
12.3 J

Consummation

transfer by a dealer owner solely to a member or

Dealer agrees to transfer the property by Warranty

members of his or her immediate family, or to a

Deed, where possible, conveying marketable title free

qualifying member of Dealer's Management, the Divi-

and clear of liens and encumbrances. The Warranty

sion's right of first refusal will not apply An "immediate

Deed will be in proper form for recording and Dealer wil I

family member" shall be the spouse, child, grandchild,

deliver complete possession of the property when the

spouse of a child or grandchild, brother, sister or parent

Deed is delivered Dealer will also furnish copies ot any

of the dealer owner A "qualifying member of Dealer's

easements, licenses or other documents affecting the

Management" shall be an individual who has been

property and assign any permits or licenses necessary for

employed by Dealer for at least two years and otherwise

the conduct of Dealership Operations

qualifies as a dealer operator

ARTICLE 13. BREACHES AND OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY
13.1

Certain Acts or Events

The following acts or events, which are within the
control of Dealer or originate from action taken b>
Dealer or its management or owners, are material
breaches of this Agreement If Division learns that an\ o\
the acts or events has occurred, it may notify the Dealei
in writing. If notified, Dealer will be given the opportunity to respond in writing within 30 days of receipt of

the notice, explaining or correcting the situation to
Division's satisfaction
13.1.1

The removal, resignation, with-

drawal, or elimination from Dealer for any reason of any
Dealer Operator or dealer owner without Division's prior
wntten approval
13.1.2

() 3 Q
Any attempted or actual sale, transfer,

or assign

Dy Dealer of this

13.1.9

cement or any of the

lful failure of Deal

i comply

rights granted Dealer hereunder, or any attempted or

with the provisions of any laws or regulation^ i elating to

actual transfer, assignment or delegation by Dealer of

the sale or service of Products.

any of the responsibilities assumed by it under this
13 J JO

Agreement contrary to the terms of this Agreement.

Submission by Dealer ofjalse a p -

plications or reports, including false orders for PrSduct^
13J.3

Any change, whether voluntary or

or reports of delivery or transfer of Products.'

involuntary, in the record or beneficial ownership of
Dealer as set forth in the Dealer Statement of Ownership

13.LU

Failure of Dealer to maintain the

line of credit required by ArticleTlO.

furnished by Dealer, unless permitted by Article 12.2.5
or pursuant to Division's written approval.

13 J .12

Failufe of Dealer to timely pay its

obligations to General Motors.
13.1.4

Any undertaking by Dealer or any of
13.1.13

its owners to conduct, either directly or indirectly, any of
the Dealership Operations at any unapproved location.

Mj^jbthei^matert^b^aill? of^

Dealer's obligations under this ^greemem;tl6tl0therwise identified in this Article 13 or in Article 14.'

13.1.5

Any sale, transfer, relinquishment, or

discontinuance of use by Dealer of any of the Dealership
Premises or other principal assets required in the conduct
of the Dealership Operations, without Division's prior
written approval.

If Dealer's response demonstrates that the breach has
been corrected, or otherwise explains the circumstances
to Division's satisfaction, then Division shall confirm
this fact in writing to Dealer
If, however, Dealer's response does not demonstrate
that the breach has been corrected, or explain the

13.1.6

Any dispute among the owners or

management personnel of Dealer which, in Division's
opinion, may adversely affect the Dealership Operations
or the interests of Dealer or Division.
13.1.7

Refusal by Dealer to timely furnish

circumstances to Division's .satisfaction, termination is
warranted and Division may terminate this Agreement
upon written notice to Dealer. Termination will be
effective 60 days following Dealer's receipt of the notice.
13.2j

Failure of Performance by Dealer

sales, service or financial information and related

If Division determines that Dealer's Premises are not

supporting data, or to permit Division's examination or

acceptable, or that Dealer has failed to adequately

audit of Dealer's accounts and records.

perform its sales or service responsibilities, including
those responsibilities relating to customer satisfaction

13.1.8

A finding by a government agency or

court of original jurisdiction or a settlement arising from

and training, Division will review such failure with
Dealer.

charges that Dealer, or a predecessor of Dealer owned or

As soon as practicable thereafter, Division will notify

controlled by the same person, had committed a misde-

Dealer in writing of the nature of Dealer's failure and of

meanor or unfair or deceptive business practice which, in

the period of time (which shall not be less than six

Division's opinion, may adversely affect the reputation

months) during which Dealer will have the opportunity

or interests of Dealer or Division.

to correct the failure.

Article 13. Breaches and Opportunity to Remedy

W-f

If Dealer does correct the failure by the expiration of

expiration of the period, Division may terminate this

the period, Division will so advise the Dealer in writing.

Agreement by giving Dealer 90 days advance written

If, however, Dealer does not correct the failure by the

notice.

ARTICLE 14. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
14.1

By Dealer

Dealer has the right to terminate this Agreement

Dealer written notice of termination. Termination will be
effective on the date specified in the notice.

without cause .at any time upon written notice to
Division. Termination will be effective 30 days after

14.5.1

Conviction in a court of original juris-

Division's receipt of the notice, unless otherwise mutu-

diction of Dealer, or a predecessor of Dealer owned or

ally agreed in writing.

controlled by the same person, or any Dealer Operator or
dealer owner of any felony.

14.2

By Agreement

This Agreement may be terminated at any time by
written agreement between Division and Dealer.
Termination assistance will apply only as specified in
the written termination agreement.
14.3

Failure to be Licensed

If Division or Dealer fails to secure or maintain any
license required for the performance of obligations under
this Agreement or such license is suspended or revoked,
either party may immediately terminate this Agreement

14.5.2

Insolvency of Dealer, or filing by or

against Dealer of a petition in bankruptcy; or filing of a
proceeding for the appointment of a receiver or trustee
for Dealer, provided such filing or appointment is not
dismissed or vacated within thirty days; or execution by
Dealer of an assignment for the benefit of creditors or any
foreclosure or other due process of law whereby a third
party acquires rights to the operation, ownership or
assets of Dealer.

by giving the other party written notice.
14.53
14.4

Incapacity of Dealer Operator

Because this is a Personal Services Agreement,

Failure of Dealer to conduct custom-

ary sales and service operations during customary
business hours for seven consecutive business days.

Division may terminate this Agreement by written
notice to Dealer if Dealer Operator is so physically or

14.5.4

Any misrepresentation to General

mentally incapacitated that the Dealer Operator is unable

Motors by Dealer or b> any Dealer Operator or owner in

to actively exercise full managerial authority. The

applying for this Agreement, or in identifying the Dealer

effective date of termination will be stated in such

Operator, or record or beneficial ownership of Dealer.

written notice and will be not less than three months after
receipt of such notice.

14.5.5

Submission by Dealer of false applica-

tions or claims for any payment, credit, discount, or
14.5

Acts or Events

allowance, including false applications in connection

If Division learns that any of the following has

with incentive activities, where the false information was

occurred, it may terminate this Agreement by giving

submitted to generate a payment to Dealer for a claim

which wou. . ot otherwise have

lified for payment.

Termination for failure to correct other breaches will
be according to the procedures outlined in Article 13.
14.6

Provision

The terminating party may select the provision under
which it elects to terminate without reference in its notice
to any other provision that may also be applicable. The
terminating party subsequently also may assert other
grounds for termination.
Transactions After
14.7.1

.ase Dealer from the

dtion to

pay for Special Vehicles if Division has begun processing such orders prior to the effective date of termination.

14.72 Termination Deliveries

Reliance on Any Applicable
Termination

14.7

owing the other, noi

If this Agreement is voluntarily terminated by Dealer
or expires or is terminated because of the death or
incapacity of a Dealer Operator or death of a Dealer
Owner, without a termination or expiration deferral,
Division will use its best efforts consistent with its
distribution procedures to furnish Dealer with Motor
Vehicles to fill Dealer's bona fide retail orders on hand

Termination

Effect on Orders

If Dealer and Division do not enter into a new Dealer
Agreement when this Agreement expires or is termi-

on the effective date of termination or expiration, not to
exceed, however, the total number of Motor Vehicles
invoiced to Dealer for retail sale during the three months
immediately preceding the effective date of termination.

nated, all of Dealer's outstanding orders for Products

14.7.3

will be automatically cancelled except as provided in this

Effect of Transactions

After

Termination

Article 14.7.

Neither the sale of Products to Dealer nor any other act

Termination of this Agreement will not release Dealer
or Division from the obligation to pay any amounts

by Division or Dealer after termination of this Agreement will be construed as a waiver of the termination.

ARTICLE 15. TERMINATION ASSISTANCE
15.1

Deferral of Effective Date

Division does not offer Dealer or a replacement dealer

If this Agreement is scheduled to expire or terminate

that has substantially the same ownership (more than 50

because of the death or incapacity of a Dealer Operator or

percent including total family ownership) a new Dealer

the death of a Dealer Owner and Dealer requests an

Agreement, Division will offer to purchase the following

extension of the effective date of expiration or termina-

items of personal property (herein called Eligible Items)

tion thirty days prior to such date, Division will defer the

trom Dealer at the prices indicated:

elective date for up to a total of eighteen months after

(a) New and unused Motor Vehicles of the

such death or incapacity occurs to assist Dealer in

current model year purchased by Dealer from

winding up its Dealership Operations.

Division at a price equal to the net prices and
charges that were paid to General Motors;

15.2

Purchase of Personal Property
15.2.1

Division's

(b) Any signs owned by Dealer of a type

Obligations

recommended in writing by Division and bearing

If this Agreement expires or is terminated and

any Marks at a price agreed upon by Division'and

(133
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Article 15. Termination Assistance

Dealer. If Division and Dealer cannot agree on a

request pertaining to eligible Motor Vehicles. Dealer will

price, they will select a third party who will set the

deliver the eligible Motor Vehicles to a destination

price;

determined by Division that will be in a reasonable

(c) Any essential tools recommended by Divi-

proximity to Dealer's Premises.

sion and designed specifically for service of Motor

Within two months following the effective date of

Vehicles that Division offered for sale during the

termination or expiration of this Agreement, Dealer will

three years preceding termination at prices estab-

mail or deliver to General Motors a complete and

lished in accordance with the applicable pricing

separate list of each of the Eligible Items other than

formula in the Service Policies and Procedures

Motor Vehicles. Dealer will retain the Eligible Items

Manual; and

until receipt of written shipping instructions from

' (d) Unused and undamaged Parts and Accesso-

General Motors. Within thirty days after receipt of

ries that (i) are still-in the original, resalable

instructions, Dealer will ship the Eligible Items, trans-

merchandising packages and in unbroken lots (in

portation charges prepaid, to the destinations specified

the case of sheet metal, a comparable substitute for

in the instructions.

the original package may be used); (ii) are listed for

Dealer will take action and execute and deliver such

sale in the then current Dealer Parts and Accesso-

instruments as necessary to (a) convey to Division and

ries Price Schedules (except ''discontinued" or

General Motors good and marketable title to all Eligible

"replaced" Parts and Accessories); and (iii) were

Items to be purchased, (b) comply with the requirements

purchased by Dealer either directly from General

of any applicable state law relating to bulk sales or

Motors or from an outgoing dealer as a part of

transfer, and (c) satisfy and discharge any liens or

Dealer's initial Parts and Accessories inventory.

encumbrances on Eligible Items prior to their delivery to

Prices will be those dealer prices in effect at the

Division and General Motors.

time General Motors receives the Parts and Accessories, less any applicable allowances whether or
not any such allowances were made to Dealer when
Dealer purchased the Parts and Accessories. In
addition, an allowance of five percent of dealer
price for packing costs and reimbursement for
transportation charges to the destination specified
by General Motors will be credited to Dealer's
account.
152.2

15.2.3

Payment

Subject to Article 17.10, Division will pay for the
Eligible Items as soon as practicable following their
delivery to the specified destinations. Pa\ment may be
made directly to anyone having a secuntv or ownership
interest in the Eligible Items.
If Division has not paid Dealer for the Eligible Trerp^
within two months after delivery, and if Dealer has
fulfilled its termination obligations under this Agree-

Dealer's

Responsibilities

ment, Division will, at Dealer's wntten request, estimate

Division's obligation to purchase Eligible Items is

the purchase price of the unpaid Eligible Items and all

bject to Dealer fulfilling its responsibility under this

other amounts owed Dealer by General Motors. After

bsection.

deducting the amounts estimated to be owing General

Within fifteen days following the effective date of

Motors and its subsidiaries by Dealer, Division will

mination or expiration of this Agreement, Dealer will

advance Dealer 75 percent of the net amount owed

rnish Division with a list of vehicle identification

Dealer and will pay the balance, if any, as soon as

mbers and such other information as Division may

practicable thereafter.

/,

0 fi

< assignment of.

its

locating a lessee who

offer to lease the Pr'

es. If

j ^ B j ^ f s i o n has decided to appoint a replacement dealer

Division does not locate a purchaser or lessee within a

B p & l e r ' s location, Dealer may sell its Eligible Items

reasonable time, Division will itself either purchase or, at

Bl&fapproved in writing by Division, assign its rights

its option, lease the Premises for a reasonable term at a

B ^ p k k Article 15.2 to a designated replacement

reasonable rent If the cause of termination or expiration;

RpSefprovided the replacement dealer assumes Dealer's

is a death or the incapacity of the Dealer Operator,

Obligations under this Article.

Division may instead pay Dealer a sum equal to a
reasonable rent for a period of twelve months imme-

W>31? Assistance on Premises
WmW IS3.1

Division's

Obligation

diately following the effective date of termination or
expiration of this Agreement.

KSubject to Article 17.10, Division agrees to give
pealer assistance in disposing of the Premises if (i) this
^Agreement expires for any reason or is terminated by
rDivision under Articles 13.2 or 14.4 and (ii) Dealer is not
goffered a new Dealer Agreement. Such assistance shall

75 J J

Leased Premises

Division will provide assistance on leased Premises by
either:
(a)

locating a tenant(s), satisfactory to lessor,

be given only on Premises that are described in the

who will sublet for the balance of the lease or

Location and Premises Addendum and only if:

assume it; or

(a)

they are used solely for Dealership Opera-

tions (or similar dealership operations under agreements with other Divisions of General Motors

(b)

arranging with the lessor for the cancella-

tion of the lease without penalty to Dealer, or.
(e)

reimbursing Dealer for the lesser of the

which will be terminated simultaneously with this

rent specified in the lease or settlement agreement

Agreement); and

or a reasonable rent for a period equal to the lesser

(b)

they are not substantially in excess of space

of twelve months from the effective date or

requirements at the time of termination or, if they

termination or expiration of the balance of the lease

are substantially in excess, they became excessive

term.

because of a reduction in the requirements applicable to Dealer's facilities.

Upon request, Dealer will use its best efforts to effect a
settlement of the lease with the lessor subject to

Any Dealer request for such assistance must be in

Division's prior approval of the terms. Division is not

writing and received by Division within thirty days of the

obligated to reimburse Dealer for rent for any month

expiration or termination of this Agreement.

during which the Premises are occupied by Dealer or

Premises that consist of more than one parcel of
property or more than one building, each of which is

anyone else after the first month following the effective
date, of termination or expiration.

separately usable, distinct and apart from the whole or
any other part with appropriate ingress or egress, shall be
considered separately under this Article 15.3.

153.4

Rent and Price

Division and Dealer will fix the amount of a reasonable rent and a reasonable price for the Premises by

153.2

Owned Premises

Division will provide assistance on owned Premises
by either (a) locating a purchaser who will offer to
purchase the Premises at a reasonable price, or (b)

agreement at the time Dealer requests assistance. The
factors to be considered in fixing those amounts are:
(a)

the adequacy and desirability of the Prem-

ises for a dealership operation; and
Article 15. Termination A^Hstince

(b)

the fair market value of the Premises. If

without cost to Dealer;

Division and Dealer cannot agree, the fair market

(c)

value will be determined by the median appraisal

refuses to use its best efforts to effect a

settlement when requested by Division, or

of three qualified real estate appraisers, of whom

(d)

refuses

to

permit

Division

to

Dealer and Division will each select one and the

examine Dealer's books and records if necessary to

two selected will select the third. The cost of

venfy claims of Dealer under this Article

appraisals will be shared equally by Dealer and
Division.

Any amount payable by Division as rental reimbursement or reasonable rent shall be proportionately reduced
if the Premises are leased or sold to another party dunng

153.5

Limitations on Obligation to

the period for which such amount is payable Payment of

Provide

rental reimbursement or reasonable rent is waived by

Assistance

Division will not be obligated to provide assistance on

Dealer if it does not file its claim therefor withm two

Premises if Dealer

months after the expiration of the period covered by the

(a)

payment Upon request, Dealer will support its claim

fails to accept a bona fide offer from a

prospective purchaser, sublessee or assignee;
(b)

refuses to execute a settlement agreement

with satisfactory evidence of its accuracy and
reasonableness.

with the lessor if the agreement would be

ARTICLE 16. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
Division and Dealer agree that mutual respect, trust

develop between Dealer and Division may be resolved

and confidence are vital to the relationship between

amicably, Division and Dealer agree to resolve disputes

Division and Dealer. So that such respect, trust and

in accordance with the Dispute Resolution Process, a

confidence can be maintained, and differences that may

copy of which has been provided to Dealer

ARTICLE 17. GENERAL PROVISIONS
17J

No Agent or Legal Representative

responsible for all expenditures liabilities and obliga-

Status

tions incurred or assumed b> Dealer tor the establish-

This Agreement does not make either party the agent

ment and conduct ot its operations

or legal representative of the other tor any purpose, nor
does it grant either party authority to assume or create

173

Taxes

any obligation on behalf of or in the name of the others

Dealer is responsible for all local, state, federal, or

No fiduciary obligations are created by this Agreement

other applicable taxes and tax returns related to its
dealership business and will hold General Motors

17.2

Responsibility for Operations

Except as provided in this Agreement, Dealer is solely

harmless from any related claims or demands made by
any taxing authority
(I1R

17.4)

Indemnification

by 6

jral Motors

nification.' ' The ob. w .dons assumed by Ge

Motors

General Motors will assume the defense of Dealer and

are limited b those specifically described in this Article

indemnify Dealer against any judgment for monetary

and in the Service Policies and Procedures Manual and

damages or rescission of contract, less any offset

are conditioned upon compliance by Dealer witluthe,

recovered by Dealer, in any lawsuit naming Dealer as a

procedures described in the Manual. This Article shall

defendant relating to any Product that has not been

not affect any right either party may have to seek

altered when the lawsuit concerns:

indemnification or contribution under any other contract
or by law and such rights are hereby expressly preserved,

\lfA.ly

Breach of the General Motors warran-

ty related to the Product, bodily injury or property

17.5

Trademarks and Service Marks

damage claimed to have been caused solely by a defect in

General Motors or affiliated companies are the

the design, manufacture, or assembly of a Product by

exclusive owners or licensees of the various trademarks,

General Motors (other than a defect which should have

service marks, names and designs (Marks) used in

been detected by Dealer in a reasonable inspection of the

connection with Products and services.

Product);

Dealer is granted the non-exclusive right to display
Marks in the form and manner approved by Division in

/f 17.4.2 ) Failure of the Product to conform to

the conduct of its dealership business. Dealer agrees to

the description set forth in advertisements or product

permit any designated representative of Division upon

brochures distributed by General Motors because of

the Premises during regular business hours to inspect

changes in standard equipment or material component

Products or services in connection with Marks.

parts unless Dealer received notice of the changes prior

Dealer will not apply to register any Marks either

to retail delivery of the affected Product by Dealer; or

alone or as part of another mark, and will not take any
action which may adversely affect the validity of the

(f 17.4.3 J Any substantial damage to a Product

Marks or the goodwill associated with them.

purchased by Dealer from General Motors which has

Dealer agrees to purchase and sell goods bearing

been repaired by General Motors unless Dealer has been

Marks only from parties authorized or licensed by

notified of the repair prior to retail delivery of the

Division or General Motors.

affected Product.

Marks may be used as part of the Dealer's name with
Division's written approval.

If General Motors reasonably concludes that allegations other than those set forth in 17.4 J , 17.4.2, or 17.4.3

Dealer agrees to change or discontinue the use of any
Marks upon Division's request.

above are being pursued in the lawsuit, General Motors

Dealer agrees that no company owned by or affiliated

shall have the right to decline to accept the defense or

with Dealer or any of its owners may use any Mark

indemnify dealer or, after accepting the defense, to

to identify a business without Division's written

transfer the defense back to Dealer and withdraw its

permission.

agreement to indemnify Dealer.

Upon termination of this Agreement, Dealer agrees to

Procedures for requesting indemnification, ad-

immediately discontinue, at its expense, all use of

ministrative details, and limitations are contained in the

Marks. Thereafter, Dealer will not use, either directly or

Service Policies and Procedures Manual under "Indem-

indirectly, any Marks or any other confusingly similar

Article 17. General Provisions

- marks in a manner that Division determines is likely to
cause confusion or mistake or deceive the public.
- Dealer will reimburse Division for all legal fees and
other expenses incurred in connection with action to

17.9

No Third Party Benefit

Intended

This Agreement is not enforceable by any third parties
and is not intended to convey any rights or benefits to
anyone who is not a party to this Agreement.

require Dealer to comply with this Article 17.5.
17.10
17.6

Notices

Any notice required to be given by either party to the
other in connection with this Agreement will be in
writing and delivered personally or by first class or
express mail or by facsimile. Notices to Dealer will be
directed to Dealer or its representatives at Dealer's
principal place of business and, except for indemnifica-

Accounts

Payable

All monies or accounts due Dealer are net of Dealer's
indebtedness to Division, General Motors and its subsidiaries. In addition, Division may deduct any amounts
due or to become due from Dealer to Division or General
Motors, or any amounts held by Division, from any sums
or accounts due or to become due from Division, General
Motors or its subsidiaries.

tion requests made pursuant to Article 17.4, notices by
Dealer will be directed to the appropriate Zone or Branch
Manager of the Division(s) of General Motors.
17.7

No Implied Waivers

The delay or failure of either party to require
performance by the other party or the waiver by either
party of a breach of any provision of this Agreement will
not affect the right to subsequently require such
performance.

17.11

Sole Agreement

of Parties

Except as provided in this Agreement, Division has
made no promises to Dealer, Dealer Operator, or dealer
owner and there are no other agreements or understandings, either oral or written, between the parties affecting
this Agreement or relating to any of the subject matters
covered by this Agreement.
Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement
cancels and supersedes all previous agreements between

17.8

Assignment of Rights or Delegation

the parties that relate to any matters covered herein,

of Duties

except as to any monies which may be owing between

-Dealer has not paid any fee for this Agreement.
Neither this Agreement nor any right granted by this
Agreement is a property right.

the parties.
No agreement between Division and Dealer which
relates to matters covered herein, and no change in,

Except as provided in Article 12, neither this Agree-

addition to ("except the filling in of blank lines) or erasure

ment nor the rights or obligations of Dealer may be sold,

of any printed portion of this Agreement, will be binding

assigned, delegated or otherwise transferred.

unless permitted under the terms of this Agreement or

Division may assign this Agreement and any rights, or

related documents, or approved in a written agreement

delegate any obligations, under this Agreement to any

executed as set forth in Division's Dealer Sales and

affiliated or successor company, and will provide Dealer

Service Agreement.

written notice of such assignment or delegation. Such
assignment or delegation shall not relieve Division of
liability for the performance of its obligations under this
Agreement.

17.12

Applicable

Law

This agreement is governed by the laws of the State of
Michigan. However, if performance under this Agree-

mtnt is ille

iaer a valid law of

jurisdiction where

tsiich performance is to take place, performance will be
%

'rnodified to the minimum extent necessary to comply
fewith

such law if it was effective as of the effective date of

'this Agreement.

ment in the superse

form for a term of i

**?$ than

the unexpired term of this Agreement.
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the rights and
obligations of Dealer that may otherwise become applicable upon termination or expiration of the term of this
Agreement shall not be applicable if Division and Dealer

1713

Superseding Dealer Agreements

If Division offers a superseding form of dealer
agreement to Division's dealers generally at any time

execute a superseding dealer agreement, and the matured rights and obligations of the parties hereunder shall
continue under the new agreement.

prior to expiration of this Agreement, Division may

Dealer's performance under any prior agreement may

terminate this Agreement by prior written notice to

be considered in an evaluation of Dealer's performance

Dealer, provided Division offers Dealer a dealer agree-

under this or any succeeding agreement.

Article 17 General Provisions

03§

GLOSSARY
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

Area of Primary Responsibility-The geographic area designated by Division from time to time in a
Notice of Area of Primary Responsibility.
Dealer - The corporation, partnership or proprietorship that signs the Dealer Agreement with
Division.
Dealer Agreement - The Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, including the Agreement proper that
is executed, the Standard Provisions, all of the related Addenda, the Accounting and Service Policies
and Procedures Manuals, and the Terms of Sale Bulletins.
Dealership Operations - All operations contemplated by the Dealer Agreement. These operations
include the sale and service of Products and any other activities undertaken by Dealer related to
Products, including rental and leasing operations, used vehicle sales and body shop operations and
finance and insurance operations whether conducted directly or indirectly by Dealer.
Division - The unit of General Motors Corporation that has entered into a Dealer Agreement with
Dealer authorizing it to market and service Division's Motor Vehicles.
General Motors - General Motors Corporation.
Motor Vehicles - All current model types or series of new motor vehicles specified in any Motor
Vehicle Addendum and all past General Motors motor vehicles marketed through Motor Vehicle
Dealers.
Products - Motor Vehicles, Parts and Accessories.
Service Policies and Procedures Manual - The Manual issued periodically which details certain
administrative and performance requirements for Dealer service under the Dealer Agreement.
Special Vehicles - Motor Vehicles that have limited marketability because they differ from standard
specifications or incorporate special equipment.
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Tab 2

1

Q

ACCORDING TO YOUR COMPLAINT, I THINK YOU

2

INDICATE THAT IN APPROXIMATELY MAY OF 1992 SIERRA BUICK

3

FAILED TO OPEN ITS DOORS FOR BUSINESS AND UNDER THE TERMS

4

OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE DEALER SALES AND SERVICE AGREEMENT

5

BUICK ADVISED HELSCO BY LETTER THAT THE SALES AND SERVICE

6

AGREEMENT COULD BE TERMINATED.

7

RECOLLECTION?

DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR

8

A

YES, 1992.

9

Q

HAD YOU HAD ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH ANYONE ABOUT

10

THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION PRIOR TO THAT TIME OF APPLYING

11

—

12

BECAME AVAILABLE?

NOT ACQUIRING BUT APPLYING FOR THE BUICK POINT IF IT

13

A

SOMETIME IN 1992 I HAD CONVERSATIONS.

14

Q

WHO WITH?

15

A

I CALLED THE BUICK ZONE OFFICE AND ASKED THEM

16

IF THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF PURCHASING THAT POINT.

17

Q

APPLYING FOR THAT POINT?

18

A

YES.

19

Q

WHEN YOU SAY PURCHASE, YOU DON'T PURCHASE

20

SALES AND SERVICE AGREEMENTS, YOU APPLY FOR THEM AND THEY

21

ARE EITHER ACCEPTED OR DECLINED, ISN'T THAT CORRECT?

22

A

WELL, THERE IS TWO PARTS TO THAT.

YOU APPLY

23

FOR THEM BUT YOU DO HAVE TO STRIKE SOME PURCHASE

24

AGREEMENT.

25

Q

WITH THE OLD OWNER?
31

1

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

2

Q

BUT YOU DON'T PAY ANYTHING TO GENERAL MOTORS

3

CORPORATION FOR THE DEALER SALES AND SERVICE AGREEMENTS

4

PER SE?

5

A

NO, SIR.

6

Q

WHO DID YOU TALK WITH AT THE ZONE OFFICE ABOUT

8

A

I BELIEVE IT WAS THE ZONE MANAGER, TOM GAROVE.

9

Q

THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN BEFORE THE MAY 1992 TIME

7

THAT?

10

PERIOD WHEN SIERRA BUICK FAILED TO OPEN ITS DOORS FOR

11

BUSINESS?

12

A

COULD HAVE BEEN, YES.

13

Q

LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT WILL BE MARKED AS

14

DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NUMBER 3 AND ASK IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY

15

IT FOR ME, PLEASE.

16

(DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. 3 WAS MARKED

17

FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

18

A

I DO RECOGNIZE THIS.

19

Q

DO YOU RECALL SPEAKING TO MR. GAROVE BEFORE

20

YOU WROTE THIS LETTER ABOUT THE BUICK POINT IN OGDEN,

21

UTAH

—

22

A

YES, SIR.

23

Q

—

A

YES.

24
25

CURRENTLY HELD BY SIERRA BUICK AT THIS

TIME?

32

1
2

Q

HOW MANY CONVERSATIONS DID YOU HAVE WITH MR.

GAROVE PRIOR TO THIS LETTER BEING SENT?

3

A

I BELIEVE JUST ONE.

4

Q

CAN YOU RECALL WHAT WAS SAID AND BY WHOM

5
6

DURING THAT —
A

I GUESS IT WAS A TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION.

YES.

HE WAS VERY POLITE TO ME, LET ME KNOW

7

THAT PRESENTLY THEY HAD A SALES AND SERVICE AGREEMENT

8

WITH A DEALER IN OGDEN, UTAH AND INVITED ME TO UPDATE HIS

9

FILE OR SEND SOMETHING TO HIM AND THAT WAS THE PURPOSE

10
11

FOR THIS LETTER.
Q

HE ALSO PROBABLY TOLD YOU, DIDN'T HE, THAT HE

12

COULDN'T REALLY TALK TOO MUCH ABOUT THAT DEALERSHIP OR

13

ITS FUTURE BECAUSE THEY HAD A CURRENT DEALER?

14

ADVISE YOU OF THAT AS WELL?

DIDN'T HE

15

A

YES, HE DID.

16

Q

IN FACT, IT'S THE POLICY OF GENERAL MOTORS

17

CORPORATION, WHEN THEY HAVE AN EXISTING DEALER, NOT TO

18

TALK ABOUT THAT EXISTING DEALER WITH OTHER DEALERS, ISN'T

19

THAT CORRECT?

20

A

THAT IS THE POLICY.

21

Q

THAT'S USUALLY FOLLOWED, AT LEAST BASED ON

22

YOUR EXPERIENCE?

23

A

YES, I DO THINK SO.

24

Q

THIS LETTER, EXHIBIT 3, WAS PRECIPITATED BY

25

YOUR TELEPHONE CALL WITH MR. GAROVE, IS THAT CORRECT?
33

1

A

YES.

2

Q

IN FACT, THAT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

3

APPARENTLY OCCURRED THE WEEK BEFORE MARCH 30 OF 1992,

4

ACCORDING TO EXHIBIT 3, IS THAT CORRECT?

5

A

YES.

6

Q

HAD YOU TALKED WITH ANYONE ELSE ABOUT APPLYING

7

FOR THAT BUICK POINT, IF IT BECAME AVAILABLE, WITH ANYONE

8

ELSE AT BUICK BESIDES MR. GAROVE PRIOR TO MARCH 30 OF

9

1992?

10

A

NO, SIR.

11

Q

HAD YOU TALKED WITH ANYBODY ABOUT ACQUIRING

12
13

THAT BUICK POINT PRIOR TO MARCH 30 OF 1992?
A

I THINK I TALKED TO MY PARTNER, MERRILL BEAN,

14

OF OUR —

OF THE POTENTIAL INTEREST IN HAVING ANOTHER

15

FRANCHISE IN THIS BUILDING.

16

Q

THE REASON FOR THAT WAS YOU HAD THE SPACE?

17

A

YES.

18

Q

BECAUSE YOU HAD ALREADY SOLD THE OTHER THREE

19

LINES THAT WE TALKED ABOUT PREVIOUSLY.

20

A

YES, SIR.

21

Q

YOU THOUGHT BUICK WOULD COMPLEMENT THE

22

CHEVROLET LINE THAT YOU KEPT?

23

A

YES.

24

Q

ANY OTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH ANYBODY ELSE

25

BESIDES YOUR BUSINESS PARTNER, MR. GAROVE, ABOUT THE
34

1

Garove

17

2

about whether or not they could make application for this

3

franchise, to your recollection?

4

A

Prior to this proposal?

5

Q

Either prior to that proposal or concurrent

6

with that proposal, in that same time period.

7

MR. STEPHENS:

Prior to Exhibit 2 or

8

concurrent with Exhibit 2.

9

A

You know, it's hard to recall conversations,

10

but I would guess that somewhere in the course of

11

considering this proposal there were other inquiries,

12

yes.

13
14
15

Q

And what did you do with those other

inquiries?
A

Well, if they were verbal, I simply advised

16

the inquirer that we currently had a dealer in place and

17

in business in Ogden, Utah and that I was not at liberty

18

to discuss any opportunities with them.

19
20

Q

Is that the general policy of General Motors

where you have an application that's been made?

21

A

Yes, sir.

22

Q

At what point do you feel that you are then

23
24
25

free to accept other applications from other parties?
MR. STEPHENS:

If the application originally

is rejected or accepted?

I don't understand your

ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK
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1
2

Garove
question.

3
4

18

MR. BEAN:
Q

Whichever way they go.

If the application is accepted, then I

5

assume no other applicants are considered; is that a fair

6

statement?

7

A

Certainly.

8

Q

And if the application is rejected, then you

9

are then in a position to accept other applications; is

10

that correct?

11

A

Certainly, yes.

12

Q

At what point in that rejection process do

13
14

you feel that you are free to accept other applications?
A

Well, that would be after our existing

15

dealer is formally notified in writing that he is -- his

16

proposal has been rejected.

17

Q

So, you would not make contact then or allow

18

some other dealer to make contact with you about whether

19

or not a franchise was available until you formally

20

notified the applicant that his application had been

21

rejected; is that correct?

22

A

That's correct.

23

Q

Are there written guidelines that are used

24

by zone managers to determine the qualifications of an

25

applicant for a Buick franchise?
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it did not come out of the zone

where you're —

office

where you go to work?

MR. STEPHENS:
THE WITNESS:
MR. BEAN:

Objection; calls

for

speculation.

I don't know.

Q.

Mr. Woodley,

is there a policy

practice within Buick Division of General

Motors

Corporation

that when a dealer has submitted

application

for a sales and service

Motors will not entertain

an

agreement,

applications

from

by rejecting

the

the sales and service agreement

Objection; the question

in using the term "policy

Would you break

or

is

or practice."

it down, please.

MR. BEAN:
understanding

of,

application?

MR. STEPHENS:
compound

General

anyone

else until that application has been disposed
either by granting

or

Q.

Any type of

common

—

MR. STEPHENS:

Objection; vague as to

"common

understanding. "
MR. BEAN:

Q.

Do you understand

the nature of my

question?
A.

No, I don't.

Q.

Do you know or have you discussed

with

anyone, any employee of Buick Motor Division, a
practice or an understanding within the
when a dealer application

industry

is pending, you

_

that

don't
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discuss or entertain that application

or any

application

the

pending

has been disposed

until

application

of?

MR. STEPHENS:

Object; the q u e s t i o n

is compound.

MR. BEAN:

Do you understand

question?

A.
it,

for that dealership

other

Q.

I don't understand

I don't understand

the

my

"industry" part of

it.

MR. STEPHENS:

He's asking

MR. BEAN:

I'm

for discussions

about

that .

discussions

Q.

saying, are you privy

or understanding

among

to any

the employees

Buick Motor Division that when an application
sales and service agreement
received,

is p e n d i n g , has

that Buick Motor Division

not consider

application

handling

as

It's my u n d e r s t a n d i n g

that we woul

two applications at the same t i m e .

MR. BEAN:

A.

Object to the question

compound.

THE W I T N E S S :

is that

application

of?

MR. STEPHENS:
definitely

discuss

applications

from any other parties until the pending
is d isposed

for a

been

will not

that application, nor will they receive

of

Q.

And where somebody

while another application

wants to make
is p e n d i n g ,

how

handled?
Normally

it would not be —

we would

not be

two applications at the same t i m e .
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m
x
x

w

Q.

What

to m a k e

you

say

to

the

other

party

wanting

m
x

application?

A.
the

do

Normally

selling

5 \

that

conversation

would

happen

with

io

ro

party.

Q.

Between

you

A.

Yes, between

Q.

And

what

and

do

the

selling

party?

5?

—
you

mean

tell

a selling

party

that

you

else

until

application

by

that?

can't

Would

look

at

you

i\

m
x
X

anyone

5 I
the

buy-and-sell

agreement

been

one

handled
A.

way

Normally

that's

or

we

that's

there

in y o u r

and

the

possession

has

another?

would

inform

the

seller

that

the
Oi

practice

would

be

not

to

evaluate

two

applications

at

onetime.
Q.
and

Do

any

registration

do

you

review

to

Buick
A.
Q.

Yes,
Are
sales

Motors

with

which

No,

Q.

--

A.

Any

would

you

I'm

or

to

CSI

or

through
read

those

retail

you;

them

sales

that

with

is,

respect

zone?

the

reports

summary

for

of

CSI

and

Petersen

would

now

m

would

have
be

those
at

the

reports
zone

now?

office,

i

m
x
X
CD
-I
CD

m
x
X

Denver.

w
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reports.

with

Buick

of

Francisco

registration

reports
in

San

read

sales?

be

come

familiar

regard

A.

reports

reports

in t h e

I do

and

the

summaries

those

dealers

retail
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Tab 3

1
2

Garove
Q

34

I'm talking about the agreement for sale of

3

assets that was made between John Watson Chevrolet and

4

Helsco, Inc. d/b/a Sierra Buick.

5

A

6

referring to.

7

Q

And were you aware?

8

A

But I'm not -- the date is unclear to me.

9

Yes, I'm aware of it, the agreement you are

believe it was sometime in late August, September.

10

MR. STEPHENS:

11

THE WITNESS:

12

Q

The buy-sell agreement?
The buy-sell agreement.

Prior to that buy-sell agreement, did your

13

investigation show whether or not Sierra Buick was still

14

doing business, and if not, what did you do about that?

15

That's what I'm trying to ascertain.

16
17
18

I

A

All our investigations showed that they were

doing business.
Q

Was a letter of termination ever sent to

19

Sierra Buick indicating that their franchise was going to

20

be terminated?

21

A

No.

22

Q

You are not aware of it?

23

A

Not as a result of those investigations.

24
25

MR. STEPHENS:

You used the term

"franchise," David, and I'm not going to object to
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1

Garove

2

many reasons in the normal course of business after they

3

have been submitted to us for consideration.

4

Q

3

I guess that's my question.

That goes to

5

the heart of my question.

In those kinds of situations

6

you've just described, normally you have a dealer in

7

place that's continuing to function; is that correct?

8

A

Correct.

9

Q

And in this case, is it possible that Sierra

10

Buick was not continuing to function, that they were not

11

selling new cars?

12

MR. STEPHENS:

Objection.

His testimony was

13

that it was his belief they were continuing to do

14

business and selling cars.

15

MR. BEAN:

Yes, I'm just reconfirming that

16

and saying is it possible that you are mistaken

17

that they were not selling cars at this time.

18
19

MR. STEPHENS:

Do you have any knowledge

that they were not doing business?

20

THE WITNESS:

21

that, no.

22

Q

I don't have any knowledge of

Do you, as the zone manager, get reports of

23

the number of cars, new automobiles, registered in a

24

particular area from a particular point in the state in

25

which that point exists?

Do you follow my question?
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elsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle
520 Wall Avenue
gden, Utah 84403
TTENTION:

Mr. David Koch, VP/General Manager

entlemen:
fcfective November 1, 1990, Buick Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, and
elsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle entered into a General Motors Corporation
ealer Sales and Service Agreement (Dealers Agreement) which authorized you to
onduct dealership operations at premises located at 3520 Wall Avenue, Ogden, Utah.
ur observation and investigation indicates that you have failed to maintain
tjstoxnary sales and service operations for at least seven (7) consecutive business
ays. This constitutes grounds for immediate termination pursuant to the Dealer
greement and is grounds for termination pursuant to state lav.
Article 14.5.3 of your Dealer Agreement provides in pertinent part:
If Division learns that any of the following has occurred, it may
terminate this Agreement by giving Dealer written notice of
termination. Termination will be effective on the date specified
in the notice.
Failure of Dealer to conduct customary sales and service operations
during customary business hours for seven consecutive business days.
or the reasons stated herein, Buick is hereby terminating the Dealer Agreement
etveen it and Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle. This termination is in
ffectlve sixty (60) days following your receipt of this letter and your status
s an authorized Buick dealer will cease at that time.
incerely.
WICK MOTOR DIVISION
General Motors Corporation

EXHIBTS^X
w

y.

Deft.

Consisting of^ ^

7

**rf

For lcJcmj*lcatJon

/ Puge(s) I

'• £. Garove
assistant Zone Manager
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?ct Henry Mixon
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Tab 4

AGREEMENT FOR SALE AND PURCHASE OF ASSETS

S7—

THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into t h i s ^
SfopK/s-rr. 1992 by and between HELSCO, INC, , an
corporation, dba Sierra Buick Jeep/Eagle Hereinafter
"Seller11) and John Watson Chevrolet/G^Watson), a
corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Purchaser").

day of
Alabama
referred
Delaware

l

y^

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Seller is engaged in business as a Buick automobile dealer
pursuant to a General Motors Sales and Service Agreement-Buick
Division and as a Jeep/Eagle dealer pursuant to a Sales and Service
Agreement with Chrysler Corporation, The said business (located in
Ogden, Utah) may at times hereinafter be referred to as the
"Dealership". The aforementioned sales and service agreement may
at times hereinafter be referred to as the "Franchise Agreements";
and
WHEREAS, Seller is desirous of selling certain specified assets used
in the Dealership business and Purchaser is desirous of purchasing
certain specified assets used in the operation of the Dealership
related to Buick, pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth
herein; and
WHEREAS, the Seller has represented and does hereby represent
that this "Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Assets" is entered into
pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Directors of HELSCO, Inc. and
approved by unanimous consent of the shareholders of the
corporation, a copy of said resolution and consent to be provided to
Purchaser prior to the Closing Date of the transaction; and
WHEREAS, the parties, by this Agreement set forth the purchase
price, terms, and conditions upon which the parties desire to proceed;
and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the purchase price hereinafter
set forth and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt
and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is mutually
agreed by and between the Seller and Purchaser as follows:
1. ASSETS PURCHASED AND PURCHASE PRICE. The Seller agrees to
sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase the following assets ( the
"purchased assets") at the price as established in this paragraph:
a. Parts Inventory. Ail Buick factory parts listed in the Buick
Factory Price Catalog as being current parts on or about the date of
closing shall be purchased by Purchaser. A physical inventory will
be conducted three days prior to the date of closing under this
agreement by representatives of both Buyer and Seller and mutually
agreed to by both Buyer and Seller. Purchaser agrees to purchase
said inventory at current factory catalog prices , to the extent the
parts and accessories are current items in the Buick catalog. It is
specifically agreed that items in parts inventory which are partial
cases, etc. which are not returnable to the factory will be purchased
at mutually-agreed prices, so long as the items are in usable
condition. The purchase price of all inventory items not returnable
to Buick shall be negotiated by and between the parties. If the
parties are unable to reach agreement regarding the value of noncurrent parts, then an appraiser mutually agreeable to the parties
shall be selected to establish the value. The cost of such an appraisal
shall be shared equally by the parties. The purchase price of the
parts inventory shall be adjusted to the date of closing.
An exhibit
to this agreement shall be prepared prior to closing which identifies
the parts and accessories to be purchased and the respective
purchase price individually and in the aggregate.
b. Fixed assets and personal property. The Seller will create
an inventory of fixed assets and personal property of the Dealership,
if any, remaining subsequent to the auction conducted by Zion's Bank
and will provide same to Purchaser. Purchaser agrees to purchase
Buick special tools at Seller's cost and to purchase Buick advertising
materials/showroom display materials at Sellers cost as shown on

Exhibit A to this agreement to be prepared and agreed to prior to
closing, to the extent the advertising materials and displays are
current and usable for 1993 models, Buick special tools and their
related storage containers will be purchased at Seller's cost only to
the extent they are no more than three years old and to the extent
they are usable, full sets. Usable full sets of special tools that are
more than three years old will be purchased by Buyer at mutuallyagreed amounts, provided that if amounts cannot be mutually agreed
upon, the purchase price will be determined by independent
appraisal. Cost of such appraisal to be shared equally by Purchaser
and Seller. Other fixed assets and personal property shall be
purchased at mutually-agreed upon amounts. A listing of assets to
be purchased and amounts to be paid therefor shall be prepared by
the Seller and signed by Purchaser and Seller prior to closing. If
Purchaser and Seller cannot agree on a price, an appraiser mutually
acceptable to the parties shall be selected to establish the value, and
the cost of the appraisal shall be shared equally by the parties. The
purchase price of property which is subject to a security interest of
Zion's Bank or GMAC will be paid to respective lender as provided
herein.
The sum of the items above shall be defined as the "purchase price".
2. PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE. The purchase price, as set forth
above, shall be paid in immediately available funds by Purchaser to
Seller on the closing date. Said payment will be made to the Escrow
Agent hereinafter designated and disbursed by the Escrow Agent to
secured/priority creditors of Seller , including the Internal Revenue
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission, as directed by Seller.
3. CLOSING DATE. The closing date will occur within three business
days of receipt by Purchaser of a General. Motors Sales and Service
Agreement-Buick Division, Provided, however, If closing does not
occur before October 31, 1992, the parties shall be relieved from
performing the terms and conditions of this Agreement and further
relieved from any claims arising hereunder. Provided, however, that

such closing date may be extended by written mutual agreement of
the parties to this Agreement,
4. WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS OF SELLER. Seller hereby
represents and warrants as follows:
a. Title, Seller will transfer to Purchaser good and marketable
title to ail of the assets purchased hereunder, free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances.
b. Bulk Sales. Seller shall cooperate in all respects in fulfilling
and complying with the terms of the Utah Bulk Sales Law.
c. Authorization. Seller is a corporation duly organized, validly
existing and in good standing under the laws of the state of Alabama
and has all necessary corporate power and authority to consummate
the transactions contemplated herein. This agreement has been duly
authorized and executed pursuant to all necessary corporate action
and constitutes a valid obligation of the Seller. The Seller will cause
to be executed the appropriate corporate resolution and shareholder
consent to allow closing of the transaction.
d. Transfer of the franchise agreement. Following the execution of
this agreement and upon payment of the agreed upon sums into
escrow, Seller will use its best efforts to assist purchaser in obtaining
the consent and approval of Buick Motor Division necessary to allow
the granting of the General Motors Sales and Service AgreementBuick Division to Purchaser.
e. Compliance with law. To the best knowledge of Seller, the
operations of Seller have not violated any federal, state, or local laws,
regulations or orders to the extent that any such violation would
materially and adversely affect Seller or Seller's ability to perform
its obligations set forth in this agreement.

f. Litigation.
(1) Seller has not received notice and has no knowledge of any claim
or demand, either pending or threatened, asserted against, affecting
or involving Seller or its business, assets, properties, rights or
operations which would materially affect the ability of Seller to carry
out the transactions contemplated by this agreement, except for
pending litigation between Seller and James Whetton , et, al„ which
litigation will be settled and dismissed, by offset of claims and
mutual releases of all parties, within two business days of the
execution of this Agreement.
(2) There is to the best knowledge of Seller's executive officers no
litigation, action, proceeding or investigation pending or threatened
( or any basis therefor known to such persons) before any court,
administrative agency or other governmental body or arbitrator by,
against, affecting or involving Seller or any of its business, assets,
properties, rights or operations or which would materially affect the
abilities of Seller to carry out the transactions contemplated by this
agreement.
g. Brokers or Finder's Fees. Seller has not incurred nor will it
incur any liability for broker's fees or finders fees. Purchaser
acknowledges it has not incurred any broker's or finder's fees in
connection with this transaction.
5. Transfer of assets. All of the purchased assets shall be
transferred to Purchaser by Seller on the closing date by appropriate
legal documents..
6.

Warranties and representations of Purchaser,
a. Authorization.
Purchaser is a corporation duly
organized , validly existing and in good standing under the laws of
the state of Delaware and has all necessary corporate power and
authority to consummate the transactions contemplated herein. This
agreement has been duly authorized by all necessary corporate

action, has been executed, and constitutes a valid obligation of
Purchaser. Documentation of such corporate authorization will be
provided at closing.
b. Franchise application. Purchaser warrants that
Purchaser is an experienced automobile dealer and is aware of the
requirements which must be met in order to obtain the
Buick franchise. Purchaser agrees to promptly perform all acts
necessary to obtain prompt approval of such applications. It is
acknowledged that time is of the essence in the performance of the
terms and conditions of this agreement. John Watson, as a
stockholder of Purchaser, warrants and guarantees that he
personally and the Purchaser will perform all acts necessary to fulfill
this agreement and to effect the transfers of assets contemplated by
this agreement. By execution of this agreement, John Watson
acknowledges receipt of good and valuable consideration for the
guarantee set forth in this paragraph and, hence, his execution of this
agreement. This personal guarantee includes payment of the
$120,000 referred to herein but is limited to said sum in dollar
amount.
c. Ownership. Purchaser is a corporation owned by John
Watson, Beanstalk Limited Partnership, and J. Merrill Bean. There
are no ownership interests (partnership, joint venture, or otherwise)
by any other individuals, corporations, or partnerships with respect
to John Watson Chevrolet or with respect to any entity which will
operate the Buick dealership or its successor companies, if any,
Purchaser represents that James J. Whetton, individually or through
a corporation or partnership, does not have an ownership interest in
Beanstalk Limited Partnership. As of the date of this Agreement, it is
not contemplated there will be any change of ownership in John
Watson Chevrolet Geo, or its subsidiaries or affiliated companies
which are in the business of selling or leasing automobiles and
trucks.
7. Access to records and properties, From and after the
execution hereof until the closing date, Seller agrees to permit
purchaser to make investigation of seller's business records relevant

to this transaction. Seller shall give to Purchaser access to relevant
records at reasonable hours and shall furnish such documents as are
requested and are relevant to this transaction. All such information
revealed to Purchaser shall be held by it, its agents and employees,
as confidential.
8. Conditions to closing.
a. Accuracy of representations and warranties. All of the
representations and warranties made by Seller and Purchaser in this
Agreement shall be correct and complete in all material respects at
and as of the closing date, except to the extent such representations
and warranties may have been affected by changes specifically
permitted by this Agreement.
b. No action or proceeding. No claim, action, suit,
investigation or other proceeding shall be pending or threatened
before any court or governmental body which presents a substantial
risk of the restraint or prohibition of the transaction contemplated
by this Agreement. It is agreed by the parties hereto that,
simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement, the litigation
between the Seller and James Whetton, et. al., will be settled and
dismissed, as described herein.
c.
Purchaser shall submit all required Buick Motor
Division documents to be appointed the Buick Dealer in Ogden, Utah,
d. Compliance with terms. On the closing date, all of the
terms, conditions and covenants of this Agreement to be complied
with, performed or observed by Purchaser and Seller at or before the
closing date shall have been complied with, performed or observed,
in all material respects.
e. Approval of documentation. The form and substance
of all certificates, instruments, opinions and other documents
delivered under this Agreement shall be satisfactory to the attorneys
for the Purchaser and the Seller.

f. Time being of the essence, Purchaser shall receive at
least verbal approval as a Buick dealer in Ogden, Utah and verbal
approval of this Agreement within twenty-one (21) days of the date
of execution of this Agreement, In the event such approval is not
received within that period, Seller, solely within its discretion, may
at any time exercise its right to terminate this Agreement upon
forty-eight (48) hours prior written notice. If Seller terminates this
Agreement as provided in this subparagraph 8 (f), the escrowed
funds and the interest, if any, earned thereon while in the account,
will be returned to Purchaser.
9.

Termination.

a. Anything, in this Agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding, this Agreement may be terminated and abandoned
at any time prior to closing;
(1) by mutual written consent of all parties hereto;
(2) notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, if
the closing has not occurred by October 31, 1992, and if prior to that
date neither Seller or Purchaser have terminated the Agreement,
then this Agreement shall automatically terminate unless extended
in writing signed by all parties hereto.
10. Notices. All notices and other documents to be given by
any party or parties to this agreement to any other party or parties
hereto shall be in writing, and shall be given in person or by
depositing in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
To Seller;
Mr. Noel Hyde, Esq,
Nielsen & Senior
Eagle Gate Tower
Salt Lake City, UT

To Purchaser:
Mr. John L, Watson
JJTU
John Watson Chevrolet/ ^ e
3535 Wall Avenue
/
Ogden, UT 84401

or to such other address as such party may provide by notice given
in the manner herein prescribed. Any such notice shall be deemed
effective upon such personal delivery or upon the third day
following its deposit in the mail as specified above.
11. General provisions. The following additional general
provisions shall apply to this agreement:
a. This agreement has been executed in and shall be
governed by the laws of the state of Utah.
b. This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding
between the parties hereto and may not be altered, amended or
revoked except by the written agreement of all of the parties or as
provided for herein.
c. This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be
binding upon the parties hereto, their heirs, and personal
representatives.
ii

d. This agreement may not be assigned without written
consent of Seller.
I

e. The parties agree that, should a dispute arise in the
consummation of the transaction contemplated herein, said dispute
will be resolved by submission of the matter for arbitration. Said
arbitration will be by an individual or organization which has
professional certification by a national organization as an arbitrator.
The decision of the arbitrator shall be binding on ail parties.
f. The paragraph headings used herein are for
convenience only and shall not be deemed to modify or construe the
provisions of this agreement.
,
g. Each of the parties shall pay ail of their own costs and
expenses (including attorney's fees and accountant fees) incurred or
to be incurred by it or them in negotiating and preparing this

agreement and in closing and carrying out the transactions
contemplated by this agreement. This provision shall be in effect
whether or not the contemplated closing shall occur,
h. All representations, warranties, convenants and
agreements of the parties contained in this agreement or in any
exhibit, instrument, certificate, opinion or other writing provided for
in it, shall survive the closing date.
12. Escrow payment, Contemporaneously with the execution
of this agreement, Purchaser will deliver to Nielsen & Senior, as
escrow agent, (Escrow Agent), the sum of $120,000. Funds
representing the purchase price as defined herein will also be
deposited with the escrow agent at closing. The total of the funds
deposited and interest earned thereon (the Escrowed Funds) will be
held by the Escrow Agent until closing. Escrow Agent agrees to hold
the Escrowed Funds in an interest-bearing account. At the closing
date, the Escrowed Funds will be disbursed by the Escrow Agent
upon written approval of Purchaser and Seller to the Internal
Revenue Service and the State of Utah Tax Commission in full
settlement of amounts owed. The remainder of the Escrowed Funds,
if any, will be disbursed to James & CoM Certified Public Accountants,
who will then disburse such funds to the secured and preference
creditors, and to unsecured creditors, to the extent of remaining
funds after payment of secured and preference creditors. Lien
releases will be obtained by Seller's agent concurrent with payments
to the Internal Revenue Service, the State of Utah Tax Commission,
and secured and preference creditors,
a. If Purchaser fails to close after appointment as a Buick
dealer in Ogden, Utah, the Escrowed Funds will be paid to Seller as
liquidated damages.
b. It is acknowledged that, from the Escrowed Funds
representing the purchase price, $81,531.78 will be paid at closing to
the Internal Revenue Service and that (approximately $38,000-exact
amount to be inserted] will be paid at closing to the Utah State Tax
Commission,

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this agreement has been executed as of the
day and year first above written.
&

SELLER:
HELSCQjnc,

BUYER:
^r*/*~
John Watson Chevrolet, Gco-

David KochX
Its President

Its

ESCROW AGENT:
Nielsen & Senior

Present

tfimfart.
John Watson, Guarantor
with-respect to the items in
paragraph 6 above

COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE AND
CONSULTING AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, is made effective as of this ?/
day of August,
1992 by and between John Watson Chevrolet -Gee, Inc., a Utah ^ 6 *
corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Purchaser" and David Koch
(hereinafter referred to as "Koch").
WHEREAS, Koch is the owner of approximately 15% of the
issued and outstanding stock of HELSCO, Inc. , an Alabama
corporation dba Sierra Buick Jeep/Eagle which operates a Buick and
Jeep/Eagle automobile and truck dealership located in Ogden, Utah;
and
WHEREAS, Purchaser has agreed to purchase certain specified
assets from HELSCO in accordance with the terms and conditions of
that certain "Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Assets", dated the
*T/ "*clay of August, 1992 (the Purchase Agreement); and
WHEREAS, Purchaser desires to obtain a Covenant Not to
Compete and Consulting Agreement from Koch, and whereas Koch is
willing to execute such a Covenant Not to Compete and Consulting
Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth herein; and
WHEREAS, Koch has agreed with Purchaser to assist the
Purchaser in its marketing efforts and business pursuits in
accordance with the terms and conditions of this agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements contained herein and other good and valuable
consideration and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties
covenant and agree as follows:
1. TERM. The term of this agreement shall be three years
effective on the date first written and continuing thereafter for three
consecutive years;

2. RESTRICTIVE COVENANT. It is acknowledged by the parties
that Koch has been substantially involved in the operation of the
automobile dealership described in this agreement as a stockholder,
an officer, director, and as general manager of the dealership during
the period HELSCO has operated the automobile dealership described
in this agreement for a substantial period of time, Koch has
developed not only expertise in the operation of the business, but
also expertise in marketing strategies which have lead to a
substantial customer base in the dealership's relevant market area.
Koch has knowledge of the books and records of the dealership
together with the knowledge of the knowledge of the propensities of
the franchisors to establish or relocate the dealership within Davis,
Weber, or Box Elder counties. Koch agrees that he will not , for a
period of three years from the effective date of this agreement,
directly or indirectly as a sole proprietorship, as an equity member
of a partnership, as an officer of a joint venture, association or
corporation, or as a stockholder owning more than ten percent of the
outstanding stock of a corporation in competition with Purchaser
compete with Purchaser as a Buick new car or truck dealer in Davis,
Weber, or Box Elder counties, State of Utah,
In the event the length of time, type of activity, geographic
area, or other restrictions set forth in this paragraph are deemed
unreasonable in any court proceeding, the parties agree that the
court may reduce such restrictions in such a manner as it deems
reasonable to protect the substantial investment Purchaser has made
in the dealership.
3. CONSULTING SERVICES. Purchaser hereby engages Koch to
consult with Purchaser on an as-needed basis and upon reasonable
notice with respect to the operation of the Buick dealership located in
Ogden, Utah.
Koch agrees to furnish such consulting services as and
when call upon by the Purchaser and at such times as Koch is
available. Koch agrees to use his best efforts to promote the
continuation and growth and profitability of the Buick dealership,
4. COMPENSATION. Purchaser agrees to pay Koch the sum of
$50,000 in consideration for the covenants set forth in this
agreement. This amount is included in the $120,000 paid into
escrow by Purchaser under the terms of the Purchase Agreement.
Payment shall be made in full on the closing date of the "Purchase
Agreement" referred to herein. Ail compensation paid to Koch under
this Agreement will be invested in HELSCO, to pay obligations of

HELSCO to the Internal Revenue Service for the trust portion of
payroll taxes withheld and to the Utah State Tax Commission for
sales taxes collected.
5. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS. Koch shall be deemed
an independent contractor in fulfilling the terms of this agreement,
and Purchaser shall not be responsible for tax withholding.
6. REMEDIES.
a. In addition to other rights of the parties as provided
by law, Purchaser shall be entitled to enforce this agreement by
injunction or restraining order, in addition to any other damages
which may be proven, including actual attorney's fees, costs and
expert witness fees which may be required to enforce the
agreement.
b. In the event of breach or default in the performance
of this noncompetition and consulting agreement by either party, the
parties agree to enter into binding arbitration , using an individual or
organization which has professional certification as an arbitrator,
7. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties pertaining to the subject matters
contained herein and supersedes any prior agreements. No
supplement, modification, or amendment to this agreement shall be
deemed, or shall constitute a v/aiver of any other provision, whether
or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
No such amendment, modification, or waiver shall be binding unless
. executed in writing by the parties,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this
agreement the date and year first above written.

COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE AND
CONSULTING AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, is made effective as of this ZTS day of Augu
1992 by and between John Watson Chevrolet Ge©> Inc., a Utah
corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Purchaser" and Henry P.
Mixon (hereinafter referred to as "Mixon").
WHEREAS, Mixon is the owner of approximately 85% of the
issued and outstanding stock of HELSCO, Inc. , an Alabama
corporation dba Sierra Buick Jeep/Eagle which operates a Buick and
Jeep/Eagle automobile and truck dealership located in Ogden, Utah;
and
WHEREAS, Purchaser has agreed to' purchase certain specified
assets from HELSCO in accordance with the terms and conditions of
that certain "Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Assets", dated the
gsr^** ^ dav of August, 1992 (the Purchase Agreement); and
WHEREAS, Purchaser desires to obtain a Covenant Not to
Compete and Consulting Agreement from Mixon, and whereas Mixon
is willing to execute such a Covenant Not to Compete and Consulting
Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth herein; and
WHEREAS, Mixon has agreed with Purchaser to assist the
Purchaser in its marketing efforts and business pursuits in
accordance with the terms and conditions of this agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements contained herein and other good and valuable
consideration and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties
covenant and agree as follows:
1. TERM. The term of this agreement shall be two years
effective on the date first written and continuing thereafter for two
consecutive years;

2. RESTRICTIVE COVENANT. It is acknowledged by the parties
that Mixon has been involved as a stockholder in HELSCO, Inc,
during the period HELSCO has operated the automobile dealership
described in this agreement for a substantial period of time. As a
stockholder and investor, Mixon has developed not only expertise in
the automobile business, but also expertise in marketing strategies,
valuable relationships with Buick Motor Division and its
representatives, and other relationships acknowledged by the parties
hereto to be valuable to the ongoing success of the Buick franchise.
Further, Mixon has numerous important business contacts in the
state of Utah who represent potential buyers of products and
services of the successor dealership. Mixon agrees that he will not ,
for a period of three years from the effective date of this agreement,
directly or indirectly as a sole proprietorship, as an equity member
of a partnership, as an officer of a joint venture, association or
corporation, or as a stockholder owning more than ten percent of the
outstanding stock of a corporation in competition with Purchaser
compete with Purchaser as a Buick new car or truck dealer in Davis,
Weber, or Box Elder counties, State of Utah.
In the event the length of time, type of activity, geographic
area, or other restrictions set forth in this paragraph are deemed
unreasonable in any court proceeding, the parties agree that the
court may reduce such restrictions in such a manner as it deems
reasonable to protect the substantial investment Purchaser has made
in the dealership.
3, CONSULTING SERVICES. Purchaser hereby engages Mixon to
consult with Purchaser on an as-needed basis and upon reasonable
notice with respect to the operation of the Buick dealership located in
Ogden, Utah. Consulting services under this agreement will be
related to knowledge acquired as a stockholder of HELSCO during the
period HELSCO operated the dealership. It is understood by the
parties that Mixon has other business and professional relationships
which may restrict the services he can provide. Accordingly, it is
acknowledged by the parties that Mixon will not be required to
perform any consulting services which are inconsistent with those
business and professional relationships. Mixon represents, however,
that he has no business relationships which are in the automobile
industry which would prevent his performance under this
agreement. Mixon agrees to furnish such consulting services as and
when call upon by the Purchaser and at such times as Mixon is

available. Mixon agrees to use his best efforts to promote the
continuation and growth and profitability of the Buick dealership.
4. COMPENSATION. Purchaser agrees to pay Mixon the sum of
$70,000 in consideration for the covenants set forth in this
agreement This amount is included in the $120,000 paid into
escrow by Purchaser under the terms of the Purchase Agreement,
Payment shall be made in full on the closing date of the "Purchase
Agreement" referred to herein. This consideration has been
negotiated by the parties based upon the understanding and
assumption that there shall remain no obligations owing to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for payroll tax trust funds or to the
Utah State Tax Commission ( Tax Commission) for sales taxes, after
application of the proceeds of sale under the Agreement for Sale and
Purchase of Assets and after application of money to which
Purchaser is entitled to offset or withhold from David Koch , The
value of such consulting and non-compete arrangements shall be
lower if such obligations do exist. If, therefore, there remain any IRS
or Tax Commission obligations, the consideration to Mixon shall be
reduced by the amount of the remaining IRS and Tax Commission
obligations. Mixon shall have no direct or indirect interest in those
moneys, and Purchaser shall pay such amounts directly to the IRS
and to the Tax Commission
5. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS. Mixon shall be deemed
an independent contractor in fulfilling the terms of this agreement,
and Purchaser shall not be responsible for tax withholding.
6. REMEDIES.
a. In addition to other rights of the parties as provided
by law, Purchaser shall be entitled to enforce this agreement by
injunction or restraining order, in addition to any other damages
which may be proven, including actual attorney's fees, costs and
expert witness fees which may be required to enforce the
agreement,
b. In the event of breach or default in the performance
of this noncompetition and consulting agreement by either party, the
parties agree to enter into binding arbitration , using an individual or
organization which has professional certification as an arbitrator.

7. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties pertaining to the subject matter
contained herein and supersedes any prior agreements. No
supplement, modification, or amendment to this agreement shall be
deemed, or shall constitute a waiver of any other provision, whether
or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
No such amendment, modification, or waiver shall be binding unless
executed in writing by the parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this
agreement the date and year first above written.
John Watson C h e v r o l e ^ - ^ ^ f ^ S ^ / ^

t

Henry P. Mixon

Lku^ f mri
Its President
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1
2

MR. STEPHENS:

Objection, assumes facts,

vague.

3

THE WITNESS:

Well, in the negotiations on

4

this, we were assured that John Watson could get James

5

Whetton to lift the restraining order.

6
7

Q.

(BY MR. BEAN)

Okay.

Is that how you

expected that to be done, is through John Watson?

8

A.

Exactly.

9

Q.

And was that an understanding that was

10

expressed at the time that you negotiated this Exhibit

11

4 contract?

12

A.

That's as it was expressed to me, yes.

13

Q.

At the time that that occurred, did you have

14

any conversations with anybody representing Buick

15

Motor Division that that was how that restraining

16

order was going to get handled?

17

A.

One telephone conversation.

18

Q.

Do you recall who that was with?

19

A.

I cannot recall.

20

his successor.

21

top of my head.

It was either Chris Wolf or

I can't recall his name right off the

22

Q.

If I gave you a name, would you recognize it?

23

A.

I'm sure I would.

24

I

Q.

Mr. Garove, Tom Garove?

25

|

A.

That's him, yeah.

19
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1
2
3
4
5
6

Q.

When you say you had one conversation, do you

recall about when that occurred?
A.

I can't give you a date on that right off the

top of my head, no.
Q.

Would it have been after the execution of

this agreement or before, if you can recall?

7

MR. STEPHENS:

Again, Exhibit 4?
Exhibit 4.

8

Q.

(BY MR. BEAN)

9

A.

My guess would be before, and without

10

actually having my diaries or anything to

11

double-check, I would just have to -- I'm almost

12

certain it was before, but I'm not positive.

13

Q.

Do you recall what was said in that

14

conversation or -- I don't mean the exact words, but

15

the nature, the substance of the conversation, what

16

was being discussed?

17

A.

Only that there was some concern by Buick

18

Motor Division that James Whetton was employed by the

19

purchasing -- the company we were planning to let

20

purchase the franchise and the concern was that James

21

Whetton would somehow be involved in the new

22

franchise.

23

that, there was strong opposition to that.

24
25

Q.
realized?

Without recalling exact verbiage or any of

To your knowledge, was that concern ever
That is, to your knowledge, was Mr. Whetton

20
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1
2
3
4

WHETTON BECAUSE NO ONE ELSE WAS ABLE TO DO THAT.
Q

THAT'S CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE,

EXHIBIT 9, IS IT NOT?
A

IT IS NOT —

IT'S IDENTIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT

5

OF SALE BUT POTENTIALLY MAYBE NOT INTERPRETED IN THE

6

AGREEMENT OF SALE AS I JUST STATED.

7

Q

IN FACT, LOOKING AT PAGE 5, PARAGRAPH F(l) ON

8

EXHIBIT 9, IT REFERS TO A "PENDING LITIGATION BETWEEN

9

SELLER AND JAMES WHETTON, ET AL., WHICH LITIGATION WILL

10

BE SETTLED AND DISMISSED BY OFFSET OF CLAIMS AND MUTUAL

11

RELEASES OF ALL PARTIES WITHIN TWO BUSINESS DAYS OF THE

12

EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT."

13

A

YES, SIR, AND THAT WAS INTENDED THAT JOHN

14

WATSON WOULD BE THE ONE TO SETTLE THAT CLAIM OR GET MR.

15

WHETTON TO RELEASE THE RESTRAINING ORDER OR PETITION THE

16

COURT TO RELEASE THE RESTRAINING ORDER.

17

Q

DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST HAD YOU HAD ANY

18

DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. WHETTON OR AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO

19

AUGUST 31 OF 1992 WITH MR. WHETTON ABOUT SETTLING HIS

20

CLAIMS AGAINST HELSCO, DBA SIERRA BUICK?

21

A

YES.

22

Q

HOW MANY SUCH CONVERSATIONS DID YOU HAVE?

23

A

I COULDN'T TELL YOU THE NUMBER OF

24

CONVERSATIONS, BUT I HAD GONE TO MR. WHETTON AND PLEADED

25

WITH HIM THAT IF IN FACT I BECAME THE BUICK DEALER IN
54
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1

A

52

I don't recall what caused it to be lifted

2

specifically.

I didn't lift it.

Are you sayii

3

did we get a bond posted or as a result of not

4

posting the bond was it lifted?

5

QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN:

6

Q

Yes.

7

A

My recollection was it was not lifted at the

8

time of this, and my recollection is that the

9

judge did not require the posting of the bond,

10

as is normally required by law.

11

Q

12

I show you Exhibit 8, and ask you to read
through that exhibit.

13

A

Okay.

14

Q

Was a pretrial conference referred to in that

15

document actually held, to your knowledge?

16

MR. STEPHENS:

17

Objection, no

foundation.

18

A

19

I don't know if this particular one was held or
not.

20

QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN:

21

Q

22

Do you recall attending a pretrial

conference

in connection with the lifting of the

23

II

restraining

order?

24

|| A

There were so many meetings and discussions.

25

||

don't -- I mean, this one appears to have been

Sunbelt Reporting & Litigation Services
(713)667^0763
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Utah?
Did I communicate that to Buick?
Yes .
I can't remember a particular conversation, but
I do recall that was my belief at the time, and
based upon that belief, it might have been
communicated, but I can't say, yes, I told them
that.
Is there some reason why you did not tell them
that there was an agreement between Helsco and
John Watson Chevrolet, that John Watson
Chevrolet would get the Whetton

restraining

order lifted as part of the Buy and Sell
Agreement between Helsco and John Watson
Chevrolet?
MR. STEPHENS:

That's vague,

ambiguous, objection, also misstates
THE WITNESS:

testimony.

Can you read that

back or repeat it?
COURT REPORTER:
"QUESTION:

(Reading back)

Is there some reason why you

did not tell them that there was an agreement
between Helsco and John Watson Chevrolet, that
John Watson Chevrolet would get the Whetton
restraining order lifted as part of the Buy and

Sunbelt Reporting & Litigation Services
(713)667-0763
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Sell Agreement between Helsco and John Watson
Chevrolet?"
A

I can't recall any particular reason for my
failure to communicate information to Buick
Motor Division.

As to whether there was an

agreement, I don't know that I would
characterize it as an agreement until it
actually happened.

I mean, there was a

discussion, if this, then that.

I don't rec

that ever being reduced to an agreement.

Th

discussion was, this will happen if this
happens, and if you make it happen, fine.

I

don't know that that's an agreement.
QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN:
Q

Was the execution of the Buy and Sell Agreement
between John Watson Chevrolet and Helsco
contingent upon the dismissal of the Buy and
Sell Agreement

-- excuse m e , the

order in the Whetton

restraining

lawsuit?

MR. STEPHENS:

Objection,

leading

The agreement speaks for itself.
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

Would you

read back the question again now that I have
looked at the agreement?
COURT REPORTER:

(Reading back)

Sunbelt Reporting &L Litigation Services
(713)667-0763
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67

And you indicate that that was a verbal
agreement.

A

Yes, that's what it says.

Q

Did you also tell Buick Motor Company at some
time along the way, representatives of Buick
Motor Company -MR. STEPHENS:

Division.

QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN:
Q

-- that the restraining order could be lifted by
John Watson and Merrill Bean if they were
appointed the dealer operator at Ogden, Utah?
MR. STEPHENS:

A

Objection, leading.

I don't recall specifically saying it, but it
may have happened.

It may have happened.

QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN:
Q

Did you tell anyone at Buick Motor Division that
there was an agreement by them, that is Merrill
Bean and John Watson and Jim Whetton, to dismiss
the restraining order and the lawsuit, the
lawsuit that John Whetton filed against

Sierra

Buick Jeep-Eagle -MR. STEPHENS:

Objection,

leading,

compound.
QUESTIONS BY MR. BEAN:
Q

-- if they were appointed the dealer at Ogden,

Sunbelt Reporting & Litigation Services
(713)667-0763
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f

Subject:

Eric E. Peterson, D i r e c t o r
Dealer Network Development
Financial Intervention
Ogden, Utah
Attention:

Dale Brinkman, Dealer Operations ManagerWest

The attached business case on the above subject c i t y i s being forwarded
to for your review and a s s i s t a n c e in obtaining the n e c e s s a r y approval
to f a c i l i t a t e f i n a n c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n in Ogden, Utah.
Please c a l l Vorn Woodley or me i f you have q u e s t i o n s concerning the
attached business c a s e .
'
T. E. Garove
Zone Manager

>

~
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BUSINESS CASE

~
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Buick Franchise Purchase
H e l s c o , Inc. dba S i e r r a B u i c k - J e e p Eagle
Ogden, Utah

ZONE;

San Francisco

DATE;

10/6/92

PRESENT FIRM NAME;

H e l s c o . Inc. dba S i e r r a B u i c k - J e e p Eagle
Ogden, Utah

TYPE OF PROPOSAL;

Financial Intervention
Purchase of our f r a n c h i s e f o r "goodwill" d o l l a r s t o
f a c i l i t a t e the implementation o f the Year 2000 Plan
i n Ogden, Utah and p r e v e n t t h e Buick f r a n c h i s e from
going i n t o Bankruptcy Court.

BACKGROUND;
Helsco, Inc. dba S i e r r a Buick-Jeep Eagle became a Buick Dealer on
December 12, 1989. Sometime a f t e r becoming t h e Buick Dealer, t h e
owners of H e l s c o , Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep E a g l e found t h e m s e l v e s i n
a l e g a l d i s p u t e w i t h the s e l l e r , Jim Whet ton.
On A p r i l 2 , 1992, a f t e r
finding i t s e l f i n a great deal of f i n a n c i a l t r o u b l e w i t h t h e I n t e r n a l
Revenue S e r v i c e , t h e Utah State Tax Board and o t h e r c r e d i t o r s , H e l s c o ,
Inc, dba S i e r r a Buick Jeep-Eagle entered i n t o an "Agreement f o r S a l e
and Purchase o f A s s e t s " w i t h Rick Warner E n t e r p r i s e s , Inc. Rick Warner
was proposed as t h e d e a l e r / o p e r a t o r . During t h e review of t h e p r o p o s a l
package submitted t o Buick by Rick Warner E n t e r p r i s e s , I n c . , t h e Zone
determined t h a t Rick Warner did not have t h e n e c e s s a r y 15% required
investment t o be named d e a l e r / o p e r a t o r . While t h e review p r o c e s s was
going on, Jim Whet ton, s e l l e r of the Buick f r a n c h i s e t o H e l s c o , I n c .
f i l e d for and r e c e i v e d a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r which p r e v e n t e d
Helsco, Inc. dba S i e r r a Buick-Jeep) Eagle from t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e a s s e t s
of the Corporation t o Rick Warner E n t e r p r i s e s .
A f t e r months o f l e g a l
maneuvers and u n s u c c e s s f u l attempts by H e l s c o , I n c . t o have t h e
r e s t r a i n i n g order l i f t e d , Helsco, I n c . and R i c k Warner E n t e r p r i s e s ,
Inc. terminated t h e i r Agreement. S h o r t l y , t h e r e a f t e r , H e l s c o , I n c .
entered i n t o an "Agreement for S a l e and Purchase o f A s s e t s " w i t h John
Watson C h e v r o l e t , Inc. This b u y - s e l l was f a c i l i t a t e d by t h e l i f t i n g of
the temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order which had e x i s t e d p r e v e n t i n g s u c h .
The Zone has reviewed the s t i p u l a t i o n s of t h e "Agreement" as w e l l as
the performance of the Dealer a p p l i c a n t . The Zone has a l s o reviewed
the Year 2000 Plan for Ogden, Utah with the o t h e r GM D i v i s i o n s t h a t
have r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in Odgen, Utah and concluded t h a t i t would be i n
the b e s t i n t e r e s t of General Motors t h a t a l l e f f o r t s be made t o conform
to the plans s e t f o r t h . Those plans are for a Buick-Pontiac-GMC Truck
dual, an Oldsmobile-Cadillac dual and a C h e v r o l e t stand a l o n e .
In an
e f f o r t t o adhere t o the Year 20(30 Dealer Network Plan for Odgen, Utah,
the Zone i s proposing that Buick e x e r c i s e t h e Right of F i r s t R e f u s a l by

GG000006

purchasing our franchise for "goodwill11 dollars as set forth in the
"Agreement For Sale and Purchase of Assets" entered into between
Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick Jeep/Eagle and John Watson Chevrolet
Inc. The dollar amount set forth in the Agreement is $120,000.
RETUKN OF INVESTMENT: The Zone has discussed the option with the
Fontiac zone management responsible for Ogden, Utah. In discussing the
Year 2000 Plan with Kent Petersen, dealer/owner, Petersen Motor
Company, Inc. the Pontiac/GMC Truck dealer In Ogden, Pontiacfs zone
management was advised by Mr. Petersen that he would be very interested
in acquiring the Buick franchise and dualling it with Pontiac and GMC
Truck. The Zone will discuss, conditions and agreements with Mr.
Petersen for the possibility of being awarded a Buick Motor Division General Motors Sales and Service Agreement.
The conditions and
Agreements will include the payment of $120,000 paid by Petersen Motor
Companyt Inc. to Buick as repayment for the amount Buick would pay to
purchase the Buick franchise for "goodwill" dollars from Helsco, Inc.
dba Sierra Buick Jeep-Eagle.
'^^}y/0
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FINAL CONSIDERATION; Should Buick decide not to exercise the Right of
First Refusal, then it is likely that Helsco, Inc. will file for
bankruptcy and Buick may be forced to accept an unsatisfactory Dealer
as h o l d e r o f t h e B u i c k
franchise. Another consideration is that of
fore oin
8 8 t h e implementation of the Year 2000 Dealer Network Plan for
Ogden, Utah by awarding John Watson Chevrolet the Buick Agreement.
The San Francisco Zone feels that given all of the particulars of the
destiny of the Buick franchise in Ogden, Utah that exercising the Right
of First Refusal and reassigning the $120,000 expense to Petersen Motor
Company, Inc. is our best course of action and is in the best interest
of General Motors long-term.
Attachments are being provided to show the improving performance level r,
of Petersen Motor Company, Inc.
—» * t "T : ^
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Garove
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2

about was in a conversation between you and Mr. Woodley

3

and Mr. Mixon; do I understand you correctly?

4

A

That's my recollection, yes.

g

Q

Well, could it have been any other person

6

with General Motors Corporation that would have been

7

involved in that conversation?

8

A

No, we were the front line decision makers.

9

Q

So would it have been you and Mr. Woodley

3*0

and Mr. Mixon - -

\\

A

Right.

i.2

Q

- - t o your best recollection?

JJ

A

Correct.

14

Q

Do you have any recollection, at this time,

15

that it could have been anyone else involved in that

16

conversation?

17

A

Would have been no reason.

18

Q

So, it wouldn't have been anyone else?

19

A

No.

20

Q

And as far as you know, there was no written

21

authorization given by Mr. Mixon for that type of

22

contact?

23

A

No.

I may add, as I recall, the chronology

24

of the events was upon receiving Mr. Mixon's verbal

25

permission to contact other candidates.

In this case,

ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK

(212) 732-6190
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Mr. Petersen's contact was made either by myself and/or
Mr. Woodley, I can't recall.

And that was followed up by

further communication with Mr. Mixon, which would have -which precipitated his understanding as documented in
Exhibit 14.
Q

In Exhibit 14 though, he doesn't say

anything about your contacting another dealer, does he,
i

another existing dealer?

>

MR. STEPHENS:

Objection.

The document

speaks for itself.
J
J
1

A
again.

It does not state that, no.

Let me read it

No, it does not state that.
Q

Your recommendation with regard to the

5

options that were set forth in considering John Watson's

6

application, it was clearly your recommendation and your

7

representation to John Watson that there could be no

8

dualing with Chevrolet; isn't that true?

9
0
1
2
3
4
5

A

That's correct.
MR. STEPHENS:

Can I talk to the witness

again, please?
(Whereupon, at this time, Mr. Stephens and
the witness left the deposition room.)
(Whereupon, at this time, the reporter
marked the above-mentioned two-page document dated
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1

A

I indicated to Mr- Vansic if there was an

2

opportunity, I would be happy to have the franchise.

3

Either that afternoon or the next day, Mr. Tom Garove

4

who was the San Francisco Zone Manager for Buick

5

called me, said that he had been in touch with Jim

6

Vansic, and that we had been highly recommended and

7

would we be interested in taking that same agreement

8

if they exercised their first right of refusal, would

9

we step in and take the Buick franchise.

10
11
12
13
14

Q

When you say the same agreement, what are

you referring to?
A

The agreement that was on the table on the

buy and sale between John Watson and Sierra.
Q

Did Mr. Garove indicate to you whether or

15

not at that time a decision had been made not to

16

accept the John Watson application?

17

A

What he said was that it did not meet their

18

criteria for Project 2000, and that inasmuch as the

19

buy and sale was imminent, that they would like to

20

align it so it would be properly aligned.

21

Q

Was any other reason given by Mr. Garove for

22

the rejection of the Watson application, to your

23

recollection?

24

A

He did not indicate anything to me.

25

Q

That was the only reason given?

13

Tab 8

1
2

Q.

Was he acting under your direction in any of

the representations that are made in this note?

3

A.

Not under my direction, no.

4

Q.

Do you know if he was acting under direction

5

of the board of directors generally, that is whether

6

there had been a resolution passed or anything like

7

that that authorized Mr. Mixon to represent the

8

corporation in this capacity?

9
10

MR. STEPHENS:
capacity.

11

Objection, vague as to what

Go ahead.
THE WITNESS:

I can't answer that question

12

directly.

I have no general knowledge of that.

You

13

have to remember that Henry Mixon, the board of this

14

corporation, was myself, Henry Mixon7 s wife and one of

15

his friends.

16

meeting or whatever in my total absence.

17

go on concerning the board meetings is what I was

18

told.

19

do any of this, I had no knowledge of it.

They had a quorum to hold a board
So all I can

If any meetings took place directing Henry to

20

Q.

(BY MR. BEAN)

Let's talk about that for a

21

minute.

22

corporation board of directors meeting held regularly

23

by this corporation?

Were board meetings held regularly,

24

MR. STEPHENS:

25

THE WITNESS:

Objection, lacks foundation.
Again, I have no direct

23
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assets?
I never recall such conversations.
that I had to authorize them.
right.

I don't know

That was their

It wasn't up to me to authorize it, as I

recall.
Now, going back to one of my previous questions,
did you have any conversations with Peterson
Motor or any representatives of Peterson Motor
Company at Ogden, Utah regarding

their

appointment as the dealer operator for Buick
Motor Division at Ogden, Utah, any
with them as to their

conversation

appointment?

As I recall, we had discussions about the
logistical arrangements once they were

appointed

or once it had been announced that they had been
appointed, I mean, matters like getting the
parts and doing this and doing that.

I mean,

that was just part of the winding down.
Did you have any discussions with Peterson,
anyone, any representative of Peterson Motor
Company regarding their application for a Buick
Dealer Sales and Service Agreement?
A

I don't recall any, no.

Q

Did you receive any kind of payment

from

Peterson Motor Company for any of the assets of

Sunbelt Reporting & Litigation Services
(713)667-0763

1

Garove
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2

A

Prior to October 15th or after?

3

Q

Either before or after October 15th.

4

A

After October 15th, we discussed the details

5

of executing Mr. Mixon's demonstrator, which was part of

6

the terms of the buy-sell agreement which --

7
8
9
10

Q

I guess I don't understand what you mean by

buy-sell agreement.
A

Who was going to provide him with a car and

how would he take delivery, through what dealership.

11

Q

Anything else that you can recall?

12

A

None specifically at this time.

13

Q

Do you recall conversations with anyone else

14

representing Sierra Buick that relates to the purchase --

15

to the exercise of your right of first refusal or the

16

purchase of the assets of Helsco d/b/a Sierra Buick that

17

you have not told us about?

18

A

Mr. Mixon was our sole contact.

19

Q

He was your sole contact?

20

A

Yes.

Mr. Koch was per -- Mr. Mixon had been

21

relocated out of the area and was, at some point in time,

22

unavailable.

23
24
25

Q

Regardless of where he was.

So, you don't

recall having any conversations with him?
A

No, there were none^ I can assure you of
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of any such contact?'

3

MR. STEPHENS:

By Pontiac.

4

A

By Pontiac, no.

5

Q

By Pontiac.

6

A

No.

7

Q

Who in your zone would have made any such

8

contact if the contact was made?

9

MR. STEPHENS:

10

MR. BEAN:

He's Buick, not Pontiac.

Yes, I understand that.

11

A

Now, you are referring to Buick?

12

Q

Yes, who in your zone.

13

A

In the Buick zone who would have made a

14

contact?

15

Q

Yes, in your zone for Buick, who would have

16

made a contact with Pontiac regarding such I contact with

17

Kent

Petersen?

18

MR. STEPHENS:

19

facts.

20

A

21

Mr. Woodley.

22
23

Q

At t h i s

juncture,

it

assumes

Yes, it would have been myself or

If Mr. Woodley had done that, would he have

discussed that with you?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Then my question is, if that kind of contact
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j

was made, would that have been contrary to the basic

|

policy of General Motors that we discussed previously,

4

about making contacts or accepting contacts from other

5

persons while an application is being

5
7

A

considered?

While an application is pending and being

considered?

8

Q

Yes.

9

A

No, it wouldn't, if it's with the permission

10

of the existing dealer.

11

Q

With the permission of, for example, Helsco?

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

Do you have any knowledge that Helsco gave

14

such permission in this case?

-15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Tell us what your information is in that

17

regard.

18

A

Once again, I can't recall the

19

conversations, but it would have been a discussion with

20

Mr. Mixon and myself and Mr. Woodley.

21

Q

And that would have been something that you

22

would have done prior to notification to John Watson that

23

he was being restricted as an applicant for that?

24

A

That's correct.

25

Q

Do you have any knowledge, at this time,
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^

that such a conversation did exist between you and

|j

Mr. Woodley and Helsco or Mr. Mixon?

j|

A

I believe there was one yes,

|j

Q

Well, when you said you believe there was

$

one --

7

A

I would say, yes.

%

Q

- - d o you have a recollection of that

9

conversation?

0

A

tl

years back.

2

place, yes.

3

Q

Once again, David, we are talking a few
To the best of my recollection, one took

In the documents that have been furnished to

%

me, Mr. Garove, I see some notations of telephone calls

5

that you had with Mr. Whetton and with other persons

6

relative to this transaction where you felt the necessity

7

to make a memo of the call.

8

A

Correct.

9

Q

If you had had such a conversation with

0

Mr. Mixon, would you have made a memo of that?

!1

MR. STEPHENS:

Objection.

Argumentative.

12

A

Not in this particular case, no.

13

Q

Why not?

14

A

The reason I was taking memos on my

!5

conversations from Mr. Whetton was, my concern about
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2

litigation that he may bring forward whatever the outcome

-j

of all of the circumstances that were going on in Ogden,

4

Utah.

5

would be brought forward based on our exercise of right

6

of first refusal.

7

the conversations.

8
9

88

At no time did I even consider that any litigation

Q

Therefore, I did not document any of

But you are saying that a conversation did

take place?

10

A

That's correct.

11

Q

So, you are telling us that the exception to

12

the policy is that if the dealer, existing dealer,

_3

permits you to do that, then you can go ahead and do

A

that, make contact w i t h other d e a l e r s , other prospective

5
L6

d e a l e r s ; is that correct?
A

It's not a n exception to a policy.

It's

.7

just a normal business courtesy thac we would discuss it

18

with our existing dealer prior to making a contact.

19

Q

Doesn't that allow you then to make

20

comparisons between p e r s p e c t i v e dealers if y o u will

21

follow that policy?

22

A

23

Q

Yes.
is that something that is acceptable as a

24

matter to General Motors, to your knowledge, to make

l§5

those kinds of comparisons?
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2

A

Yes.

3

Q

So then, what you are telling me, if I

4

understand you correctly, is you can consider the

5

application or the possibility of the strengths and

6

weaknesses of many different dealers for a particular

7

franchise all at the same time if you get permission from

8

the existing dealer to do so; is that correct?

9
10
11
12

A

If that's the desires.

And sales and

service agreements, correction on the terminology.
Q

When you say if it's his desire, you mean if

it's the existing dealer's desire?

13

A

14

our request.

15

Q

Correct or he grants us permission based on

That's what I'm saying.

So, if you are able

16

to make comparisons of various applicants for sales and

17

service agreement, you ask the existing dealer if he'll

18

grant you the right to do that and then you can make

19

comparisons with four or five prospective --

20

A

21

Q

22

Candidates.
candidates for that dealer sales and

service agreement; is that what you are telling me?

23

A

That's correct.

24

Q

And then when you do that, when you make

25

those comparisons, do you look at all of the factors that
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2

you've discussed with us previously for each of those

3

dealers to determine which is the strongest candidates

4

for that sales and service agreement?

5

A

Yes, all of those items we've discussed.

6

Q

So, the fact that there may be a dealer who

7

has an application with the Buick Division of General

8

Motors and is first to have that application pending, it

9

doesn't necessarily mean that his application will

10

receive consideration solely on the merits of that

%X

application, that it may be compared with other

12

prospective dealers if you desire to do so?

£3

MR. STEPHENS:

14

MR. BEAN:

If the dealer desires.

His point was he could ask the

15

dealer and if the dealer gave his permission, at

16

their request, they can do that.

17

Q

Isn't that so, sir?

18

A

That's correct.

19

Q

So, if you want to do that, you can do that

20

by simply getting the dealer's permission to do that and

21

you never get the permission in writing.

22

that.

23

have to be in writing, it can be verbal; is that correct?

Let me rephrase

The permission from that existing dealer does not

24

A

As in this case it was, correct.

25

Q

And the permission that you are talking
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1

questions about Mr. Mixon with regard to this

2

exhibit.

3

direction of you as president of the corporation to

4

Mr. Mixon to make contact with Mr. Whetton or his

5

attorneys or to make contact with Buick Motor Division

6

with respect to that lawsuit?

7

nature of my question?

Was there any type of action or any

Do you understand the

8

A.

No, sir, I don't.

9

Q.

I'm trying to understand in what capacity

10

Mr. Mixon was making representations as contained in

11

this note to Buick Motor Division and making

12

representations to Mr. Whetton, in what capacity he

13

was representing HELSCO.
MR. STEPHENS:

14

Objection, it lacks

15

foundation.

It calls for representations in the

16

letter, Exhibit 8, for the note to file letter 8,

17

Exhibit 8.

18

the question.

I think it's vague.
Go ahead.

THE WITNESS:

19

I don't understand

I can't answer the question

20

because I don't know what capacity he was trying to

21

serve when he was doing this.

22

Q.

(BY MR. BEAN)

That's the very thing I'm

23

trying to get at.

24

president of the corporation?

25

Did you direct him to do this as

Tab 9

1
2

Q.

When you say you had one conversation, do you

recall about when that occurred?

3

A.

4

I can't give you a date on that right off the

top of my head, no.

5

Q.

6

Would it have been after the execution of

this agreement or before, if you can recall?

7

MR. STEPHENS:

Again, Exhibit 4?
Exhibit 4.

8

Q.

(BY MR. BEAN)

9

A.

My guess would be before, and without

10

actually having my diaries or anything to

11

double-check, I would just have to -- I'm almost

12

certain it was before, but I'm not positive.

13

Q.

Do you recall what was said in that

14

conversation or -- I don't mean the exact words, but

15

the nature, the substance of the conversation, what

16

was being discussed?

17

A.

Only that there was some concern by Buick

18

Motor Division that James Whetton was employed by the

19

purchasing -- the company we were planning to let

20

purchase the franchise and the concern was that James

21

Whetton would somehow be involved in the new

22

franchise.

23

that, there was strong opposition to that.

24

Q.

25

realized?

Without recalling exact verbiage or any of

To your knowledge, was that concern ever
That is, to your knowledge, was Mr. Whetton

]

20
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ever employed by John Watson Chevrolet?
A.

I believe so, as a salesman, but that was way

prior to us even discussing the matter of the
franchise purchase.
Q.

Did you indicate to anyone representing Buick

Motor Company that John Watson may be able to get the
restraining order dismissed?
A.

Yes, sir, that was in that phone

conversation.
Q.

That was in that phone conversation?

A.

Yes.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 7
was marked
for identification.)

Q.

I show you, Mr. Koch, what's been marked

Exhibit 7 to the deposition and ask if you have -aside from the first page which is a fax page, if you
have seen the other two pages of that exhibit before.
A.

I don't believe so.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 8
was marked
for identification.)

Q.
Mr. Koch.
before.

I show you what's been marked as Exhibit 8,
I don't represent that you have seen this
I, however, would like to ask you a couple of

21
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dealership, did you make any comments to anyone about
whether or not this was contrary to the provisions of
the Project 2000 realignment?
A

Again, to be honest with you, I don't recall

that comment.
Q

So to your recollection, you didn't have any

conversations with Mr. Vansic, Zone Manager of
Pontiac, or with anybody at GMC Truck as to whether or
not you should be the one or entitled to receive the
Buick franchise rather than Rick Warner or anyone
else?
A
it.

The same answer.

If I did, I don't recall

You talk to these people once a month, and a lot

of things are on the record.
off.

A lot of things are

But I have no recollection of specifically

saying, "Well, I ought to be the man to have Buick."
Q

When you heard that the Rick Warner

application had been rejected, did you make any
attempt at that time to file an application for the
Buick Sales and Service Agreement?
A

No.

Q

Can you tell us why you didn't do it at that

A

I had heard that John was going to receive

time?

it and it had between Merrill and Jim Whetton.

They

11

1

had had the inside track to receive it.

2

was a done deal.

3

John on his acquisition of Buick about the time that

4

we received the Mitsubishi franchise.

5

entered into negotiation with Warner on the

6

Mitsubishi.

7

And so I did not try to go into competition with him

8

over it.

9

Q

I thought it

In factf at one time I congratulated

And I had

So I thought it had been accomplished.

Did you ever have any conversations with

10

either David Cook or Henry Mixon about trying to

11

buy or enter into a buy and sell agreement with Sierra

12

Buick/Jeep/Eagle in connection with the Buick Sales

13

and Service Agreement?

14

A

No.

15

Q

Is it fair to state, Mr. Petersen, that at

16

that time and prior to the time you were contacted

17

by Mr. Vansic, that you were not actively seeking the

18

Buick Sales and Service Agreement for the Ogden area?

19

A

Probably.

20

Q

After you had the conversation with the

21

Pontiac Zone Manager, did you then have conversations

22

with anybody representing the Buick Zone?

23

A

24

Q

25

Yes.
Can you tell us who you had conversations

with?

12
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NICHOLAS CRIVELLI; NICK
CRIVELLI CHEVROLET, INC.;
NICHOLAS CRIVELLI and ORLANDO
G. CRIVELLI, t/d/b/a CRIVELLI
ENTERPRISES,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 94-1453

v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant.

OPINION
ZIEGLER, Chief Judge.
Pending before the court is the motion of defendant,
General Motors Corporation, for summary judgment pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Defendant has moved for summary judgment

with regard to two claims of plaintiffs, to wit, violation of the
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act and tortious interference with
contracts.

General Motors also has moved to dismiss the claims

of Nicholas Crivelli, Orlando Crivelli and Crivelli Enterprises.
This case arises out of the attempted purchase of an
automobile dealership in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania.

In early

1991, the owner of Scheidmantel Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. decided
to sell his business, and entered into negotiations with Floyd
McElwain, another auto dealer.

Scheidmantel's franchise

agreement with GM contained two clauses relevant to this action.
One mandated that any sale or transfer of the franchise must
first have GM's approval, and the other granted GM a right of
first refusal prior to the final transfer of the franchise.

In

October 1991, Scheidmantel and McElwain signed an asset purchase

»i»**

agreement which would have transferred ownership to McElwain.

GM

approved the transfer, but McElwain rescinded the agreement on
October 28, 1991.
On November 20, 1991, Scheidmantel signed a second
asset purchase agreement, this time with plaintiffs.

In this

agreement, plaintiffs sought to relocate the Oldsmobile-Cadillac
dealership from Beaver Falls to the site of Nick Crivelli
Chevrolet, Inc., in Vanport Pennsylvania, about five miles away.
GM did not approve the Crivelli/Scheidmantel agreement, and in
subsequent months plaintiffs modified the agreement in order to
gain GM's approval.
required the move.

In doing so, they removed the condition that
At the same time, however, GM began separate

negotiations with McElwain, ultimately agreeing that if GM
exercised its right of first refusal in the Scheidmantel
franchise contract, McElwain would assume GM's rights and replace
plaintiffs as the buyer.

The GM/McElwain contract would have

pre-empted any final sale from Scheidmantel to plaintiffs and
would have given McElwain the dealership at the price and terms
of the Crivelli/Scheidmantel agreement.
By letter dated January 31, 1992, plaintiffs notified
GM of their modified agreement with Scheidmantel.

On February

sixth, GM exercised its right of first refusal, and scheduled a
closing for the Scheidmantel/McElwain transfer.

In March 1992,

however, before the final transfer of the dealership to any
party, creditors forced the Scheidmantel dealership into Chapter
7 bankruptcy proceedings.

On April 23 the United States
2

Bankruptcy Court held an auction to dispose of the dealership and
awarded the dealership to McElwain, as the ^highest bidder.
Plaintiffs claim that the actions of General Motors
violated the Pennsylvania statute prohibiting manufacturers from
unreasonably withholding approval of franchise transfers among
auto dealers.

Further, plaintiffs argue that the actions also

give rise to a tortious claim involving intentional interference
with performance of contract by a third person.

Defendant argues

that this case is ripe for summary judgment in its favor, as
there are no issues of material fact and that defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

We disagree.

Summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with any affidavits, show that there is no issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
322 (1986).

Celotex v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317,

In considering a motion for summary judgment, we

must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that
party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986).

Further, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

held that
[a]lthough a /scintilla of evidence' supporting the nonmovant's case is not sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, it is clear that a district court should
not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
itself, but instead, should determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.
Country Floors v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford. 930 F.2d at
3

1062 (3d Cir. 1991), citing Anderson. 477 U.S. at 252.

Pennsylvania Statute
Plaintiffs contend that defendant violated §
818.9(b)(3) of the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act, which
states that it is unlawful "for any manufacturer . . .

licensed

under this act to [unreasonably withhold consent to the sale,
transfer or exchange of the franchise to a qualified buyer
capable of being licensed as a new vehicle dealer in this
Commonwealth.11

Under the act, "any person who is or may be

injured by a violation" may bring an action for damages.

63

P.S.A. §818.20(a).
Defendant argues that plaintiffs lack standing under
this act because the statute "protects [only] the existing
dealer's ability to obtain by 'sale' the value represented by
'the franchise.'"

Defendant's brief at 25. However, in Big

Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358,
1383 (3d Cir. 1992) f cert, denied. 113 S.Ct. 1262 (1993), the

Court of Appeals interpreted the statute to greoit standing to a
prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership.

Therefore, we

hold that plaintiffs have standing to bring suit under the
statute.
Defendant also argues that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether GM reasonably denied the transfer of
the franchise to plaintiffs, and that GM is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

We disagree.
4

Plaintiffs first submitted the Scheidmantel/Crivelli
transfer application to defendant's local ?zone office" on
December 10, 1991.

At that time, the application included a plan

to relocate the franchise to the site of Crivelli's current GM
dealership.

Subsequently, plaintiffs removed the condition, and

notified defendant of the change on January 31, 1992.

During the

interim period, General Motors initiated negotiations with
McElwain concerning the contractual right of first refusal.

On

February 6th, defendant exercised its right of refusal and
notified plaintiffs of its action.

GM contends that this

amounted to nothing more than an exercise of its "considered
business judgment," in selecting franchisees for its dealerships,
and therefore was not unreasonable.

Defendant's brief at 22.

Plaintiffs rejoin that their modified agreement with Scheidmantel
overcame all of defendant's stated objections, and that
defendant's denial of permission to transfer the franchise
violated the statute.
We have considered In Re Headquarters Dodge, Inc., 13
F.3d 674 (3d Cir. 1993), where the Court of Appeals found that an
issue of material fact arose in a similar situation.

In that

case, under a similarly-interpreted New Jersey statute, a
plaintiff contended that a manufacturer had modified conditions
for approval of transfer.

The Court found that a finder of fact

would have to determine whether the denial of approval was
unreasonable.

Applying that teaching, we find that plaintiffs

have adduced sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of
5

material fact.

Plaintiffs' claim will survive summary judgment.

Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship
GM further claims that its pre-existing right of first
refusal precludes plaintiffs' claim for tortious interference
with the performance of a contract.

In its brief, defendant

argues that because the right of first refusal existed in
Scheidmantel's franchise contract before plaintiffs and
Scheidmantel began negotiations for transfer of the franchise,
General Motors acted within its rights.

Defendant's brief at 10.

Plaintiffs argue that the ultimate determination of
whether a tort occurred should be based on whether GM violated
the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act.

In support, plaintiffs

again cite Bia Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, 974 F.2d
at 1380-1382 , as well as §767 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts•

According to §767(a)# the nature of the actor's conduct

should be a part of the determination of whether the conduct was
improper.

Further, the Comment on Clause (a) states that

evidence of whether the conduct alleged was improper can include
H

[c]onduct specifically in violation of statutory provisions."

In Big Apple BMW, the Court of Appeals found that because the
"factual underpinnings of [the] tort claims are intertwined11 with
the plaintiffs7 statutory claims, a finder of fact would need to
determine whether the actions constituted improper interference.
Big Apple BMW. Inc.. 974 F.2d at 1382.
In considering these factors, we hold that a fact-finder
6

/ must make the determination as to defendant's liability on the
tort claim.

Because a genuine issue of material fact exists for

the statutory claim, summary judgment is inappropriate on the
tort claim.
Dismissal of Plaintiffs
Finally, GM also has moved to dismiss Nicholas
Crivelli, individually, and Nicholas and Orlando Crivelli, doing
business as Crivelli Enterprises.

Defendant argues that Crivelli

Enterprises can claim no injury from the events that occurred in
this case.
claims.

Plaintiffs agree.

Therefore, we will dismiss those

Defendant also claims that Nicholas Crivelli personally

should be dismissed from the case.

We disagree, because Crivelli

was a party to the second Scheidmantel/Crivelli agreement, and
therefore Nicholas Crivelli may remain as a party to the action.
An appropriate order will follow.

Dated:

December

1995

cc: Counsel of Record

7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NICHOLAS CRIVELLI; NICK
CRIVELLI CHEVROLET, INC.;
NICHOLAS CRIVELLI and ORLANDO
G. CRIVELLI, t/d/b/a CRIVELLI
ENTERPRISES,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. 94-1453

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant.
ORDER

m****
AND NOW, this

day of December, 1995, after

consideration of the motion (document no. 5) of defendant
General Motors Corporation for summary judgment pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c),
IT IS ORDERED that the motion be and hereby is granted
with respect to the claims of Orlando Crivelli and Crivelli
Enterprises and that judgment be and hereby is entered in favor
of defendant on these claims,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion be and hereby is
denied in all other respects.

2^?.

Donald E. Z\
Chief Judg<

cc: Counsel of Record
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)KE MANAGER'S COMMENTS - OGDEN. UT.

le San Francisco Zone proposes Mr. Richard L. Warner to be
laler/owner of this new Dealer Company with a 15% investment. The
:>orda Family Trust, headed by Mr. Raymond J. Noorda will own 85% of
ie new Dealer Company, which will be Rick Warner Ogden Motor Sales,
ic. DBA Rick Warner Buick Jeep/Eagle.
ie proposal is a result of an "Agreement for Sale and Purchase of
ssets" between Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick Jeep-Eagle and Rick
arner Enterprises, Inc. The Agreement was received in this office on
pril 7, 1992. This subject point is outside the relevant market area,
1A, (10 mile radius) of the other like GM franchises, therefore, it
111 not be necessary to notify any dealers to satisfy the Utah State
ranchise Law. Ogden is also an Single Dealer Area (SDA).
iPITALIZATION: The proposed new dealership corporation will be owned
7 Richard L. Warner, 15% and the Noorda Family Trust, 85%. The total
roposed capital investment is $681,500. The Minimum Net Working
apital Standard is $500,000. The Actual Working Capital Amount is
537,500. There will be no deficiency. The proposed net value of
ixed and other assets is $72,000.
r. Richard L. Warner will invest $103,000 in capital stock to account
or his minimum required investment of 15% to be named dealer. Mr.
,
arner's funds will come from his financial investment in Rick garner *""*
nterprises and will not be encumbered.
\
\ v *
t —* \ """^ —
NDEBTEDNESS:

There is no proposed Long-Term Debt. ' v ' ^^-v^V'to -

r. Warner is currently dealer/owner of several other automotive-—m"~~
ealerships, including: Saturn of Salt Lake C^ty^^Rick"Warner
ontiac-Mazda, Salt Lake City, Utah, Rick Warner Chrysler-Plymouth,
alt Lake City, Rick Warner Hyundai, Ogden, Utah, Rick Warner
incoln-Mercury, Provo, Utah, Rick Warner Suzuki, Salt Lake City and
arner Imports, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah.
r. Rick McDonald who is currently the general manager of Rick Warner
itsubishi, Riverdale, Utah is proposed as Executive Manager of the new
'ealer Company. Mr McDonald's application indicates that he has been
n the automobile selling business since January, 1975. There is no
inancial investment proposed for Mr. McDonald.
ir. Raymond J. Noorda, head of the Noorda Family Trust, is
'hairman-President, CEO of Novell, Inc. a Provo, Ut. based computer
oftware company. Mr. Noorda indicates on his Source of Funds
Statement the current value of Novell, Inc. common stock at
>527,000,000.
VERIFICATION OF FUNDS: An attached deposit slip from Mr. Richard L.
Earner was used to verify that funds are available to him to make the
minimum required investment of 15% in the proposed Dealer Company.

GG00004O
000269

HffE MANAGER'S COMMENTS - OGDEN. UT. (COETT'D)
JCILITIES: Buick and Jeep/Eagle will be relocated from their present
gpation at 3520 Wall Avenue - Ogden, Utah to 770 West Riverdale Road
llverdale, Utah. The new location will be 2 miles from the current
^cation. As mentioned earlier, Ogden is an SDA and there are no other
|ick dealers within a 10 mile radius. Therefore, no notification is
jquired to any Buick dealers.
^ick and Jeep/Eagle will be joining Mitsubishi which is already in the
roposed facility. However, there will be adequate space for the
gSdition of Buick and Jeep/Eagle.
Juick will be separated from the other product lines and will be
distinguished through the use of elements purchased by the dealer
|hrough the Buick Retail Environment Design Image Element catalog.
|hose elements are: Car Talker, Buick Ceiling Ring with Dome and
Illumination, New Vehicle Carpet Display Pad and the Buick Icon. Order
form to be submitted after signing proposed Dealer. (Signed order form
on file at zone office).
the proposed Rent and Rent Equivalent is $240,000 or $444 per new unit
sold retail. The average Rent and Rent Equivalent for the San
Francisco Zone per new unit sold retail is $584. The current lease on
the proposed facility expires in 1999 with a 10 year renewable option.
*e San Francisco Zone recommends approval of this proposal.
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Tab 14

(c)

Please

identify

all

documents

referring

to

or

relating in any way to your response to subparts (a) and (b)
of this Interrogatory.
ANSWER:

Not applicable.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Admit that the reasons for not
appointing John Watson Chevrolet, Inc., as the authorized Buick
dealer for the Ogden, Utah area had nothing

to do with

the

performance of John Watson as an authorized Buick dealer either in
Rocks Springs, Wyoming or Evanston, Wyoming.
RESPONSE:

Admi t.

INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

If your response to Request

for

Admission No. 22 above was anything other than an unqualified
admission:
(a) Please state all facts upon which you base your
qualification or denial.
(b)

Please identify all persons having knowledge

of facts supporting or otherwise relating to your response to
subpart (a) of this Interrogatory and state the basis for such
knowledge.
(c)

Please identify all documents referring to or

relating in any way to your response to subparts (a) and (b)
of this Interrogatory.
ANSWER:

Not applicable.

-23-

1

Q

NOT AS OFTEN, THOUGH.

2

A

NOT AS OFTEN.

I HAVE GOT THOSE IN MY RECORDS.

3

TO JUST GIVE YOU THE NAMES OFF THE CUFF, I MAY MAKE A

4

MISTAKE.

5

Q

WAS THAT DEALERSHIP IN EVANSTON SUCCESSFUL?

6

A

FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL.

7

Q

WHAT DO YOU MEAN, FAIRLY?

8

A

EVANSTON WAS GOING THROUGH SOME —

9

DECLINE RECESSION-WISE.

A LITTLE

IT WAS PROFITABLE BUT IT WAS NOT

10

AS PROFITABLE AS I HAD HOPED AND IT WAS AWAY FROM MY HOME

11

HERE IN OGDEN, UTAH AND THAT WAS THE REASON THAT I SOLD

12

IT.

13

Q

WOULD IT BE FAIR TO SAY THAT YOUR EVANSTON

14

VENTURE WAS LESS PROFITABLE THAN PREVIOUS VENTURES THAT

15

YOU HAD HAD?

16

A

I WOULDN'T CATEGORIZE IT THAT WAY.

17

Q

IT JUST WASN'T WHAT YOU HAD HOPED?

18

A

EXACTLY.

19

Q

HOW WERE YOUR PERFORMANCE RATINGS IN THE

20
21
22
23
24
25

EVANSTON OPERATION?
A

IN THE SHORT TIME THAT I HAD IT, I DON'T THINK

THAT WE EXCEEDED STANDARDS THAT WERE SET EVER.
Q

IN FACT, YOU DID NOT EXCEED; IN FACT, YOU FELL

SHORT OF THE STANDARDS THAT WERE SET?
A

POSSIBLY.
18

1

Q

IN FACT, FOR JUST AN EXAMPLE, I'LL SHOW YOU A

2

DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE MARKED AS EXHIBIT 1 AND ASK IF

3

THIS IS A TYPICAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR THAT

4

EVANSTON OPERATION DURING THE TIME THAT YOU WERE THE

5

DEALER OWNER-OPERATOR OF IT.

6

(DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. 1 WAS MARKED

7

FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

8

IT INDICATES, DOES IT NOT, EXHIBIT 1, THAT

9

YOUR PERFORMANCE BASED ON SALES IS NOT EFFECTIVE?

10

A

YES.

11

Q

WOULD THAT BE A TYPICAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

12

BY BUICK DURING THE TIME THAT YOU HELD THE DEALERSHIP

13

FROM BUICK AS WELL AS FROM CHEVROLET AND OLDSMOBILE?

14

A

I COULDN'T ANSWER THAT.

15

Q

BUT AT LEAST AS OF THE FULL YEAR 1987 IT

16

APPEARS OVERALL PERFORMANCE WAS' DEEMED NOT EFFECTIVE BY

17

YOUR ZONE/BRANCH MANAGER WHO APPEARS TO BE JERRY HOLLAND.

18

DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR RECOLLECTION?

19

A

AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, THERE'S TWO OR THREE

20

WAYS OF MEASURING SALES EFFECTIVENESS.

OUR SALES

21

EFFECTIVENESS WAS NOT AS WE HAD HOPED.

THERE WERE OTHER

22

PARTS OF THE DEALERSHIP THAT WERE DOING REASONABLY WELL.

23

Q

LIKE BASED ON REGISTRATIONS?

24

A

AS YOU CAN SEE ON THIS.

25

THAT MEANS THAT WE

WERE PROBABLY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OTHER DEALERSHIPS IN
19

DNPTSR10
RETAIL SALES AND REGISTRATION SUMMARY
LOC PT: 0006714 DIVN CODE: P GM LINE: P
DIV P G
PETERSEN MOTOR COMPANY, INC.
OGDEN, UT
1989
2973
199
228
0

INDUSTRY REG IN APR -SDA
REG TO = NAT IN APR -SDA
ACTUAL REG IN APR
-SDA
REG VARIANCE TO NATL IN APR

UNIT SALES
SALES VARIANCE TO NATIONAL
REGISTRATION INDEX IN APR
SALES INDEX
SALES INDEX RANK IN GROUP
PF01
PF05
PF09
MORE

10/05/92

16:07:'
I
APPT DATE 06/27/8(
1990
12/199!
226:
3000
179
n:
173
12.C
6

10

233
0
114.57

130
49
96.65

107.1'

117.09
010/022

72.63
013/019

91.0:
017/02:

,i

DLR FIN SUMM
PF02 SALES BY SGMT PF03 DLR CSI INQ
PF04 FAC INQ-PREM
REG BY SGMT
PF06 FT REG BY SGMT PF07 SALES/REG HIST PF08 SALES/REG
BROWSE MENU
ENTR NEXT PAGE
PF10 INQUIRY MENU
PF11 MAIN MENU
P/WI
DATA - PRESS ENTER TO CONTINUE
t

-J

.-

\ a\

• r <\ \ * *
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DNPTSR10
RETAIL SALES AND REGISTRATION SUMMARY
LOC PT: 0006714 DIVN CODE: G GM LINE: L
DIV P G
PETERSEN MOTOR COMPANY, INC.
OGDEN, UT

10/05/92
1989
2158
174
179
0

INDUSTRY REG IN APR -SDA
REG TO - NAT IN APR -SDA
ACTUAL REG IN APR
-SDA
REG VARIANCE TO NATL IN APR

16:08:

APPT DATE 06/27/8
1990
12/199/
2122
188
170
14
190
11,
0
2

UNIT SALES
SALES VARIANCE TO NATIONAL
REGISTRATION INDEX IN APR

127
47
102.87

62
108
111.76

4
10.
81.6'

SALES INDEX
SALES INDEX RANK IN GROUP

72.99
142/242

36.47
196/227

28.1"
1S3/22I

PF01 DLR FIN SUMM
PF02 SALES BY SGMT PF03 DLR CSI INQ
PF04 FAC INQ-PREM
PF05 REG BY SGMT
PF06 FT REG BY SGMT PF07 SALES/REG HIST PF08 SALES/REG
PF09 BROWSE MENU
PF10 INQUIRY MENU
PF11 MAIN MENU
ENTR NEXT PAGE
END OF REQUESTED INFORMATION
, P/W:
(\

\

• : 'J i
FOfcA"^

ow-
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DNPTSI01
PONTIAC CSI INQUIRY
10/05/92 16 07:1
LOC POINT: 0006714
PLAN NO 0117824
DIVN CODE: P STATUS ACTIVE LOAD
PETERSEN MOTOR COMPANY, INC.
NON GM
OGDEN, UT 84405 WEBER
DIVISION P G
APPT DATE 06/27/80
CSI OVERALL DEALERSHIP
CUSTOMER
SURVEY
—DEALER RANK—
LAST 3 MTHS
12 MTH
RESPONSE
DIVN
YR STA
ZONE
PERIOD
DLR ZONE DIVN DLR ZONE
NUM PCT
92
AUGUST
101/123 2420/2789
81
87
88
86
88
34
44%
92
JUNE
82
86
87
84
87
98/121 2355/2787
43%
31
83
86
87
73
85
92
MARCH
45%
96/120 2242/2799
38
81
86
87
81
86
45%
91
DECEMBER
104/126 2410/2832
41
45%
80
86
87
95
87
91
SEPTEMBER
109/129 2467/2840
46
46%*
78
86
87
86
86
91
JUNE
117/132 2590/2848
52
41%
76
85
86
72
85
91
MARCH
116/133 2655/2860
47
40%
77
86
86
78
85
90
DECEMBER
115/132 2619/2869
58
2665/2867
38%
76
86
86
77
87
90
SEPTEMBER
119/133
67
= DEALER PARTICIPATING IN PROGRAM LESS THAN 12 MONTHS
$ = OWNERSHIP CHANGED HANDS LAST 12 MONTHS; PREV OWNER DATA INCL IN REPORf.
§ = NO CUSTOMER RESPONSE DURING LAST 3 MONTH PERIOD
PF01
PF02
PF04 SALES/REG SUM!
PF03 DIV DLR IN
PF05 DLR FIN SUMM
PF06 FAC INQ-PREM
PF08
PF07 ^ , i -T \ 1
PF09 BROWSE MENU
PF10 INQUIRY MENU
"ENTR NEXT DIVISION
PE-n'MATN MENU
P/W:

'<U

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

000849

DNPTFA05
DEALER FACILITY INQUIRY - DETAIL
LOC PT: 0006714 PLAN NO 0117824 STATUS ACTIVE LOAD
PETERSEN MOTOR COMPANY, INC.
GMMS 1016 DATE 11/01/90
0
DIVN
P
G
PGUID
200
200
GUIDE -—BUILDING—
LOTDEPARTMENTS
STALLS
OTHER
GM
GM OTHER
NEW VEHICLE DISPLAY
3
5
10
30
60
USED VEHICLE DISPLAY
33
40
47
PROD. SERVICE: MECH
9
12
18
PROD. SERVICE: BODY
5
8
10
SERVICE RECEPTION
2
8
12
4
8
PARKING - CUSTOMER
28
40
46
NEW VEHICLE STORAGE
50
70
155
EMPL/DEMO PARK MISC
14
35
50
SQ . FT
GENERAL OFFICE
1800
2340
1560
PARTS
2800
3600
4060
PFOl FAC STUDY-SUMM PF02 NON-GM INQ
PF05 DLR FIN SUMM
PF06 FAC INQ-PREM
PF09 BROWSE MENU
PF10 INQUIRY MENU

10/05/92

FACTS
TOTAL NONGM
400
760
% GM
COMB
GM
TOTAL GUIDE
TOTA:
35 1167
10!

PF03 DIV DLR INQ
PF07 CSI INQUIRY
PF11 MAIN MENU

F0B

Krrora^

16:09:52
BMD PONT

40
12
8
12
40
70
35

121
133
160
600
143
140
250

8'
3(
IS
3:
8(
22!
8i

2340
3600

130
129

390(
766(

PF04 SALES/REG SU1
PF08 INV INQ
ENTR NEXT LOC PT
P/W:
ONC

^JF
000852

Tab 15

September 17, 1992
Mr. Tom Garove
.j Buick Motor Division
39465 Paseo Padre Parkway
Fremont CA 94538 -"""
Dear Mr. Garove:
I forwarded the documents concerning John Watson's application as
Buick dealer in Ogden to Mr. Watson today via Mr. Merrill Bean by a
copy of this letter.
Your letter of September 15, 1992 transmitting said documents
requested a copy of the Buy/Sell Agreement between HELSCO and
John Watson. It is my understanding Dave Koch, President of HELSCO
forwarded said document to you the day after it was executed. It is
my understanding from John Watson today that said document has
already been forwarded to Flint for corporate review. Accordingly, I
did not send another copy to you. If you need an "official"
transmittal in a certain form from an officer of the corporation,
please contact Dave Koch. I am not an officer.
Sincerely,

fa.

Henry Mixon

EXHI8IMK\l.
Cc-:::::.-:j cfo

For Identification

I

^.Vanrfs)

000197

Tab 16

RECEIVED
BUICK MOTOR DIV.
OCT 1 3 1992
Mr.
Buick
P.O.
Oakli
Dear

. ~ « . ^ , A I » October 13, ^1992
SAN FRANCISCO ZONE
^ C ^ { ,
otor Division
\ ^ J ~*
\x 23500
r* i \ \ *
CA 94623
Wpodley

ten:

You ii
Buick
rights j
purctu
for Si
1992,
should!
service
day
termini
Mle
action
rights
My ur
Buick 1
current
current
pure!
storage
amoudl
fees/coj
the abj
(trust

tcated that, in the event John Watson is not approved as the
ler in Ogden, Utah, Buick Motor Division will exercise its
ider the dealer sales and service agreement to complete the
under the same terms aft are contained in the Agreement
and Purchase of Assets (the Agreement) dated August 31,
lich you have been provided. Further, you indicated that
clay in resolving the issuance of the new dealer sales and
igreement extend beyond the e^ptiftion o f the statutory 60
Buick Motor Division will not cause the franchise to be
In reliance upon that representation, HELSCO will not
Chapter 11 protection under the bankruptcy laws. Such
fould be needed at this time only to preserve the franchise
ultimate sale.
landing of the terms of the Agreement is as follows. The
and accessories will be Inventoried and purchased at
atalog prices (or at amounts mutually agreed to, if not in a
atalog). The special tools and their storage cases will be
as provided in the Agreement. Fixed assets (such as parts
ins, etc.) would be purchased at mutually agreed upon
(not a required asset to be purchased). The consulting
ant not to compete of $120,000 will be paid. The sum of
amounts will be paid to the law firm of Nielsen & Senior
count).

Sincei

Henry tjkixon

000136

Tab 17

1360

971 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d SERIES

Henry T. Reath, I/ewis R ONhin. Puano.
Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia. Pa .
JameR W. Quinn (argued), Mindy .F Sj>ec
tor, Weil, Gotshal & Mange?, New York
City, for appellee cross appellant.
Before: MANSMANN. COWEN and
ROTH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT1
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
In these cross appeals, we are once again
called upon to delineate that quantum of
evidence necessary for an antitrust plaintiff to prove in order to withstand a motion
for summary judgment. Here the unsuccessful applicants for several BMW franchises brought suit against the United
States distributor for BMW automobiles.
BMW of North America (BMW NA). The
applicants (the Potamkins) assert that
BMW NA and its dealers violated the Sherman Act by engaging in concerted action to
exclude them from becoming dealers.
BMW NA contends that it acted independently of its dealers and tenders business
reasons for its refusal to deal with the
Potamkins. In response, the Potamkins
have countered each business reason with
circumstantial evidence of concerted action.
Thus faced with equal and competing inferences, we must apply to the standard for
summary judgment, in which all inferences
must be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party, Country Floors, Inc. v. A Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930
F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir.1991), the holding in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 768, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1473, 79
L.Ed.2d 775 (1984), that in an antitrust
action "there must be evidence that tends
to exclude the possibility of independent
action by the manufacturer and distributor."
The plaintiffs are brothers Robert and
Alan Potamkin, and their corporate entities, Big Apple BMW, Inc. and Potamkin
BMW and VW, Inc., who, in 1985, sought
BMW franchises in Manhattan, New York
1.

References to portions of the record filed under seal have been deleted from the published
version of this opinion. Deletions in this pub-

and Philadelphia. Pennsylvania. The Potamkin family, which for our purposes include* Robert, A Inn. and their father Victor, owns approximately 45 automobile
franchise located it) Manhattan, Philadelphia. Atlanta, anrl Miami. According to
Victor.
these
franchises collectively
amassed a sale*; volume of between $800
and $900 million in 1987 alone. A657.
The Potamkins asserted in their complaint that BMW NA and certain of its
dealer? engaged in a "group boycott to
exclude plaintiffs and pursuant to a contract, combination or conspiracy with certain BMW dealers to fix, raise, maintain
and stabilize prices of BMW automobiles in
the United States." Complt at !34.
Briefly, BMW NA contends that it unilaterally rejected the Potamkins because their
high volume price-discounter image is incompatible with the image of BMW NA
and because the Potamkins did not meet
other required standards.
We conclude that, for purposes of summary judgment, the Potamkins have set
forth sufficient evidence of concerted action between BMW NA and its dealership
body to exclude the Potamkins and further
produced evidence that tends to show that
BMW NA's alleged reasons for rejecting
the Potamkins were pretextual. Thus, we
will vacate the judgment with respect to
the antitrust claims and the closely related
pendent state law antitrust and tortious
interference claims and remand them for
further proceedings. These counts will
then be joined with the Pennsylvania Board
of Vehicles Act claim, the sole claim that
the district court had excepted from summary judgment, for further proceedings.
I.
The factual underpinnings for the Potamkins' claims arose from three distinct, but
allegedly related, incidents in which the
Potamkins negotiated with BMW NA and
BMW dealers for franchises in the Philadelphia and New York City metropolitan
areas. The first incident involved Victor
lished opinion of the court are indicated by
three asterisks, and the length of the matter
deleted is given in brackets.

BIG APPLE BMW, INC. v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.
Cite a* 974 F~2d 1358 (3rd CIr. 1992)
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6. Monopolies <$=»28(7.3)

11. Federal Civil Procedure <£=>2484

Antitrust plaintiff must be prepared to
demonstrate causal relationship between
alleged dealer complaints and distributor's
action in order to show that concerted action in violation of Sherman Act is distinguishable from "perfectly legitimate" independent conduct; in that regard, proof of
causation requires more than sequence of
dealer complaints to distributor followed by
distributor's conduct alleged to violate antitrust laws. Sherman Anti Trust Act, § 1,
15 U.S.C A. § 1.

Unsuccessful applicants for automobile
franchises set forth sufficient evidence of
concerted action between distributor and
its dealership body to exclude them, for
purposes of determining admissibility of
statements as coconspirators admissions
and defeating distributor's motion for summary judgment on antitrust claims. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1;
Fed.RuIes
Evid.RuIe
801(d)(2)(E),
28
U.S.C.A.

7. Federal Civil P r o c e d m .

Unsuccessful applicants for automobile
franchises produced evidence tending to
show that distributor's alleged independent
reasons for rejecting their applications
were pretextual and thus defeated distributor's motion for summary judgment on antitrust claims; alleged reasons included allegations that applicants' image as high
volume price-discounters was incompatible
with desired product image, that applicants' customer service record was inadequate, that one proposed location was inadequate for a number of reasons, that applicants were uncooperative, and that one applicant objected to annual allocation of
cars
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 15
U S C A . § 1.

^2484

On automobile distributor's motion for
summary judgment on antitrust claims of
concerted action, district court inappropriately compartmentalized unsuccessful automobile franchise applicants' evidence and
drew inferences in distributor's favor; in
defending against summary judgment, applicants did not have to eliminate all possible independent justifications by distributor
so that only evidence of concerted action
would be left in the record, but rather had
to produce evidence tending to exclude possibility of independent action. Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 15 U S C A . § 1.
8. Corporations «=»l.5(3)
Statement of subsidiary may be attributed to its corporate parent, consistent
with agene> theory, where parent dominates actiuties of subsidiary
9. Monopolies «=>28(7.3)
Statement evidencing occurrence of
concerted action is not inadmissible in anti
trust action because it follows that aclivit)
Sherman Anti Trust Act, § 1, 15 U S C A
§ I10. Evidence <S=»253( 1)
Proponent for admission uf statement
as coconspirator admission must establish
existence of conspiracy b> a fair prepunder
ance of independent ewdence. mere assou
aUon does not suffice, but on the other
hand, timing u r c u m s U i k c s , one or a aeries
of meetings may
Fed Rules L\id Rule
SOHdH-'MrJ) 28 I ' S r A

12. Federal Civil P r o c e d u r e <s=>2484

13. Federal Civil P r o c e d u r e <s=2515
Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for automobile
distributors on unsuccessful franchise applicants' pendant state law claims for tortious interference with contract, the underpinnings of which were intertwined with
antitrust claims.
14. Trade Regulation «=>871.3
Unsuccessful applicants for automobile
franchises had standing to allege violation
of Penna)l\anid Board of Vehicles Act by
automobile distributor 63 P S §§ 818.1 et
seq , 818 9(b){3, 4) 818 20(a)

Harold £ Kohn (argued), Robert J. l>a
Hocca, Kohn Savett, Klein & Graf, Charles
J Bluom, Kleinbard, Bell & Brecker, Philadelphia Pa , for appellants cross appellees
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Potamkin's negotiations for a Great Neck,
New York franchise in 1981. It admittedly
falls outside the statute of limitations but
is included for the purpose of demonstrating a pattern of conduct. The latter two
incidents comprise the Potamkins' basis for
liability. We provide only a cursory sketch
of these incidents here because the evidence will be later reviewed in detail.
. .First, during 1981, Victor Potamkin met
with BMW NA representatives on several
occasions to discuss Victor's acquisition of
a Great Neck, New York BMW franchise.
The Potamkins allege that Victor and
BMW NA's Eastern Regional Manager
Terry Cronin reached an oral agreement
for a BMW franchise; BMW NA insists
that their discussions terminated prior to
any agreement because Victor allegedly attempted to bribe Cronin. Both parties
agree that these discussions ended without
a written agreement. By letter dated November 4, 1981, BMW NA conveyed to
Victor its desire not to appoint a dealer in
Great Neck. A1203.
The second incident occurred in 1985.
Gladys Caufield, owner of the Trans-Atlantic BMW dealership in Manhattan, in anticipation of losing her lease, began to negotiate with the Potamkins. A1613-14. In
early September, they reached an oral
agreement of sale for a price of $800,000
plus an undetermined amount for parts.
In the ensuing months, however, BMW NA
informed Caufield that it would not award
a franchise to the Potamkins, and only
days before the expiration of her lease,
BMW NA offered her the significantly lower amount of $550,000, plus a repurchase
of parts as required by the franchise agreement. A1640. She accepted this offer and
BMW NA closed Trans-Atlantic, leaving
only one dealer remaining in Manhattan
A164S-49.
The third incident occurred in Philadelphia, contemporaneously v>ith the second,
when Hubert Potumkin entered into a written agreement to purchase the assets ut
Irvin Greens BMW dealership in October
2. In it* a p e l l a t e bf uf* HM\S N \ h u w u i n u i u c J
to cite to that CMJCIUC r o k J t i i a J n u ^ i b l c bs
the J u t l U l

kOUII

but

hii>

talk J

to

J.alk'i.f.L
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of 1985. A172Q-47. This "buy-sell" agreement was contingent upon Robert's acquisition of a BMW franchise, and included ah
expiration date of December 23, 1985.
A1729-30. Robert sought immediately to
obtain a franchise application from BMW
NA, and although they vigorously' contest
the reasons, both parties agree that Robert's application was not taken until October 29, 1985. Thus, as BMW NA recognized, it had 60 days from October 29th in
which to act on the application under state
law. After the buy-sell agreement expired
on December 23rd, BMW NA informed
Green that Potamkin was not a suitable
candidate for a BMW franchise. A869-70.
The Potamkins filed suit in April of 1987,
alleging that BMW NA violated section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, sections
4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 15, 26 (Count I), and the Pennsylvania
Board of Vehicles Act, 63 Pa.Stat.Ann.
§ 818.1, et seq. (Purdon's Supp.1991)
(Count II). In addition, the Potamkins alleged that BMW NA tortiously interfered
with their contractual and prospective business advantage (Count III), committed
state law civil conspiracy (Count IV), and
utilized unfair methods of competition under Pennsylvania law and New York's Donnelly Act (Count V).
After lengthy and acrimonious discovery,
in Ma> of 1989, BMW NA moved for summary judgment. Much of the evidence provided in support of its motion involved information that the district court had ruled
inadmissible in its April 18, 1989 order limiting discovery A59-60 In answer to the
Potamkins* responsive motion, as well as to
amplify ifc> previous order, the district
cuurt issued an order on June 2, 1989,
which excluded, for purposes of summary
judgment, "information concerning plaintiffs' specific customer satisfaction rankings except to the extent that such informatiun was known to and allegedly relied
upun b> the defendant in 1985, and has
been disclosed to plaintiffs in discovery

1

A1448-49

ihnx: ruling*
\U* will, therefore, review the
cviJcruc J> t o i i h n e J b\ those orders.
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In due course, th^ d^trr-t cur* r;l*id :»> iMy t'tnn ««»nvu'tn»n that, while the evifavor of BMW NA »»n each r«'*m!. • wry* d»mcv •!<>•»> n«»t rule «»ut the possibility that
for Count II, the Penn*} Kama I?'»ard of **'•» defendant * n'jVctioii* of plaintiffs' apVehicles Act claim, v.hirh it TP***T\t»d f«»r pl»i ati^n* wt-rv the product of concerted
trial. The Potamkin? sought and rf*cn\\p<\ action het*A*H*n defendant and one or more
a Rule 54(h) certification from the district of it5 dealer*, there i* dimply no proof of
court as to tho^e count5 on which summary concerted action sufficient to withstand a
judgment was entered. On thp *tntp hw motion for Mimmary judgment." /rf. at 15.
claim of Count II, the district court certiB.
fied a controlling question of law concern( 1 | Summary judgment should be
ing standing to sue under the Board of
Vehicles Act, and we subsequently granted granted where no genuine issue of material
BMW NA permission to appeal the denial fact exists for resolution at trial and the
of summary judgment on that claim pursu- moving' party i«* entitled to judgment as &
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) This appeal and matter of law Fed R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is ho
longer a disfavored procedural shortcut,
cross-appeal followed.
and may present the district court with the
The district court exercised federal subfirst opportunity to dispose of meritless
ject matter jurisdiction over the Sherman
cases under the federal practice of notice
Act claim and pendent jurisdiction over the
pleading. Celofrx Corp. v. Catrett, 477»
state law claims. Our standard of review
US 317, 327, 106 S Ct 2548, 2354, 91
is plenary. Goodman v. Mcad Johnson &
L Ed 2d 265 (1986) This is true even in
Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976), cert,
antitrust cases, "where motive and intent
denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50
play leading roles, the proof is largely in
L.Ed.2d 748 (1977). We review the dismissthe hands of the alleged conspirators/and
al of the pendent state claims utilizing an hostile witnesses thicken the plot," Poller
abuse of discretion standard. Cooler/ x\ v. Columbia Broadcasting System,, Ipc,
Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct 486, 491^7
830 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.1987).
L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); see Matsushita Elec
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp^
IL
475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct 1348, 89,LEd.2d$£
A.
(1986); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
As the district court accurately stated in Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct 1464^79
its unpublished Memorandum Opinion, 1990 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984); Edward / Siceenefb
WL 182340 "[t]he narrow issue upon which Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 fjjfc
decision turns is whether plaintiffs have Cir.1980), cert denied, 451 U.S.,91I,lpl
enough evidence to get to a jury on the S.Ct. 1981, 68 L.Ed.2d 300 (1981); Fragile
issue of concerted action." Id. at 5. The & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F2i 40
. ' , ,\]fi*
district court first concluded that the Po- (3d Cir.1985).
tamkins had failed to produce direct eviThe summary judgment standard^ h^f
dence that BMW dealers opposed the Po- been likened to the "reasonable jurj^jjf:
tamkins as dealers, complained to BMW rected verdict standard. See Andersopjf.
NA about the Potamkins, or that BMW Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251>,i06
NA's decisions were responsive to dealer S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202,(1986).
complaints, Id. at 6. The district court The moving party need not produce- erithen evaluated "19 bits of evidence which, dence to disprove the opponents clahnjCid.[the Potamkins] argue, support ... an in- otex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct at 2552,W
ference [of the requisite concerted ac- does carry the burden to demonstrate the
tion]." 3 Ia\ After considering each of the absence of any genuine issues of material
"19 bits" individually, the district court fact If the movant has produced evide5jt<
concluded that it was "left with the reason- in support of summary judgment, then tw
3. These "19 bits" of evidence are listed infra at

footnote U.
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opponent may not rest on the allegations
set forth in its pleadings but must counter
with evidence that demonstrates a genuine
issue of f a c t Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). This, in
turn, requires the opponent to "set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
[2,3] When deciding a motion for summary judgment, nonetheless, a court's role
remains circumscribed in that it is inappropriate for a court to resolve factual disputes and to make credibility determinations. Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 1061.
Thus an opponent may not prevail merely
by discrediting the credibility of the movant's evidence; it must produce some affirmative evidence. Anderson,
477 U.S. at
256-57, 106 S.Ct at 2514-15. Inferences
should be drawn in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, and where the
non-moving party's evidence contradicts
the movant's, then the non-movant's must
be taken as true. Country Floors, 930
F.2d at 1061 (citing Goodman v. Mead
Johnson & Co, 534 F.2d at 573).
v This trial "on paper" differs from a trial
before a jury in one significant detail: "at
the summary judgment stage the judge's
function is not . . to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial." Anderson,
477 U.S. at
249, 106 S.Ct at 2511. This does not require a court to turn a blind eye to the
weight of the evidence; the "opponent
must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material f a c t s " Matsushita,
475 U S at 586,
106 S.Ct, at 1356 To raise a genuine issue
of material fact, however, the opponent
need not match, item for item, each piece of
evidence proffered by the movant. In practical ternib, if the opponent has exceeded
the "mere scintilla" threshold and hut> of*
fered a genuine issue of material fact, then
the court cannot credit the movant'* ver
sion of events against the opponent, even if
the quantity of the movant's evidence far
butweighs that of it* opponent
It thus
remains the province of the factfinder to
ascertain the behevability and weight i>f
the evidence

A non-movant's burden in defending
against summary judgment in an antitrust
case is no different than in any other case.
As was recently clarified by the Supreme
Court:
The Court's requirement in Matsushita t h a t the plaintiffs' claims make economic sense did not introduce a special
burden on plaintiffs facing summary
judgment in antitrust cases. The Court
did not hold if the moving party enunciates any economic theory supporting its
behavior, regardless of its accuracy in
reflecting the actual market, it is entitled
to summary j u d g m e n t Matsushita
demands only that the nonmoving party's
inferences be reasonable in order to
reach the jury, a requirement that was
not invented, but merely articulated, in
that decision. If the plaintiffs theory is
economically senseless, no reasonable
jury could find in its favor, and summary
judgment should be granted.
Eastman
Kodak Co v. Image
Technical
Services, — U.S.
,
, 112 S.Ct
2072, 2083, 119 L Ed 2d 265 (1992) (footnote
omitted).
Therefore, in the summary judgment
context, ''inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the opposing party M Matsushita,
475 U S. at 587, 106 S C t
at 587 These inferences, however, when
drawn from ambiguous evidence, are circumscribed in antitrust cases because a
fine line demarcates concerted action that
violates antitrust law from legitimate business practices See Monsanto, 465 U S at
762-64, 104 S C t at 1470-71 Care must
be taken to ensure that inferences of unlawful activity drawn from ambiguous evidence do nut infringe upon the defendant's
freedom, so long as it acts independently,
to refuse to deal, United States v Colgate
£ Co, 250 U S 300, 39 S Ct 465, 63 L Ed.
992 (1919), or to impose vertical non price
restraints, Continental
T V, Inc v GTE
Sylmnia
Inc., 433 U S 36, 97 S C t 2549,
53 L r ^ i 2 d 5fa8 (1977) Nevertheless, the
dununarv judgment movant must show
that an inference of concerted action to
exclude Luiiipetitiun from evidence of BMW
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NA's inconsistent beha\K»r and dealer com
plaints i* unreasonable Srr En*t*nnn Ao
(ink,
U S at
. 112 S f t at 2<W
('
(1-6) Of COUP***, in ruling upon a mo
tion for summarv judgment a court mu*t
evaluate the material facts against the sub
stantive proof required of the plaintiff
For a section 1 claim under the Sherman
Act, a plaintiff must prove "concerted ac
tion," a collective reference to the " 'contract . combination or conspiracy.' " Bogosian v Gulf Oil Corp, 561 F 2d 434,
445-45 (3d Cir.1977), cert denied, 434 U S
1086, 98 S.Ct. 1280, 55 L.Ed 2d 791 (1978),
see Edward J. Sweeney, 637 F 2d at 111
If, as BMW NA asserts, it acted independently in denying the Potamkins a franchise, no antitrust liability would attach
Colgate, 250 U S at 307, 39 S.Ct. 468
Moreover, the inferences of concerted action that may be drawn from circumstantial
evidence in antitrust cases is circumscribed.
Thus an antitrust plaintiff must be prepared to demonstrate a causal relationship
between alleged dealer complaints and a
distributor's action in order to show that
the concerted action in violation of the
Sherman Act is distinguishable from "perfectly legitimate" independent conduct
See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64, 104
S.Ct. at 1470-71.
In that regard, proof of causation requires more than a sequence of dealer complaints to a distributor that are followed by
the distributor's conduct alleged to violate
antitrust laws. Edward J. Sweeney, 637
F.2d at 111-15. A jury may not be permitted to speculate as to cause from a chain of
events, id. at 111; the plaintiff must demonstrate adequately " 'a unity of purpose
or a common design and understanding, or
a meeting of the minds/ " Id. (quoting
American
Tobacco Co. v. United
States,
328 U.S. 781, 810, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 1139, 90
L.Ed. 1575 (1946)).
As the Supreme Court admonished in
Monsanto, we ought not to permit an inference of an agreement in violation of the
Sherman Act to arise merely from "the
fact that termination came about 'in re-

«*p«»n«t» to complaints ' 465 US. at 763,
HU S Ct at 1470 Permitting such an inferrnce could "deter or penalize perfectly
legitimate conduct", non price restrictions
mav simply reflect normal business condition* which do not raise the specter of
concerted action
Moreover, dealers are
often important sources of information for
distributors or manufacturers and these
sources should not be restricted by imprac
tical antitrust prohibitions. See id. at 76364. 104 S Ct at 1470-71.
In Monsanto, the Court ruled that more
than mere complaints of concerted action
were necessary to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. Accordingly, "tt]here
must be evidence that tends to exclude the
possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently." 465 U S at 764, 104 S.Ct at
1471.
'*[T]he antitrust plaintiff shou#
present direct or circumstantial evidence
that reasonably tends to prove that the
manufacturer and others 'had a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed
to achieve an unlawful objective/? I<L,
(citing Edward J. Sweeney, 637 FMtt
111).
Monsanto does not require that a plaintiff provide direct evidence of a causal
relationship; concerted action may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. /See
id., 465 U S. at 764, 768, 104 S.Ct at 147CV
1472 That evidence should be analyzed *s
a whole, rather than compartmentalized* to
determine whether it supports an inference
of concerted action. Continental Ore C&
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 3f0
U.S. 690, 82 S.Ct 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777
(1962). In Continental Ore, the Court admonished federal courts not to "approach
[antitrust] claims as if they were . . . conv
pletely separate and unrelated lawsuit*.*
Id. at 698, 82 S.Ct at 1410.
In cases such as this, plaintiffs shoaiytf
given the full benefit of their prooi^nt^
out tightly compartmentalizing the fig*,
ous factual components and w i p i n g ^
slate clean after scrutiny of each.,,*
[T]he duty of the jury was to look at the
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whole picture and not merely at the individual figures in it.
370 U.S. at 699, 82 S.Ct. at 1410.
We utilized this approach in Arnold
Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp,
786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.1986), in which the
plaintiff asserted that GM and its dealers
conspired to deny the plaintiff a franchise
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. There we found sufficient to withstand summary judgment the evidence that
GM had favorably viewed Arnold Pontiac's
franchise application until after the GM
dealers' collectively expressed disapproval
and threatened non-cooperation.
Id. at
573-74. Arnold Pontiac had met the Monsanto standard, specifically that the conduct of the dealers constituted sufficient
evidence that "tends to exclude the possibility that [GMC acted] independently."
Id. at 574 (quoting Monsanto).
We concluded that a reasonable inference of concerted action could be drawn from the
whole of the evidence and remanded the
case for trial. Id.
[71 Here, the Potamkms assert, and we
agree, that the district court inappropriately compartmentalized their evidence and
drew inferences in favor of BMW NA rather than in their favor They a r g u e that the
district court's holding, in effect, would
require that to successfully defend against
summary judgment, they must produce evi
dence sufficient to prevail upon their own
motion for summary judgment
In es
sence, the Potamkins urge, and we agree,
that m defending against summary judgment, they need not "eliminate all possible
'independent* justifications b> the manufac
turer, [so that] only evidence oi concerted
action would be left m the record " The)
need, rather, to produce "evidence that
tendb to exclude the possibility of indepen
dent action " Motisantu, 465 U S at 768,
104 S C t at 1473
According to the Potamkmb,
Monsanto
cannot be read to require an opponent of
sununar) judgment to produce the same
quantum and kind of evidence it would
need to aftirmatueU make its own motion
for b u m n u n judgment Thus the Potam
kins urge thai a leading ut Munstinto that

requires them to affirmatively disprove any
legitimate reasons for BMW NA's actions
would be inconsistent with the burden of
proof required for a non-movant to defeat a
summary judgment motion. In this case,
that consideration is especially germane because the quantity of the Potamkins' evidence is outweighed by the quantity of
BMW NA's evidence. BMW NA primarily
contends that summary judgment is appropriate because "there [is] no evidence to
establish that BMW dealers were opposed
to appellants' efforts to obtain franchises,
or that any BMW dealers complained to
BMW NA about [the Potamkms], or that
BMW NA's refusal to appoint [the Potamkins] as dealers was in response to dealer
complaints." With the foregoing orientation, we now turn to review the evidence
presented in this case
III.
The Potamkms have produced evidence
of concerted action spanning several years
and three locations. For the sake of clarity, we will order the evidence according to
the location in which the Potamkins sought
a particular franchise. There is consistent
evidence that BMW NA encouraged the
Potamkins to acquire BMW dealerships,
that the New York and Philadelphia dealers subsequently complained to BMW NA
about the Potamkins, and that BMW NA
later denied the Potamkms franchises giving allegedly pretextual reasons
A.
1981

Gteat

Neck

In 1980, Victor Potamkm initiated negotiations with BMW NA for a franchise by
writing to BMW's German manufacturer
A14b3 In response, Terry Cronin, BMW
NA's Eastern Regional Manager, sent the
following correspondence to Victor in No\ ember vi I9b0
OLwuusI), because I reside and work in
the New York Metro area I am personal
1> well aware of your status as a proven
and successful automobile executive
Hcalcri/ation for the northeast portion of
the I mud States comes under the re

971 FFDF.RM. RKPnRJT.K. .M SFKIFS

13G6

sponsibility of \h** FaM'-rn r» c : , r
I
would be very happy to m^M v.ifh # wi at
your convenience t/> di.«c»i*c '.«. ra>*. »r
mutual opportunities may exl^t ^r-t^p^n
yourself and BMWNA.
A1464.
Accordingly, Victor and Cronin met on
approximately four or five occasion? Cmnin testified in his deposition that following
initial meetings, also attended by Andrew
Pokomy, BMW NA's Vice President of
Sales, A1487-88, 1507-09, he "was favorably impressed wfth Victor" as an individu
al, although Cronin shied away from opining as to Victor's suitability for a dealership at that time. A1491-92. These meetings focused upon available "open
points." * As one basis for its termination
of negotiations, BMW NA contends that
Victor's interests lay not m the Great Keck
open point that BMW NA sought to fill,
but in Atlanta and Miami, A1489-90, or
North Plainfield, New Jersey. A1501.
Cronin testified, but Victor denies, that Victor was primarily interested in a North
Plainfield, New Jersey, franchise rather
than one in Great Neck, New York. A261;
A645.
However, despite inquiries about other
locations, BMW NA does not dispute, and
Cronin testified, that Victor located a facility in Great Neck. A1495-96. Cronin, who
visited that facility, A1496-97, testified
that "It probably needed a great deal of
renovation. But I believe it could have
been suitable for BMW." A1498. Cronin
also testified that the Potamkins envisioned
this as an exclusively BMW franchise and
may have anticipated selling as many as
500 cars annually. A1500.
Negotiations proceeded apace as Cronin
subsequently met with Robert and Alan
Potamkin at BMW NA's eastern regional
office, to review a "pro forma facility in*
vestment analysis" during the summer of
1981. A1499, 1508. At the conclusion of
this meeting, Cronin was still interested in
the Potamkins" pursuit of the Great Neck
point/ A1503J and Robert and Alan were
expected to report back to Victor and con-

•.in BMW V \ If r*'.'\ w.»rt. «till interested,
[r r>»r»i;vn* Vn*>i»r « b^ti^f that during these
r»*i:«»vV.»'*r« h»* and RMW NA reached an
^rn1 aen»*Ti'»nt on the (Jrent Neck BMW
fnrvh;<*<* A»>tr>
Liter, during that fall. (Vonin again met
with Victor at the '21 Club" in Manhattan,
when*. CpMiin t^hfi^d. they discussed the
viability of BMW in J treat Neck over lunch
and Victor again allegedly inquired about
North Plainfield A1509. Afterward, in
Victor's limousine. BMW NA alleges that
Victor attempted to bribe Cronin for a
North Plainfield location. Cronin testified:
"... (H]e said to me that North Plainfield
was very important to him: that it would
be worth a lot of money to him, $25,000, if
he were awarded the North Plainfield
point." A1510. Cronin immediately returned to his office and telephoned Gordon
Bingham, then-Vice President of Operations and Jack Cook, then-President of
BMW NA. to report the alleged bribe.
A1513-14: A1522-23 Pursuant to Cook's
instructions, Cronin did not tell anyone else
of this incident, nor did he document it.
A1523-1526. It is not disputed that others
at BMW NA became aware of the alleged
bribe.
By letter dated November 4, 1981, from
Cronin, Victor learned:
After much deliberation, we have decided
that the appointment of a BMW dealer in
Great Neck, at this time, would not be
the proper long range solution to our
long standing problem. In lieu of an
appointment, we have opted to work with
our existing dealer body to improve the
overall representation of BMW on the
Northshore of Long Island.
A1203.
In support of their allegation of concerted action, the Potamkins have produced the
affidavit of Harry Gray. In 1981, Gray
served as a Long Island BMW dealer and a
member of the area Dealer Advertising
Group ("DAG").
Dealer Advertising
Groups are composed of regional dealers
who meet regularly with BMW NA representatives to coordinate advertising sfcrate-

i

4.

An "open point" is a location for which a new
franchise is slated in contrast with a "buy-sell"

situation in which a new dealer replaces a retirM
ing one.
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gy. A1854-55; * • * [one sentence deleted]. In his affidavit, Gray reported dealer
opposition to a Potamkin franchise featured at a DAG meeting:
2. Great Neck, Long Island, was a
BMW "open point" during the early
1980's. I knew that BMW had expressed
interest in having Victor Potamkin as a
franchised dealer at that location.
3. At that time, I recall attending a
BMW
Dealer
Advertising
Group
("DAG") meeting with other BMW dealers from the New York area and with
BMW employees. I recall specifically
that the dealer principals for BMW dealerships in Brooklyn, New York, Jamaica,
New York, Smithtown, New York and
In wood, New York were present. There
were other BMW dealers present as well.
4. There was a discussion among the
BMW dealers about the possibility of
Victor Potamkin obtaining the Great
Neck, BMW open point.
5. The dealers opposed BMW granting Victor Potamkin a BMW franchise.
The dealers feared that Mr. Potamkin
would take away significant business
from them, and would "alter the competitive landscape", as I believe one dealer
expressed it.
6. The dealers understood and expressed that Mr. Potamkin's Great Neck
dealership had already been approved at
the level of BMW's central office, in
Montvale, New Jersey
However, the
central office had decided to leave the
final decision to the regional office for
the BMW Eastern region, which region
included all of the New York area dealerships
7 BMW dealers at the meeting *atd
they had already spoken to Terry Crown the BMW Regional Manager for
the Eastern rtgion, opposing Mr Potum
kin's BMW franchise appointment, and
that they uould continue to speak to
him on this subject, Mnce the dealers
understood that Mr Cronin had significant input on this matter
8 1 subsequent!) t a m e to understand
that lVrr> I'ronm had opposed this up
5

• * * (one H I I I U K C JilclirJ)

1367

558 (3rdCLr. 1W2)

pointment, which I concluded was in response to the New York-area BMW dealers' objections.
A1541-43 (emphasis added).
Assuming that Gray's trial testimony
would be consistent with his affidavit, the
district court ruled it inadmissible, reasoning that Gray's testimony would not establish a conspiracy between BMW NA and
the New York area dealers. Specifically,
the district court found that Gray's affidavit did not establish that dealer opposition
had been communicated to BMW NA nor
that BMW had acted in response to dealer
complaints. Memorandum Opinion at 8.
Therefore, the district court ruled t h a t
Gray's conclusion of causation constituted
"[t]hat kind of unfounded speculation
[that] would not be admissible at trial, and
does not prove anything." Id.
The Potamkins argue that the affidavit
itself evidences communication of dealer
opposition to BMW NA because Gray
states first, that Cronin possessed authority to approve Victor for the Great Neck
point; second, that some of the DAG members had communicated their opposition to
Cronin; and third, at the meeting they expressed an intent to continue to communicate to Cronin their opposition.
The record also supports this first proposition; prior to Michael Jackling's installation as BMW NA's Vice President, Director
of Operations in October of 1985, BMW
dealership appointments were largely relegated to the regional offices.
A2378.
While there is little in the record to flesh
out the details of the pre Jackling era dealer appointment procedure, a jury could reasonably infer, from the evidence that Jackling confined post-l9b5 decisions to BMW
NA's Montvale headquarters, that regional
representatives
wielded
a
significant
amuunt of power over appointments p n o r
to 19fc>5
#

* * [one sentence deleted] 5 Thus the
third proposition, according to the Potamk»m> would be supported by Gray's testimuii) ut Lunctrtcd action on behalf of the
New \ u i k tireii dealership body with BMW
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NA to reject Victor's apj*untment a.* a
price competitor. BMW NA accurately
notes that, as factual matters, the Gray
affidavit does not even identify t'rnnin a?
one of the unnamed BMW NA employee?
present at that DAG meeting. Nor d^es it
contain evidence that BMW NA considered
the alleged dealers' demand?. This factual
argument, however, properly belongs in
front of a jury. That Gray's affidavit is
not a proverbial smoking gun does not
make it inadmissible.
As a legal matter, BMW NA suggests
that the Gray affidavit is inadmissible because it allegedly contains only Gray's surmise of causation and lacks the requisite
personal knowledge required by Fed.
R.Civ.P. 56(e). In this respect, BMW NA
cites Edward J. Sweeney, Inc., in which we
held, in part, that the plaintiff had failed to
meet its burden to prove concerted action,
when defending against summary judgment. 637 F.2d at 116-17. Significantly,
in that case we did not rule that evidence of
concerted action inadmissible, but simply
insufficient to sustain the plaintiffs burden
of proof. This case, as distinguished from
Edward J. Sweeney, presents more evidence than a witness's "general feeling,M
637 F.2d at 114, and another witness's
" 'belief . . . without factual basis," 637
F.2d at 112. See also Mid-South Grizzlies
v. National Football League, 550 F.Supp.
558 (E.D.Pa.1982) (finding a statement that
some people opined that the applicant's
past WFL affiliation would hurt its chances
of obtaining an NFL affiliation was insufficient to prove retaliation, in part because
the witness admitted these views were personal to the speakers and did not represent
the NFL's position), affd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d
Cir.1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104
S.Ct. 2657, 81 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984).
In addition, we noted in Edward J. Sweeney that "absent some evidence supporting
appellant's theory, we will not assume [that
the defense witness] lied about his [legitimate] reasons." 637 F.2d at 113. By contrast, Gray's affidavit, combined with the
6. BMW NA's response at appellate oral argument to the apparent inconsistency between
Cronin's outrage in 1981 at the alleged bribe

segment nf a 197S BMW Policy and Procedure Manual for Pealer Development," indicates that Cronin was given decision-making authority And that area dealers had
voiced tn Cronin. and intended to continue
tn voire, their opposition to a Potamkin
franchise. The fact that Cronin has categorically refuted any dealership pressure
or discussions with dealers concerning Victor's interest in a BMW franchise does not
serve to render Grays affidavit inadmissible, but simply creates a material fact for
the jury to resolve. See A265.
The Potamkins do not request that we
simply discredit the testimony of BMW
NA's witnesses in order to deny summary
judgment. Rather, they have proffered
significant, albeit circumstantial, evidence
to counter this evidence. For example,
Robert alleges that one New Jersey BMW
dealer, Gene Hoffman, revealed to him in
late 1985 that "BMWNA's decision in 198182 not to give the Potamkins a BMW franchise in Great Neck, Long Island was due
to the fact that other Long Island BMW
dealers feared the price competition that a
Potamkin BMW franchise would bring to
the Long Island market." A1712. Hoffman has testified inconsistently that 1) he
cannot recall the substantive content of his
conversations with Robert and 2) he denie*
Robert's allegations. A417-18. Reasonable inferences of concerted action may be
drawn from the Gray affidavit combined
with Hoffman's comments, BMW NA's al*
leged abrupt reversal of opinion, and,%
will be seen below, Cronin's solicitation;^
Robert even after the alleged bribe '&
tempt.
Unlike the plaintiff in Edward /. Sweeney, who failed to disprove the defendant's
legitimate reasons, the Potamkins .hafe
produced evidence that tends to negate
BMW NA's allegation of the attempted
bribe. BMW NA has not explained why,;if
the bribe incident occurred, later in 1982
Cronin suggested to Robert Potamkin thit
he purchase Irv Green's franchise as Rob*
ert alleges. A1704.5 The absence^of.anf
:

and his solicitation of Robert's application in
1982 is two-fold: (1) Robert's recollection of the
1982 date is inaccurate, or (2) Cronin had DO
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BMW NA documentation of the bribe and
Having heard nothing from BMW NA, ,
Cronin's November 1981 letter to Victor Buchner unsuccessfully attempted to reach
evidencing different concerns further Cronin on October 16th. A1674. . Subse- •
serves to buttress an inference that this quently, the Potamkins and Caufield
alleged bribe may have been conjured up reached an "agreement in principle" on Oclater. The Potamkins point out that Victor tober 29, 1985, subject to successfully ne-.and Gunter Kramer, BMW NA's President, gotiating a written sales agreement.
had a cordial lunch together in 1983, A1632, A1674. BMW NA again stepped
A1460; 2171, although Kramer responds into the picture the next day, on October .
that, new to his position at that time, he 30th, when Cronin and Andy Pokorny of.
had not yet been informed of the bribe. BMW NA met with Buchner, Caufield and*.
A484-86.
her partner at Trans-Atlantic. A1633.,:
Given this sequence of events, a reason- Buchner testified that Cronin advised them
able jury could infer that BMW NA would "that BMW would not accept Potamkin a s ,
have welcomed a "high volume" dealer a dealer" and "BMW wanted Manhattan to
such as Victor, and after succumbing to be a one-dealer territory" and they- should
pressure from its New York area dealers, "delay signing an agreement with Potamentertained the prospect of installing a Po- kin until BMW could make its offer to
tamkin dealership in an alternative loca- Trans-Atlantic." A1633. Buchner believed that BMW's opposition to the Potamtion, Philadelphia.
kins was related to discounting and reputation for service. A1634.
B.
1985: Manhattan
In early September of 1985, the Potamkins7 began negotiating with Gladys Caufield and her lawyer, Marvin Buchner, in
order to purchase Caufield's Manhattan
BMW dealership, Trans-Atlantic. Caufield
explained that she had sought to sell her
business to the Potamkins because " . . . it
just made more sense . . . you know, they
had the wherewithal to really do a beautiful job and I thought that's what BMW
was looking for." A1662-63. Because her
lease was expiring, bhe was compelled to
sell the business by the end of December of
1985. A1612-1614. At a September 9th
meeting, the Putamkms offered to buy
Trans-Atlantic for $800,000 plus an undetermined amount for parts. A1620 On
September 30th, Cronm ^poke to Buchner,
and urged that Caufield stall the Putamkm
deal so that BMW NA could make an offer
by October 10th. A1673.
re*pun*ihilil> for ihc Philadelphia
umiurs
The tit si e x p l a n a t i o n i l c a i l ) l a i ^ s ail »>M.C ut
ClcdibilllN

t o r OlC JUI \

I lie x . c o . , J

C\p)«il.allun

is not Inn nc oui bs O K i c n t i J
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\shcu the MiJ Atlauiu Region was h i si f u i i n e J
C r o a t u s c i \ c J lhe i-asici u Rifciwii w h u h i i.vu.i.
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Informing them of the agreement in principle, A1634-35, Buchner countered that if
a signed agreement was submitted to
BMW for approval and was rejected, it
would precipitate litigation by Trans-Atlantic and probably Potamkin against BMW.
A1633. The following day, October 31st,
BMW NA's counsel, Michael Epstein from
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, contacted Buchner and asked to see the agreement with
the Potamkins; Buchner refused and the
two agreed to a November 5th deadline for
a BMW NA offer. A1635-36. On November 7th, Caufield, her partner, and Buchner
met with BMW NA's Vice President Miclt&el JatkUtig and Michael Epstein and Arthur Jacobs of Weil, Gotshal & Manges.
AHiay.
After reviewing the Potamkin negotiation,, BMW NA offered Caufield $500,000
phi* repurchasing assets as required under
the franchise agreement. A1640. No
7-

i i l a J s > L a u h e l d testified t h a i she believed that
*hc u i i J her !avv)Lr, M a r w n B u c h n e r , n e g o t i a t e d
V
MIU ail t h r e e of (he P o t a m k i n s , A1663, b e c a u s e
>hv. uu-t vsith all t h i c e at o n e t u n c . M o r e o v e r ,
Hi.iwhncr i m i u l U LuntaLtcd o n e of Victor's salcsni
; u t^ UKju.te into ihe I ' u l a m l u n s " interest in
I *-*.>• Atlantic
nlftil
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agreement \sa* reached b*it Ja^VlTg d"l
infh'cntp that BMW NA wnnM m>t nwaH a
franchise to the* Potamkm* hrra»i«p n« P\ichner recalled, it %\a* the t/»nnr <>( hi«
comment that the\ were pnep d!«™tm**r* "
A1641. In re«=pon«e to a counteroffer
based on the price the Potamkin* were
willing to pay, BMW N.V* counsel "indicat
ed to [Buchner] that the portion of BMW
was that the^e premise were closing down
and that we really had nothing to *ell. they
had nothing to buy" A1K42

pr*hip"» by hitting thorn out and then openf p a firtorv store or mausoleum. A873Tr>. 211** For thi«* reason. BMW NA sug£p*t« that Caufield « negotiations with the
Potamkin*! w*»re merelv an attempt to obtain a valuation of her business. A305;
Following BMW NA's purchase of
Tran*-Atlantic*5 a**ets. however, it deviated from the "Manhattan Project", granting
to Martin BMW an exclusive Manhattan
franchise BMW NA alleges it chose this
course because it came to see the wisdom
of not engaging in competition with its
dealers

Buchner then called the Potamkins' law
yer and explained that Caufield would not
sign that agreement until the Potamkins
could provide a possession date A1643
Nevertheless, Robert asserts that one
Nothing happened until December 17th, BMW dealer, Hoffman, later informed him
when Jacobs offered Buchner BMW NA's that a BMW NA representative had "visittop offer of $550,000/ and Caufield, ed him and asked his opinion" about the
pressed by an expiring lease, accepted
proposed sale of Trans-Atlantic to the PoA1644. Buchner explained that "BMW, tamkins. A1712 During BMW NA's nethrough Mr. Cronin, had made it crystal gotiations with the principal of Martin
clear that they would not approve the Po- BMW—prior to the Caufield/Potamkinjie;
tamkin people; therefore, our choices of gotiations—a Cronin memorandum anticipurchasers was limited to one and my in- pated the need to discuss with the area
structions were to strike the best deal I dealers the operation of a factory store.
could with BMW and close it." A1645. A2227; A873-75. The Potamkins theorize
Caufield stated, "I think they indicated that the dealer opposition of 1981 was reacclearly that if we went ahead with the sale tivated in 1985 to defeat their agreement in
to Potamkin that we would be in litigation principle with Caufield for Trans-Atlantic
for a long period of time." "... [A]nd if and to award Martin BMW an exclusive
we were in some kind of litigation I had Manhattan dealership.
parts and cars and whatever that would be
tied up and it was sort of forcing the hand,
C.
so to speak." A1665.
1985: Philadelphia
BMW NA counters that it had long
Also
during the fall of 1985, Robert and*
planned to eliminate one of its two ManhatAlan
Potamkin
reached a written buy-seQ,
tan dealerships because New York is wideagreement
with
Philadelphia BMW dealer*
ly considered to be a one-dealer market,
Irvin
Green,
but
once again fell short ofi
according to Cronin, and BMW NA already
acquiring
a
BMW
franchise. Because tha,
had an additional New York City dealerthird
attempt
constitutes
the heart of tbe^
ship, Martin BMW. A296-97. Caufield
testified that in 1984, BMW NA had once Potamkins' lawsuit and BMW NA presents
mentioned the possibility of buying Trans- a multitude of reasons for its decision-^*}
Atlantic and turning it into a factory store reject Robert's franchise application, an e»d
or mausoleum, although no terms or prices pecially detailed review is required.
Robert alleges that Cronin approached
were reached. A1655-56; 303-07. This
was consistent with BMW NA's earlier him in 1982 about acquiring the Philadelplan for its Manhattan dealers, dubbed the phia franchise owned by Irvin Green"Manhattan Project," which envisioned Green conceded that BMW NA, particulareliminating the two Manhattan BMW deal- ly Cronin, had long been dissatisfied with
8. BMW NA ultimately paid $693,569 for Trans-

Atlantic, inclusive of parts. A1649
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his meager sales performance * * *
[phrase deleted]. Therefore, on October 8,
1985, Green and Robert entered into a buysell agreement for Green's BMW and
Volkswagen franchises. A929-47. Robert, as half owner, would manage the dealership; Alan and another investor were
each to contribute 25% of the capital. The
Potamkins planned to move these franchises to a different location in Northeast Philadelphia, at the corner of Grant Avenue
and Academy Road, which also housed
Robert's Chevrolet, Dodge, Isuzu, and
AMC Jeep Renault franchises. A595;
A2065.
The buy-sell agreement was expressly
contingent upon the award of BMW and
Volkswagen franchises, and contained an
expiration date of December 23, 1985.
A1729-30. This expiration date, combined
9. There is significant dispute concerning whether BMW NA made a good faith attempt to consider Robert's application. According to Robert's affidavit, by October 10th Green hand-delivered the buy-sell agreement to Philip Capossela, then the BMW Regional Manager for the
mid Atlantic Region, and requested a dealership
application form which Capossela refused to
provide. A1706. Capossela testified that he
was thus aware of the expiration date, A103,
and that at that time he told Green that Robert
was not a '"suitable" candidate fur a franchise,
in the words of BMW NA in house counsel.
A105-10O. Robert telephoned Capossela and offered personally to navel to his Virginia office
to obtain an application, but was told that the
district manager wv>uld piuvide Robert with a
copy and that he, Capossela, would contact Rob
ert by October 16th. A1706-07. Robert was
unable to reach Capossela again, but sent a
letter, dated October 18th, A1716, and contacted
Robert Casella, BMW Director of Dealer Dcvel
opment for the mid Atlantic Region, on October
22, NS5. who again discouraged Robert from
traveling to Virginia to obtain an application
form. AI 707 Casella agreed to meet with Rob
ert on October 2^th and to supply a form at that
tune. RO1H.II then wiotc a follow-up letter.
A1717. Casella [chiles Ruben's rcvuidahou thai
Casella gave him assurances thai there wuold be
su!twicnl tune to pun.ess the application bch.ic*
the evpuattou i»f the bu>->ell agreement A 147.
set abx> Al20S-<>o tlasellu's
Intel br*iuh
Memo vl the incident)
liMW NA piowdcs a host ol icaxn.s U.f failing to decide on the applualum until ailei the
agl c e m e n t e x p n e d
It l.int> that * * * (ila>.s-e
deleted] a n d thai l i e l J p c i x . n r . e l ..cold m l have
taken the a p p l u a i u . u K f v i e iku>(Nci 2vil. ai.d
30th UMW NA al>u s v . ^ e s i s lhai l<* ( i i e e i . J . J
(IOl | ' I O | p t l l v
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with BMW NA's alleged delay in delivering
a franchise application to Robert, forms a
significant part of the Potamkins' grievance with BMW NA. Although Green and
Robert each sought to obtain a BMW franchise application immediately after signing
their agreement, the Potamkins assert that
BMW NA delayed sending the necessary
application form until October 29, 1985.
BMW NA was required to act on Robert's
application under the Pennsylvania Board
of Vehicles Act, 63 Pa.StatAnn. § 818.9(b)(4), within 60 days. By delaying until
October 29th, BMW NA ensured that this
deadline would exceed the December 23rd
expiration of the buy-sell agreement.9 By
letter to Irv Green dated November 25,
1985, Michael Jackling, at that time BMW
NA's Senior Vice President of Operations,
explicitly acknowledged this deadline.10
A1746.
sell agreement. Thus. Capossela testified that
Green needed to enclose a cover letter to introduce the buy-sell agreement, and his personal
delivery of the buy-sell agreement to BMW NA'
was insufficient notice. A1756.
Indeed Jackling asserted that Robert's application was incomplete, and the buy-sell agreement
expired of its own accord. A2415-16. The record does not indicate why, if the application
package was incomplete, Jackling directed
counsel at Weil, Gotshal to hire a private investigator to investigate Robert pursuant to the
application, nor why other processing steps
were taken. • * * [one sentence deleted). And
Casella explained (hat an application is pending
from the "time the [acquisition agreement) hits
my desk." A1814.
Although District Pans Manager Graynor indicated that Robert and his proposed parts manager had refused to sign the Prospective Dealer
Parti Department form, A2017, Robert contends
they were never shown that form. A1974. Another BMW dealer, Martin Sussman, had refused to sign a BMW Dealer Operating Requirement Agreement because he disagreed with one
of its Conditions, but had not been threatened
with termination of his franchise. A2141-44.
10.

L\ relevant pait. Jackling wrote:
I am ir.tunncJ that Pennsylvania law allows
HMW.NA lu respond to a request for consent
to the wle uf a trariihise 'within 60 days of
receipt ut a unfit;/! rtque.it on the forms, if
any genu ally utilueJ by the manufacturer or
vh>uiLwtur U-» suJi pui poses a\\\S containing
the iuloi malum i chimed"
\t vvur iku/txr 10 l*a5 meeting with Mr.
l'ap<o.*4.ta U M U N \ w a s not pioVlded with a
w . u u . i u . ^ . u i wi with the iufoi (nation we
.e^wire m i . i J c r in e v a l u a t e yuur potential
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As a result of this poMuring, Andrew
Pokorny, BMW NA's Vice President of Re
gional Operations and Sales, A28i>. sent to
Irv Green a letter dated December 2f\
1985, informing him that it would not
award Robert Potamkin a franchise. By
this time, the executor}' contract had already expired. Ultimately, Green sold his
BMW franchise to an existing area BMW
dealer, Robert Sloane, and his partner,
Martin Lustgarten, who relocated the franchise to an affluent Philadelphia suburb.
The Potamkins allege that they were denied the Green franchise because Philadelphia area BMW dealers feared price competition and coalesced to pressure BMW NA
into rejecting their application. As proof,
they tender the testimony of Bruce Braverman, Robert's Lease Manager. This evidence consists of statements allegedly
made by a BMW leasing representative,
D,on Mitchell, to Braverman. Braverman
testified in his deposition that:
Don Mitchell told me that the BMW dealers in the area would not let Potamkin
get the franchise because they were
afraid that Potamkin's reputation of selling cars cheaper than everybody else
was not something that they wanted to
get involved with. They didn't want to
be involved in price competition. They
wanted to keep their price levels where
they were and that [sic] they were going
to do what they could to make sure that
Potamkin did not get the franchise.
A2195-96. In answer to the question "Did
Mitchell indicate that he had spoken to
anyone from BMW of North America?/'
Braverman also stated:
No. He indicated to me that he had
spoken to dealers. The dealers, it was
the dealers who did not want Potamkin
to get the franchise, it wasn't BMW who
had rejected them.
To me it seemed like it was a conspiracy
of the dealers in the tri-state area that
purchaser. Mr. Potamkin submitted his application package on October 29. The following day, October 30, we received your written
request for consent.
By statute, BMWNA's 60 days to evaluate the
proposed sale of a franchise cannot expire on

didn't unnt Potamkin to get that franchise \ don't think BMW cared.
A2M2
However. Braverman also answered negatively when asked, "Did Mr.
Mitchell indicate that the dealers had specifically spoken to a particular individual at
BMW?" A2312. Braverman memorialized
this alleged conversation in a memorandum
dated January 15. 198f>. A2197. While
this testimony also falls short of direct
"smoking: gun" evidence of causation, if
admissible, it does supply additional circumstantial evidence of concerted action.
In excluding" this evidence, the district
court reasoned that Mitchell's statement
would constitute hearsay unless he possessed authority to bind BMW NA, which
he indisputably lacked. This conclusion
misperceives the nature of a vicarious admission, wrhich the Federal Rules of Evidence designate as outside the realm of,
hearsay by definition. Further, the vicarious admission rule of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) does not require that
a declarant have authority to bind its employer. As the Advisory Committee noted
when amending this rule, to limit its scope
in this manner would preclude much probative evidence because an employer will
rarely authorize its employee to make incriminating statements. Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). - The
rule simply requires that an agent make
the statement "within the scope of' his or
her employment.
To analyze the relevant scope of Mitchell's employment, we must first identify his
employer. Braverman testified that Mitchell was BMW Credit's representative to
Robert's prospective dealership. A219495. Yet according to BMW NA, Don
Mitchell was employed by General Electric
Capital Auto Lease (GECAL) as an area
sales manager. A2426. Mitchell testified
that he received his salary from GECAL
without commissions from BMW Credit
A506.
. ;.'J
a Saturday or Sunday. Consequently, whether we count from October 29 or from October
30, BMWNA's deadline is Monday, December
30, 1985.
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The relationship between Mitchell's employer, GECAL and BMW NA is complex.
* * * [three sentences deleted].
* * * [paragraph deleted].
' [8] As far as the record discloses,
Mitchell was the only representative of
BMW Credit and BMW Leasing assigned to
serve the territory in which Robert's proposed dealership was located. Mitchell described his job function as "soliciting] leasing business from automobile dealerships
and independent leasing companies within
[his territory]." Pursuant to the GECC
and BMW NA joint ventures, his job included some retail installment financing.
A2427; * * * [citation to record deleted].
He also "provide[d] the BMW dealers with
help on their leases and promotions,"
A2434, and provided BMW dealers with
training and the necessary supplies to complete the leasing and financing paperwork.
A2846. As the leasing agent for GECAL
to BMW dealerships, he admitted, "I represent BMW Credit Corporation." A2872.
We conclude that Mitchell's statement,
made as a representative of BMW Credit
and BMW Leasing, may be attributed to
BMW NA. The statement of a subsidiary
may be attributed to its corporate parent,
consistent with agency theory, where the
parent dominates the activities of the subsidiary. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., 505 F.Supp.
1190, 1247-48 (E.D Pa.lDbO). This evidence
of the relationship between BMW NA and
BMW Credit and BMW Leasing, while
close, does suffice to confer agency status
on Mitchell BMW NA's ownership interests, control through corporate officers, advertising, and the subsidiaries' use o( the
BMW logo on their documentation, together indicate a sufficiently dominating interest in its subsidiaries.
As a further matter, the identity of the
dealer^ referred to Ls sufficient^ clear
from the record. BMW NA's District Man
ager Martin Focht identified the members
of the Philadelphia area dealer advertising
group (DAG) as consisting u( (he folluuing
dealerships
Rosen. Otto's De\on Hill
Sloane. DeSimone Martin I'nion Park
Thompson, Hans, diui West German

A1854. Mitchell specified servicing the following BMW dealerships from September
1985 through January 1986: Rosen, Otto's,
Devon Hill, Thompson, Hans and West German. A2201-02. Braverman'g account of
Mitchell's statement conveys t h a t ' R o s e n
referred to the area dealers, which would
fairly comprise, the area DAG. The evidence sufficiently identifies the source of
the dealers' statements. Contra
Carden
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 F.2d 996,
1002 (3d Cir.1988) (an Unidentified "they',"
who said something to the declarant, was
insufficient).
[9] The district court noted, as its second reason, that Mitchell was alleged to
have made the statement "some two weeks
after" BMW NA rejected Robert's application. We reject the theory that a statement evidencing the occurrence of concerted action may be inadmissible because it
follows that activity. Although Mitchell's
alleged statement to Braverman occurred
on January 16, 1986, and after the decision
to reject Robert's application was made,
there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the dealers' statements to Mitchell followed the rejection of Robert's application. In addition, that a vicarious admission is disclosed after the fact does not
defeat its admissibility. See Mahlandt v.
Wild Can id Survival & Research Center,
Inc., 588 F 2 d 626 (8th Cir.1978).
[10] The Potamkins also assert that the
dealers' statements to Mitchell are admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), the coconspirator admission provision. In United States r. Ammar,
714 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir 1983), cert, denied, Stillman v. United
States, 464 U S . 936, 104 S.Ct. 344, 78
L.Ed 2d 311 (1983), we comprehensively
identified the requirements for such an admission 1) independent evidence establishes the existence of a conspiracy and connects the declarant and defendant to it; 2)
the statement was made in furtherance of
the conspiracy; and 3) the statement was
made during the course of the conspiracy.
Id at 245 The proponent must establish
the first requirement by a "fair preponderance i)i independent evidence " Id at 250.
Merc association does not suffice but, on
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the other hand, timing circumstance, nr
one or a series of meetings, may. Id.
More recently, while not deciding the
question of whether the challenged hearsay
statement alone might adequately demonstrate conspiracy, the Supreme Court ruled
that the conspiracy need not be exclusively
proven by evidence aliunde. Bourjnily r
United States, 483 U.S. 171. 181, 107 S.Ct
2775, 2781, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). Scr
United States v. Levy, 865 F.2d 551, 553
(3d Cir.1989). Thus, for the first element,
we may look to independent evidence plus
the statement itself for evidence of a conspiracy. On appellate review, the witness"
statements "must be accepted as true for
the purposes of determining the sufficiency
of the evidence." Am mar, 714 F 2d at
251. As well, the co-conspirator admission
of Rule 801(d)(2) does not require personal
knowledge. As noted by the Advisory
Committee, Rule 801(d)(2) is designated as
an admission against interest; its admissibility is premised upon our adversarial system rather than in reliance upon indicia of
reliability or trustworthiness. Id. at 254;
see United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118
(3d Cir.1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1029,
106 S.Ct. 1233, 89 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986).
[11] Because the Potamkins have proffered evidence to show concerted action in
violation of the Sherman Act, they have
demonstrated the requisite conspiracy for
admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). This
judgment is entirely separate from the fact
that both Mitchell and Rosen, in their deposition testimony, categorically deny the
li.

These "19 bits" were identified as follows:
1. the letter rejecting Victor Potamkin's
Great Neck application;
2. the affidavit of Harry Gray;
3. BMW MA's failure to differentiate among
the various members of the Potamkin family;
4. and 5. Michael Jackling's and Terry Cronin's assertions that they did not want the Potamkins as dealers because they were "price
discounters/'; '
" 6» Bruce BraVerman's testimony about state
ments made by Don Mitchell;
. .7. BMW MA's alleged opposition to price advertising by'its dealers;
*'« 8. dealers' cooperative efforts to enforce advertising standards;
9. evidence that BMW dealers had a strong
motive to exclude [the] Potamkin[s];

statements attributed to them in Braverman'* t^timnnv. At trial, the factfinder
mu«t decide which of the diametrically opposed witnesses is truthful.
La5t. *he district court reasoned that
Bravennan's testimony did not support an
inference that dealer sentiment caused
BMW N'A's inaction on Robert's application. Memorandum Opinion at 10, 1990
WL 182340. We agree that as with the
Gray affidavit, the Braverman testimony
alone does present sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find concerted action in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act.
IV.
[12] BMW NA provides a variety of
reasons for allegedly independently rejecting the Potamkins as BMW dealers. The
district court found these reasons compelling, on balance, when contrasted to the
"19 bits" of evidence it attributed to the
Potamkins.1' To the contrary, although a
jury may credit BMW NA's reasons, we
cannot conclude that a reasonable jury
would disbelieve the Potamkins' substantial
rebuttal evidence. In light of BMW NA's
many inconsistent reasons for denying the
Potamkins a franchise, and assuming all
credibility determinations in favor of the
Potamkins at this juncture, we are satisfied
that they have met their burden of proof.
Viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the Potamkins while bearing
in mind that an antitrust plaintiff must
assert an economically sensible claim, we
10. the testimony of Michael Vadasz;
11. discussions of sales figures at dealer advertising group meetings;
12. groups of BMW dealers are organized
into 'Twenty Group" clubs;
13. BMW NA monitors the average profit
margin for all dealers in each region;
14. allocation of vehicles;
15. the 1978 dealers' manual; consulting existing deaters about new applicants;
">^}
16. the testimony of Frank Ursomarso;
17. evidence that BMW NA conferred with
other New York metropolitan dealers "concerning plans for the New York market"; "m
18. evidence that BMW NA punished (M*
counters by decreasing their allocations; and
last,
'
19. BMW NA's aversion to the Potamkins.
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turn to consider BMW NA's alleged independent reasons and the Potamkins' evidence that these reasons were pretextual.
In sum, BMW NA alleges that the Potamkin image as high volume priceKiiscounters
was incompatible with the desired BMW
image; the Potamkins* customer service
record was inadequate; the proposed Philadelphia location was inadequate for a number of reasons; the Potamkins were uncooperative; and Robert objected to an annual allocation of 94 cars.12 Indeed, when
contrasted to BMW NA's earlier actions
expressive of an interest in the Potamkins,
the plethora of complaints pressed by
BMW NA is both internally inconsistent
and inconsistent with its concomitant treatment of BMW dealers. We turn to address
BMW NA's alleged reasons for refusing to
grant a franchise to the Potamkins.

As its primary reason for refusing to
grant a franchise to the Potamkins, BMW
NA asserts that the Potamkins threatened
harm as potential "free rider" dealers.
BMW NA mistakenly reads Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,
485 U.S. 717, 108 S.Ct. 1515, 99 L.Ed.2d 808
(1988), to support its proposition that no
liability could attach to its decision not to
appoint the Potamkins as dealers. It contends that under Sharp, the Potamkins
12, A N o v e m b e r , 1985 m e m o r a n d u m f r o m R o b
ert Casella. B u s i n e s s D e v e l o p m e n t M a n a g e r for
the M i d - A t l a n t i c R e g i o n , to E d w a r d R o b i n s o n .
BMW NA's E a s t e r n R e g i o n S a l e s M a n a g e r , be^t
a r t i c u l a t e s B M W NA's p o s i t i o n :
1. Mr. P o t a m k m h a s not i n d i c a t e d a willing
ness to p r o v i d e the n e c e s s a r y m i n i m u m o p e r
ating r e q u i r e m e n t s s t a n d a r d s for Service a n d
Parts
2. It is not c l e a r t h a t p r o p o s e d P o t a m k m
BMW \ t o u l d l>e a d i s t i n c t a n d M:par ale upcraturn a l l o w i n g tor the c o m p l e t e
autonoim
n e e d e d lv»i a p i u i u i c n l a n d d i s i u u l BMW
o(H.t a l l o t )

3
Mi P o i a m k i t i h a s c \ p r c » c J an u n w i l l i n g
nc*s to pi ovule the nccc^*ai> exclusive per
sonnet l e q u u c d for the BMW" u p c i a l i o n
4
As a d e a l e r in P h i l a d e l p h i a Pcnn>> 1\ u m a
M\d lltiotigh his assoxialiuii ai\J \ c > u d u . U ;
est m the P o t a m k m New \ oi L u i b a h u j i < . ' i i
Kot*ol M P o t a m k m hiuvgs a voir.ewLui J> >,
d\
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must prove an agreement to fix prices or
price level, and BMW NA maintains that it
has not set price levels for its cars,- although the record is replete with evidence
that BMW NA representatives and dealers
share and discuss retail price statistics.
A1845; see also A2053; A2063-64. * ? *
[two sentences deleted].
*'
Therefore, there is evidence of a concrete
motive for dealer animus toward other
dealers who would undercut a flexibly set
price over invoice by advertising sales at,
for example, $99 oyer invoice. Nevertheless, there is no direct evidence, only evidence from which a factfinder could infer,
that BMW NA and its dealers have tacitly
fixed prices for BMWs.
BMW NA further asserts that it does not
prohibit its dealers from price advertising.
Seet e.g., A135-37 (testimony of BMW
NA's Mid-Atlantic Region Business Development Manager Robert Casella); A327-31
(testimony of BMW NA's Mid-Atlantic Region District Manager Martin Focht). In
fact, numerous BMW dealers concurred
that they are free to price advertise. See,
e.g., A420 (testimony of BMW dealer Gene
Hoffman); A399 (testimony of BMW dealer
Irv Green); A406 (testimony of BMW dealer Andrew Hill); A502 (testimony of BMW
dealer Martin Lustgarten); A225 (testimony of BMW dealer Mario Gesarini). BMW
tampering, advertising misrepresentation, and
q u e s t i o n a b l e l e a s i n g tactics.
The above as
e v i d e n c e d by e n c l o s e d n e w s p a p e r a r t i c l e s .
5. .Sir. P o t a m k i n h a s e m p h a t i c a l l y s t r e s s e d
that the g u i d e of 94 u n i t s w o u l d not b e accepta b l e It is felt that at s o m e t i m e in the f u t u r e
o u r s t a t u s at t h e p r o p o s e d facility w o u l d be
c o m p r o m i s e d a n d the BMW o p e r a t i o n w o u l d
be s h u t t l e d into s e c o n d a r y o r less t h a n adequate accommodations.
A190I.
In a d d i t i o n , n u n ; of those s a m e r e a s o n s w e r e
p u i v i d e d to G i e e n b> A n d i e w P o k o r n y :
M u i c o v c r . to date, Mr P o t a m k i n h a s b e e n
u n w i l l i n g 10 a ^ r c e to meet B M W N A ' s m i n i m u m s u n d a i d o p e r a t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s , a n d to
acvept a n SPG of 94 unit*—the identical SPG
\i>u friave We a r c u n w i l l i n g to a c c e p t a n y
b ; . \ c t not p r e p a r e d to meet o u r m i n i m u m
upc.'tiiuig s u n d a i d s
In a d d i t i o n , P o t a m k i n ' s
m.(ik>i. lellcvts a spirit of n o n c o o p e r a t i o n
..,',..:. ii a<iiUai> tui iliat t e q u u e d to build a
6 ^-..J
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NA and it<* dealer* d<> admittedly di«rn?ir
age other BMW dnalers (mm p?»iraginir in
price advertising because they view that
practice as counterprfHluctivr* giv^n the
preferences and demographics of a typical
BMW customer. As one dealer explained.
'The quality of the product is a factor, but
you have to understand as a dealer whn
your customers are, what the demographics of the customers are and figure out howto handle that customer " A2470. Accordingly, customers spending more than $30.000 for an automobile "don't want it
thought of as a price i t e m . . . [Ijt is an
image thing, an association, an affinity
with a fine product/* A330. BMW NA's
Senior Vice President of Operations. Michael Jackling, stated that BMW NA
speaks with its dealers about advertising
and about setting the appropriate tone.
Because BMW is marketing a luxury
product, BMW is very sensitive as to
how that product is perceived in the marketplace, so . . . that the product value
itself is maximized through its image as
well as its specification, performance and
ownership qualities.
A450. • • • [one sentence deleted].
Thus BMW NA claims that the Potamkins' advertising style—prominently featuring prices and terms like "blow out
sale" or "seliathon" A314-17; A915-28— is
incompatible with the BMW image and
heavily influenced BMW NA's decision to
.reject the Potamkins.
BMW NA misapprehends the legal parameters. In Sharp, the Court held that
"a vertical restraint is not illegal per se
unless it includes some agreement on price
or price levels/' Ruling after a trial in
which the jury was instructed only on a per
se theory of liability, the Court remanded
the case for a new trial holding that per se
illegality would not attach to a vertical nonprice restraint and that "an agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer to terminate a 'price cutter/ without a further
agreement on the price or price levels to be
13. Proof of anticompetitive effect is the hallmark of a rule of reason test, see Tunis Bros.
Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715 (3d
Cir.1991) cert, denied, — U.S.
, 112 S.Ct.
3034, 120 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992), and it is well

charged by th»' remaining dealer," must be
yv\£r<\ undnr a nil* of reason test. 485
f r S at 7JK. T.W. UN SCt. at 1520, 1526.
Thu«. <»vrn if th»* case is on all fours with
Shnrp. the Pntnmkins may still proceed to
a jury trial under the rule of reason test13
Moreover. thi« case has an additional
horizontal component that Sharp lacked.
In Shnrp, a single dealer, Hartwell, pressured Sharp tn terminate Business Electronics. Here the Potamkins pled in their
complaint, and the evidence suggests, that
a number nf BMW dealers combined to
form a group boycott to pressure BMW
NA to reject Potamkin competition. The
Potamkins assert that all of BMW NA's
alleged reasons for rejecting them are pretextual and that until BMW dealers voiced
their strenuous opposition to Potamkin
competition, BMW NA had acknowledged
the value of installing Potamkins as dealers. Thus the Potamkins present a horizontal boycott case, rather than the nonprice vertical restraint suggested by BMW
NA. As we fully evaluate infra, the evidence of record, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the Potamkins, supports
their proposition.
.,,*'
Sharp suggests that the proper distinction between a horizontal and a vertical
restraint lies in determining which kind of
an arrangement produces the restraint
rather than analyzing its anticompetiti?e
effects. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 730 n. 4, 108
S.Ct at 1523 n. 4. Under either analysis,
however, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the Potamkins, the evidence
suggests that BMW NA rejected the Potamkins as a result of dealer opposition to
price competition.
Last, Sharj) also reflected the concern
that fear of antitrust liability should not
serve to inhibit a manufacturer's ability to
expel "free riders" from its dealership
body. BMW NA insists that it feared &
"free rider" effect. As explained in GTS
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55, 97 S.Ct at 2560,
this effect occurs when the "free riding"
settled that protecting interbrand, rather than
intrabrand, competition should be the goal «f
antitrust law. GTE Sylvania, 433 US. at 52,97
S.Ct. at 2558.

B1G A p p L E

BMW

INC

v

BMW

QF N0RTH

AMERICA, INC.

1377

Cite a* 974 FJd 1358 (3rd Cir. 1992)

retailer reduces or eliminates service to
create price competition and a customer
researches a purchase at a full service retailer but ultimately buys the product from
the discounting retailer. BMW NA maintains that it feared just such an effect,
emphasizing that quality service is crucial
to its reputation and ultimate success. In
support of its claim, BMW NA asserts that
the Potamkin reputation evokes a high volume, price-discounting image.
When
viewed in the light most favorable to the
Potamkins, however, the record suggests
that this image incompatibility, as well, is
simply pretextual.*4

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that
the Potamkins would not have posed the
"free rider" problem. Robert Potamkin asserts that he had been willing to conform
to any service and facilities requirements
that BMW NA demanded. Robert insists
that he was willing to meet any BMW
requirement, "if I could get somebody in
authority to talk to me." A1974; 1977.
Despite BMW NA's claims that Robert evidenced an uncooperative attitude, an internal BMW NA document acknowledged that
Robert had promised to meet all required
BMW standards. See A1998-99.15

14. In a letter to BMW dealer Irv Green, Andrew
Porkorny, BMW NA's Vice President of Regional Operations and Sales, also provided as a
reason for the decision that "Mr. Potamkin is
not qualified," the following:

and he checked positive as well as negative
sources.
Moreover, BMW NA's thorough investigation
into the Potamkins' business practices appears
pretextual given its lack of interest in similarly
investigating other prospective and existing
dealers. For example, although Gay was asked
to investigate all consumer complaints against
the Potamkins, a 1981 lawsuit brought by the
Pennsylvania Attorney General against several
Toyota dealerships, who. also owned BMW franchises, attracted no attention from BMW NA.
One BMW dealer who entered into an "assurance of voluntary compliance" with the state
Attorney General's Office testified that he did
not receive an inquiry from BMW NA. A204O41.

In general, it is clear to us that there is a
fundamental incompatibility between the
"BMWNA" corporate image and the "Potamkin" image, that the proposed buyer will not
maintain the high commitment to customer
service required by BMWNA, and that Mr.
Potamkin
will not properly
represent
BMWNA in the market place. As a result, the
public and BMWNA will be harmed should
your proposed transaction go forward.
A869. In an effort to prove that incompatibility, BMW NA has also produced the report of a
private investigator, Earle Gay. which was pre
pared at the request of BMW NA's counsel during the pendency of Robert's application for the
Green franchise. The Potamkins have provided
sufficient evidence to render as a material factu
al dispute the genuineness of this 'image" rea
son, however, especially as it relates to Gays
report.
First, combined with the other evidence to
indicate that BMW NA never intended to con
sider Roberts application, there is i\o dispute
that Robert's application was the first tor which
BMW NA'hued a private investigator's services.
A2288. Gay submitted his rcpoii directly to the
Weil. Gotshal & Manges law firm and BMW NA
dcvision-makers never teceived a copv of it.
A21&4. Further, from the information provided
to Gav at (he outlet of hi> invCbiigation a jury
could mlei dial BMW NA was culling piclcvlual
excuses to dcn> a Potamkin trauchoc. Guv
testified that he was oidered to investigate con
sumei complaint*, but not provide J with lav or
able ictcieiKcs lumishcd b> Kobcit. A22^2-s>6
Despite BMW NA s contention that uppluani
rcicictucs ate alwavs tavorable and lhcicU>ie
wcic considered lc>s valuable lot pui poses ol ih
investigation. Gav testified that in each s.>h>c
qucnt investigation ot a potential dealer. BM\S
NA tiuntshcd bun with a vt>p\ ni the appluatn.;.

15. Another reason given by BMW NA pertained
to alleged deficiencies in Robert's Philadelphia
location. We note that these are no more extensive than those attributed to other prospective
and existing dealers, and a reasonable jury may
find that rationale for BMW NA's decision to
have been pretextual. For example, one BMW
dealer, John Thompson, whose franchise acquisition was conditioned upon relocation, received numerous extensions over several years.
A2034-4G. By contrast. BMW NA contends that
the location oi Robert's proposed facility was
undesirable, as had been Green's location, and
that BMW NA had planned to move that dealership point north into the more affluent suburban area where Sloanc BMW was eventually
opened. Vet. in contrail to the negotiations
with and repeated extensions given to Thompson. BMW NA never informed Robert of this
aliened deficieuc). Robert also opined that his
piupuscd tacjli;>. luvuied at a busy crossroads
ficquentcJ b> lesidcnt* of the northern suburbs, would have been an appropriate one.
Another dealer. Frank Ursomarso, conceded
thai he tailed it* meet a requirement of separate
t'iaiuhiM: tu^duie* but has reached a compromise with BMW NA A2465. For example, in
lopM-nyc lo> ii.-.c difuieric) of which Robert was
mlvj; IUCJ L . i u t J cusiwiner service counter, he
r.v,,i.o<J tv, h,.ilJ K.;;e lu suit BMW NA In
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Additionally, only innuendo supportss
BMW NA's assumption that the Potamkinss
would have engaged in price advertisingg
BMW*. In fact, one BMW NA "InterBranch Memo" reported that "[Robert):)
stated .. . [he] has no intention of utilizingz
[price advertising] in [the Potamkin organi-ization's] potential activity with the BMWf
franchise." A1989. Alan Potamkin also0
testified that each Potamkin franchise belonged to its corresponding Dealer Advertising Group, A2444; one could presume?
that Robert and Alan would have adhered1
to that practice and joined the Philadelphia*
area BMW NA DAG and its collective ad
vertising efforts.
The record is equally clear that a numberr
of BMW dealers did engage in price advertising on occasion. See, e.g. the testimony
of BMW dealers: Green, A399; Hoffman.
A409-10; Lustgarten, A500; Hill, A327-31.
Although these dealers were ''counseled"
by District Manager Martin Focht and other BMW NA representatives, A327-31;;
A2210-12, sometimes at the behest of competing area dealers, price advertising remained an occasional practice. A327-31.
Significantly, BMW NA ultimately granted[
a franchise to one dealer who displayed the»
same price advertising practices associatedI
with the Potamkins.16
We do not mean to suggest that BMW
NA had a responsibility even to consider
the applications of the Potamkins. Clearly,
as long as it acted independently, BMW
NA could escape antitrust liability for its
conduct But the Potamkins have provided
sufficient evidence of concerted action, and
have raised genuine issues of material fact,
which call into question BMW NA's statement of reasons for rejecting the Potamkins. There is no evidence that the Potamkins' service and facilities would not have
equalled those of other qualified dealers
contrast, BMW NA's District Parts Manager
John Graynor indicated to Robert and his parts
manager that BMW required an exclusive BMW
parts manager and counted their disagreement
as a deficiency; yet Robert was never informed
that many BMW dealerships satisfied that requirement by assigning one assistant parts manager exclusively to the BMW franchise. A191618.

and applicants, sre supra, notes 14-15;
however, and there is sufficient indication
that the alleged concerted action between
BMW NA and its dealers may have dimintehed retail competition without a corresponding benefit to consumers. Moreover,
like the manufacturer's reversal of opinion
in Arnold Pontine. BMW NA's conduct is
inconsistent with all of the evidence that
BMW NA's Eastern Regional Manager
Cronin negotiated with Victor Potamkin in
good faith, and even after Victor allegedly
tried to bribe Cronin, Cronin allegedly encouraged Robert to buy Green's Philadelphia franchise. If proven at trial, the fact
that the Philadelphia area dealers, like the
New York area dealers, were familiar with
the Potamkins* success as high volume
price discounters and feared that kind of
competition, would make sense of BMW
NA's reversal of opinion with respect to
the Potamkins.
B.
Another of BMW NA's reasons for rejecting Robert Potamkin's application for
the Philadelphia franchise was his alleged
challenge to the number of cars he would
be allotted annually. When BMW NA field
personnel took his application in late October of 1985, Robert qualified his signature
on the "New Dealer Information and Requirements" form, with the typed notation:
"I do not accept Irvin Green's SPG (planning guide). It is unreasonable." A120T.
This notation became one of the primary
reasons cited for BMW NA's rejection of
Robert's application.
While the precise definition of the SPG
remains in dispute, the parties agree that a
dealer's SPG serves as a guide to the number of BMW automobiles allotted to it annually. A dealer's SPG is derived from
16. Although BMW NA rejected BMW dealer
Robert Ciasulli's initial application for a franchise in a 1981 proposed buy-sell agreement,
citing a "perceived lack of commitment to customer satisfaction," A2214, and again in 1986,
citing concerns nearly identical to those invoked when rejecting Robert's application,
A2229-30, the record indicates that Ciasulli subsequently received the Mack BMW franchise in
Toms River, New Jersey. A2377; 2307-03.
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both the number of cars available from the
German manufacturer and BMW NA's assessment of the sales requirements and
service capacities of each dealership.
BMW NA has been imprecise in defining
the SPG throughout this litigation, * * •
[one clause and one sentence deleted].
In October of 1985, before Robert Potamkin made the notation, Robert Casella,
BMW NA's Regional Business Development Manager, informed Robert that
Green's dealership carried with it an SPG
of 94. A171-72; A1999. Despite Casella's
view that the SPG serves merely as a guide
or a forecast, (in his words, "I'm not aware
that it has [limited allocations] but it
could," A1803-O4), he did not convey that
to Robert. A171-72; A1999. The BMW
NA representatives who subsequently evaluated Robert's proposed facility were unqualified to negotiate the SPG and also
declined to explain it. A632. Robert explained that he refused to sign without
reservation, and thereby to obligate himself to, a form that indicated an annual cap
of 94 BMWs, before he could speak to
someone in authority at BMW NA. He
testified that he signed the form with the
notation so as to comply as fully as possible with BMW NA requirements, but he did
not want to be bound by a figure that he
felt had been neither adequately explained
nor justified. A910-12. His notation was
received as evidencing an uncooperative attitude, yet it is undisputed that no one from
BMW NA inquired of Robert, concerning
his notation. A869-70.
BMW NA has explained, however, that
the SPG of 94 conformed with corporate
policy According to Phil Capo^eHa, MidAtlantic Regional Manager in 1985, when a
dealer acquires a dealership through a buysell agreement, lie inherit* the i>ame SPG
as the seller. A l i i , see A IT 1-74, A495
The SPG lb thus neutral ami &enej> neither
to inflate or deflate the price uf the dealership during the transaction A new dealer
may, however, anticipate an increased SPG
after, for example, demonstrating an ability to accvunnuulale a higher "rate ui lra\
el" (actual sales). AlJ>-iW. A41HMM, or expanding or enhancing u* Lciln>
A3,iT-.^

Nonetheless, there is substantial, evidence which shows that the SPG did not
limit actual allocations of cars. Green's
eventual successor, Sloane BMW, while
nominally bound by an SPG of 94, A1898,
actually obtained approximately 400 BMWs
a year. A1830. An internal BMW NA
memorandum suggests that the decision to
hold Sloane BMW to a nominal SPG of 94
was motivated by this litigation. A1898.
In fact, District Manager Focht praised
Sloane for selling more than 101 BMWs
during its first three months of operation.
A2305. BMW dealer Sloane's experience is
consistent with that of another BMW dealership manager, Michael Vadasz, that his
SPG never limited the number of cars he
would be able to sell, A793; see, e.g.,
A1887-88 (Focht), and of dealer Andrew
Hill of Devon Hill Motors. A2118-20. In
fact, Hill believed that the SPG equals approximately one-half of a dealer's actual
allotment. A2124. And BMW NA's President, Gunter Kramer indicated, the "actual
allocation is also determined by rate of
travel," unless that rate indicates price discounting. A491. None of this was explained to Robert; he was simply told that
his SPG would be 94 and no more.
Moreover, Robert indicated that he had
been willing to meet any BMW NA criteria,
including renovations to his proposed facility, to meet standards required for a higher
SPG, and had so informed Casella. A170809; A1719; A1999. As evidence, Robert
produced the cover letter submitted with
his application to Casella, BMW NA's MidAtlantic Region Business Development
Manager. In relevant part, Robert wrote:
On Tuesday I gave you a copy of plans
for a facility in which we could put our
BMW dealership As we discussed, facility size and car numbers go hand in
hand That facility could be used exclusively fur BMW m both saleb and service
it v» e get enuugh cars to support it. If
v. e get a smaller number of cars, we
could use the bhouroom for both BMW
and VW and the service department for
BMW e\cUi3i\el>. We will consider both
^mailer facilities ami larger facilities as
the number ^i cars dictates
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A1719. In contrast \n HMW NA * >K-»M
of nnnrr>npcration, (%a«n1!a * O«A»> v','.rrv\l
BMW NA memorandum refh-cU R/>N r» s
willingness to me«*t any rr •jinp'f"^nt«»
Al 998-99.
C.
Integral to BMW NA * theory of the
case is its assertion that during the early
1980s, BMW NA was initiating a dealer
"upgrade'* program Thi* invohed targeting items for improvement, gradually improving deficient aspects of existing deaferships, and requiring improved standard* of
prospective franchise applicants
RMW
NA also faults Robert for planning to place
his BMW dealership in an "automaH" adjacent to Robert's other dealership* * * *
[one sentence deleted].
The Potamkins proffer significant evidence suggesting that this reason, as well,
is pretextual. First, and most importantly,
the Potamkins produced a letter addressed
to Business Development Manager Casella,
that Robert had expressed an interest in
making his BMW facility exclusive if he
received the number of cars necessary to
make it profitable. A1719. Despite this
invitation, Robert stated that he was not
asked to make the dealership exclusive.
See A1710-1L Second, many other BMW
dealers operated multi-franchise dealerships and, contrary to BMW NA's implication, BMW NA appeared unconcerned, and
in some cases even unaware, of the additional franchises * * * [one sentence deleted].
Finally, Casella opined that with an SPG
of 94, Robert would be likely to "shuffle"
his BMW franchise to less accommodating
facilities, A194-95, tacitly acknowledging
that with an SPG of 94 a BMW dealership
would have been only marginally profitable. In addition to BMW NA's intent to
hold Robert to a 94 SPG, as contrasted
with the .treatment accorded other dealers,
this decision makes little economic sense
for BMW NA. Accordingly, BMW NA's
President, Gunter Kramer, acknowledged
BMW NA's emphasis on dealership profitability. Cf. A480-81.

^FimN

FrrVU RMW N \ * alleged concern that
Rnb^rt"* i|n i^r^hip \\ a* n«»t to he an exclusive <»ne i> \v»>-\k»ned b\ th»> testimony of
RMW M \ representative* that m 1985, the
definition of an oxchmw*"' dealership had
n,>r yit N*on clarified
Prior to the arrival
of Vice Pr»^nknt and Director of Operations Jack ling, an ' exclusive" dealership
could con«i*t »»f a different building from,
evpn if phv*»cr\llv attached to. other franchises Over time. thi<? concept evolved to
re-fjuir** that tho RMW franchise would
stand alone entire!v
In 1985, however,
Robert's proposed RMW showroom and
service area would have met the first definition of "exclusive."
I).
In summary, although BMW NA offers a
wide variety of rensons for having rejected
the Potamkins as RMW franchisees, it has
failed to meet the standard of proof neces-1
sary for summary judgment. The Potamkins have countered each alleged reason
with evidence that both discredits BMW
NA's witnesses and provides independent
support for the Potamkins' claim that
BMW NA and its dealer? acted in concert
to repel any Potamkin competition in BMW
sales.
Because the Potamkins have adduced
sufficient evidence to support their federal
antitrust claim, we will vacate the order
granting summary judgment on Count I
and remand the case for further pretrial
proceedings. As well, the judgment withj
respect to Counts IV and V, dismissed pursuant to the disposition of Count I, will be
vacated and remanded.
V.
[13] In Count III, the Potamkins also"
claim that BMW NA tortiously interfered
with their contract and prospective contract
tual advantage to purchase the Green and
Trans-Atlantic dealerships, respectively;
The district court granted BMW NA surn^
mary judgment on this claim as well, con-'
eluding that the Potamkins lacked an en-*
forceable contract in either case absent"
BMW NA's approval and that BMW NAt
was privileged not to offer its approval/
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A.
The parties apparently agree that sections 766 and 766B of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, adopted by both New
York and Pennsylvania, govern.17 GuardLife Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg
Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628,
631, 406 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1980); Adler,
Barish, Daniels, Leinn and Creskoff v.
Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175, 11831184 (1978); see Thompson Coal Co. v.
Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466,
471 (1979).
With respect to the Green agreement, we
look to section 766, entitled, Intentional
Interference with Performance of Contract
by Third Person, which provides:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract . . . between another and a third
person by inducing or otherwise causing
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary loss resulting to the
other from the failure of the third person
to perform the contract.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766
(1979). Factors delineating the contours of
"improper" conduct are set forth in section
767,** and include the nature of the actor's
conduct and intent.
As articulated by the Pennsylvania Su
preme Court, proper conduct may be de
scribed as "socially acceptable conduct"
that comport* with the "'rule* of the
game' which &ociet> ha* adopted." Adler,
Ban±h, 4b2 Pa at 433, 393 A 2d at llb4
17. The p a i n t s have not a d d r e s s e d ihe q u e s t i o n
of whoue of luu
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(prospcvUVL c vuili av. tual a d v a n t a g e ) AI\\\ iYiiK
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Because only an agreement in principle
had been reached during the Trans-Atlantic negotiations, section 766B, Intentional
Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relation, governs that claim:
One who intentionally and improperly;interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to
marry) is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary harm resulting from
loss of the benefits of the relation,
whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a
third person not to enter into or continue
the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B
(1979) Having set forth the applicable legal principles, we turn to the parties' contentions.
B.

With respect to the Green agreement,
BMW NA urges that absent a valid, enforceable contract, the Potamkins would
not have a claim for tortious interference.
Likewise, BMW NA claims that a higher
standard u> required for a prospective contractual advantage, and that, concerning
Trans-Atlantic, it has also not been met.
To the contrary, the Potamkins contend
that if we reverse the antitrust claim in
their favor, the> have, a fortiori, presented
material factual issues on the question of
IM d e t e r m i n i n g w h i t h e r a n a c t o r ' s c o n d u c t in
iitUiiiiunall) i n t u f c n n g w i t h a c o n t r a c t or a
[»u»>|A.viiu c o a t i a ^ i u a l i c l a t i o n of a n o t h e r is
HI p r o p e r or nut t-onsidci ution is given lo the
l\ »Ui.«. u.g ta^tuf*
ia) ihe natiwe or the a c t o r ' s c o n d u c t ,
lb) i h i actor s m o t i v e .
iwi a n . m u t e s t ut the o t h e r with w h i c h t h e
a. . . s madviv.t interfere*.
U i if.L i n u c o t sought to be a d v a n c e d by
thw a , ( u ,
(et the social i n t e i c s l s in p r o t e c t i n g t h e
(<wwUo.» yjt awituu of the a^tor a n d the con.tavix.ut t..(e;e>i> of the o t h e r ,
ir > the p r o u r t i i i v or r e m o t e n e s s of t h e acK^{ s vot»J»Kt to the i n t e r f e r e n c e a n d the relate....» u u u c i t the ^ i t m
K.^t i ^ o .d; i,f T u n s . § 767 (1979)
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whether BMW NA'« int»^rf»r^j>r» -i.ivw,.,*,*, ,i
to actionable "imprnpnr mnd'K!
Although variously r»iu» )K"1 a<= ^ ' priM
lege to intprfr»re. or in'^rf'T^nro n#>* *»T»
proper." the Re*tat*»m»'nt pr'>v»d"« »hv
"[t]he issue in earn rnc*» i* w h ^ ' l v r th»»
interference is improper nr not upd^r t^*»
circumstances
/*
§ 7^7. comment b
Further, "[aj determination of propriety re
quires inquiry into the 'mental and mora!
character of the defendant"* rnndurt '
Brownsville
Golden Age Xnr^ng
Ffmnr
Inc. v. Wells. 839 F.2d l.r>:>. \W M Cir
1988)
Some stated examples of improper a m
duct are particularly germane
In one.
"conduct that is in violation of antitrust
provisions or is in restraint of t r a d e " may
constitute improper interference
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 767 comment on
clause (a). Economic pressure, such as
that allegedly applied to Can field when
BMW NA bought Trans-Atlantic at a significantly lower price than the Potamkins
had offered while suggesting that she had
nothing to sell wiihout its approval, may
constitute unprivileged, improper interference. BMW NA's allegedly disingenuous
delay in taking Robert's application for the
Green franchise, if found by the jury to
have violated the Pennsylvania Board of
Vehicle Act and to have been sufficiently
intentional, could also constitute improper
interference. Because the factual underpinnings of these tort claims are intertwined with the antitrust claims, we will
vacate the district court's judgment with
respect to them and remand them as well.
VI.
[141 In its cross-appeal, BMW NA challenges the district court's denial of summary judgment on Count II, alleging a
violation of the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act, 63 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 818.1, et seq.
Although BMW NA presented a multifaceted attack on this claim in its motion before
the district court, on appeal it has confined
its challenge to the single question certified
by the district court: "Does a prospective
purchaser of an automobile dealership have
standing to pursue a claim under the Penn-

ed-, v m H ' ^ ^ j ,»f Vfine)*'* Vet

against

^ f n r t « h,(»»»r wh«» w i t h h o l d * its consent to
rhi» t n ' ^ f ' T " f 1 f r a n i ' l n ^ e " " (citations

n»iW>'«h
HIP Vet prmule* for liability
wher^ a fr\nrhi««*r ha** acted so as to:
Hi rnr^a^onrxMy withhold consent to
t>v» «a|p tr\n*for or exchange of the
fmnrhi** to a qualified buyer capable of
being hc*m^d a^ a new vehicle dealer in
t h i * Commonwealth {. or)

Ml Fail In re*p<uid m writing to a requ<»«t for a m ^ n * n<? specified in paragraph I'M within f>0 r|n\ s nf receipt of a
written request
Such failure shall
be deemed tn be refusal to consent to the
request
M Pa Stat Ann $ ^18 9<bX,*) and (4). Section 20 provides for civil actions:
Notwithstanding the terms . . . of any
agreement
. [1) any person who is or
may be injured by a violation of a provision of thi* act or (n) any party to a
franchise who i* so injured in his business or property by a violation of a provision of this act relating to that franchise
or [iii] any person so injured because he
refused to accede to a proposal for an
arrangement which, if consummated,
would be in violation of this act, may
bring an action for damages and equitable relief, including injunctive relief, in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
63 PaStat.Ann. § 818.20(a) (bracketed
numbers added for purpose of explanation).
Since this count raises an issue of Pennsylvania law, our duty is to predict how the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide
this issue
Robertson
v. Allied Signal*
Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 1990); see
Coynmissioner v. Estate of Bosck, 387 U.S.
456, 464-65, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1782-83, 18
L.Ed.2d 886 (1967). We must make this
prediction without the benefit of substantive legislative history or Pennsylvania
caselaw concerning this standing provision
of the Board of Vehicles Act. Lacking
direct guidance on the interpretation of this
Act, we turn to the general instructions of
Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act
of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq. (Purdon's Supp 1991). The Statutory Construction Act provides that we should construe
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the Act "to give effect to all its provisions," and further provides that "when
the words of a statute are clear and free
from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its s p i r i t " 1 Pa C S.A. § 1921(a), (b)
(Purdon's Supp.1991).
Given this guidance from the Pennsylvania legislature, we conclude that the clause
providing that "any person who is or may
be injured by a violation of a provision of
this Act . . may bring an action . " plainly confers standing upon the Potamkins
BMW NA contends that the Act protects
only franchisees' economic interests by leveling the playing field between franchisees
and manufacturers, and therefore does not
impose on manufacturers any duty to prospective franchisees. While this contention
has some appeal, we reject it because it is
inconsistent with the plain language of section 818 20. Second, BMW NA contends
that the standing conveyed to "any person
who is or may be injured . " by section
818.20(a), must be read narrowly so as to
avert rendering unnecessary the standing
conveyed in the following clauses In other words, if "any person who is or may be
injured" were broadly construed to encom
pass the Potamkins, the following clauses
would not enlarge the class of litigants
BMW appears to suggest that "any person
who is or may be injured" refers to \iola
tions of the statute other than those relat
tng to regulation of franchises
The Act doe* not support BMW NA'*
position, however, and BMW NA ha* not
cited an> binding or even persuasive casts
In none of the cases BMW NA cites did the
courts construe a statute similarly broad in
granting standing to "any person " At
least with respect to the standing provision
in clauses one and three BMW NA s con
cern that the first makes the remaining
clauses superfluous is misplaced The cun
cern of the first clause is mjurv caused b>
violation The concern of the third provid
tng standing to "anv, person so injured In.
cause he refused to accede to a proposal
for an arrangement which if consummat
ed, w o u l d

act

is

injur) c a u s e d l»v r t ! u > a l to p a i l k i p u U

he

a

violation

of

this

in a

violation; no actual violation need occur.
Even if the first clause covered every conceivable violation, some additional persons
could sue under the third clause.
BMW NA also asserts a policy argument, predicting that if the court opens the
door to prospective franchisees, manufacturers will be afraid to deny applications,
even reasonably, for fear of litigation.
Where manufacturers have acted reasonably, however, they have not only the defense of reasonableness, but in litigation
brought in the federal courts, the protection of Rule 11 as well. Moreover, the fear
of litigation is not alien to car manufacturers nor limited exclusively to them; they
are subject to all kinds of liabilities—product, negligence, and, even under this statute, liability to franchisees. These are subsumed in the cost of doing business and
from society's viewpoint have favorable aspects which outweigh the negative ones.
In sum, we will not diverge from the
plain language of the Pennsylvania Board
of Vehicles Act's standing provision, especially where we cannot find support in legislative history or caselaw for doing so.
VII.
We u ill therefore vacate the grant of
summary judgment on Count I, vacate the
dismissal of Counts III, IV and V, and
affirm the district court's order with respect to Count II, remanding all counts for
further proceedings
ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring and
dissenting
I join part VI of the majority's opinion
and judgment which affirms the denial of
summary judgment on the Potamkins'
claim under the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act Flow ever, I respectfull) dissent
Iroin the majont)'s disposition of the Potumkiii:/ antitrust and tortious interference
*ith contract claims
In regard to the
antitrust claim I conclude that the plain
tiffs have not met their burden of producing tuaci.ee which tends to show that the
vlisinhat^r BMW NA, had entered into a
miopiracv with its dealers to b o ) t o t t the
1 . tun Kiio
Mure s i g n i t i c a i . t l ) , 1 find t h a t
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plaintiffs have not met their burden of
producing evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility that BMW NA wa« acting
independently of it^ dealers when it rejected the Potamkin dealerships
Mnnsanfn
Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Cnrp, lfi5 tr S
752, 768, 101 S.Ct. MR I. 1173, 79 L F d 2d
775 (1984). There is no evidence of a "conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective "
Id.; Edward J. Sieerncy & Sons. Inr r
Texaeo, 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d 0 . 1 9 * 0 ) ,
cert denied, 451 U.S. 911, 101 S f t . 1981.
68 L.Ed.2d 300 (1981). I would, therefore,
affirm the summary judgment entered
against the Potamkins on their Sherman
Act § 1 claim. Because the basis for the
tortious interference with contract claim is
so closely interwoven with the antitrust
claim, I further conclude that it must fail
with the failure of the antitrust claim. I
would, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment on that claim as well.
Turning first to the antitrust claim, I
believe the majority has misread our standard for summary judgment when it allows
t h e ' Potamkins' antitrust claim to go forward. As the majority acknowledges, an
antitrust plaintiff must be prepared to demonstrate a causal relationship between alleged dealer complaints and a distributor's
action in order to distinguish concerted action in violation of the Sherman Act from
"perfectly legitimate" independent conduct.
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64, 104 S.Ct. at
1470-71. However, the present case differs from situations such as that in Arnold
Pontiac-GMC,
Inc. v. General
Motors
Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.1986), where we
were able to find such a linkage. In Arnold Pontiac, there was direct evidence of
concerted action which was coupled with
circumstantial evidence that GMC had
planned to grant Arnold Pontiac-GMC a
Buick franchise but changed its mind after
a meeting between its representative and
the local dealers. We found that the combination of direct and circumstantial evidence raised a genuine issue as to whether
the Buick dealers had conspired to thwart
I. The Potamkins had been long recognized for
selling high volumes of automobiles at discount

competition at the dealership level. For
this r e a ^ m . we reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for
trial
Our careful review of the record here
shows no direct evidence of a conspiracy
that allegedly caused the Potamkins their
injury.
We are left to infer from only
circumstantial evidence whether there was
concerted action. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574,
m , 10H S.Ct. 1348. 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986). As I relate below, I find that BMW
KA's conduct is as consistent with permissible unilateral conduct as it is with illegal
conspiracy, and therefore, following Matsushita,
I find that the evidence is not
adequate to support the alleged antitrust
conspiracy.
The evidence here suggests at most that.
at different times New York area and Philadelphia area dealers may have complained
to BMW NA about awarding dealerships to
the Potamkins. Yet, in Monsanto, 465
U.S. at 763, 104 S.Ct. a t 1470, the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that a jury could
infer the existence of a price-fixing agreement from the complaints of other distributors or "from the fact that termination
came about 'in response to' complaints"
from other distributors. The Court required something more of section 1 plaintiffs: Evidence that "tends to exclude the
possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently/' Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764,
104 S.Ct at 1471; Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 473 (3d Or.
1985).
The Court explained that a plaintiff does
not establish an illegal price-fixing agreement solely by proof of complaints by com-1
petitors of the prospective dealer. Complaints about discounters 1 "are natural—
and from the manufacturer's perspective,
unavoidable—reactions by distributors to
the activities of their rivals." Monsanto,.
465 U.S. at 763, 104 S.Ct at 1470. ' A
distributor's decision not to deal may reprices.
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fleet a restraint which is primarily horizontal in nature, in that dealers are trying to
suppress competition by utilizing the power
of a common supplier Nevertheless, so
long as the distributor made an mdepen
dent business decision not to do business
with a dealer, the fact that the distributor
was aware of the dealers' complaints is of
no moment Id at 763-764, 104 S Ct at
1470-71
In looking at all of the evidence which
the Potamkms present, I understand we
cannot compartmentalize the various factu
al components However, neither can we
read between the lines to infer linkage
where there is none When drawing infer
ences, we may draw only reasonable infer
ences from sufficient evidence For the
reasons which follow, I conclude that the
Potamkins have not presented the quantum
of evidence necessary to permit their case
to go to the jury In reaching this conclu
sion, I heed the Monsanto Court's warning
that allowing finders of fact to infer con
spiracies from extremely equivocal evi
dence may deter pro competitive conduct
If an inference of such an agreement
may be drawn from highly ambiguous
evidence, there is a considerable danger
that the doctrines enunciated in Sylva
ma and Colgate will be seriously eroded
Id. at 763, 106 S Ct at 1470
Evaluating the evidence in the present
case in the light most favorable to the
Potamkins, I conclude that a jury could not
find a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
\ct without relying on speculation or con
(ecture, a result we have cautioned against
Edward J Sueeney, 637 F 2d at 116
When examined closely the Potamkins'
evidence lb slender With regard to the
illeged 1981 conspiracy, the Potamkins*
)resent the Gray affidavit along v»ith the
tatement of Robert Potamkm to support
in inference of concerted action AJ> the
najonty notes, the Gray atfidavit contains*
10 evidence that BMW NA considered the
lealers alleged demands* or acted in re
ponse to those demands Ne\ertheless>
» The affidavit suggests that sonic dealers had
complained to Cronin prior to the meeting and
that others eomplamed fallowing the meeting

the majority reads the affidavit to support
an inference that BMW NA knuckled under
to dealer pressure Taking the affidavit
together with the other evidence the Potamkins present, I cannot draw such an
inference Gray's testimony relates only
Gray's own belief that BMW NA's decision
to deny the Potamkins the Great Neck
open point came as a result of the New
York area BMW dealers' objections The
affidavit neither mentions whether a BMW
NA employee participated in the meeting at
which dealers discussed complaining to
BMW NA nor supports an inference that
the dealers had formed an agreement to
pressure BMW NA or its Eastern Regional
Manager, Terry Cronin 2 The affidavit relates only that dealers at the meeting opposed BMW NA's granting the Potamkins
a franchise, a sentiment which is not sur
prising from dealers who would face new
competition if the franchise were granted
Even if a representative of BMW NA
were present at the dealer advertising
group meeting, such contact between a distributor and its dealers, while evidence of
an opportunity to conspire, does not
amount to a conspiracy Our case law
suggests such meetings have important
business purposes, they provide the distributor or manufacturer with important
information which can be used to change
product mix or advertising direction Distributors and dealers must speak "to assure that their product will reach the consumer persuasively and efficiently " Monsanto, supra, 465 U S at 763-64, 104 S Ct
at 1470
As further evidence of concerted action
by New York area dealers, Robert Potam
kin offers his own statement that in late
1985, Gene Hoffman a BMW dealer m
Bloomfield New Jersey told him that
BMW N \ s decision to deny the Potamkins
the Great Neck franchise "was due to the
fact that other Long Island BMW dealers
feared the price competition that a Potam
km BMW franchise would bring to the
Ixmg Island market ' I do not find that
There is nothing to suggest a meeting or the
minds followed by concerted action

1386

97 J FKDKRVL RKPORTFR. 2d SKR!K<

this evidence enhances the Potamkm*' cm
spiracy claim Again, all bu^me^e* fear
competition, particularly fmm a ncu mm
petitor who will compete on price Mnreover, I do not read Robert Potamkm s affidavit to suggest that Hoffman told him
that BMW NA consented to an agreement
with its Long Island dealers to exclude the
Potamkins.3 Robert Potamkin's affidavit,
even when considered with the Gray affidavit, does not present evidence which tends
to exclude the possibility that BMW N'A
acted unilaterally to keep the Potamkins
out of Long Island.
* * * [one sentence deleted} * However,
even if BMW NA did contact existing dealers, a conclusion refuted by the testimony
of Cronin and Hoffman among other*, such
evidence, when taken together with the
Gray and Robert Potamkin affidavits, still
does not raise an inference of concerted
action between BMW NA and its New
York area dealers to deny the Potamkins a
franchise. At a minimum, "the circumstances [must be] such as to warrant a jury
in finding that the conspirators had a unity
of purpose or a common design or understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an
unlawful arrangement." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U S. 781, 810,
66 S.Ct. 1125, 1139, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946).
BMW NA's own decision to contact its
dealers would not meet the Potamkins' burden of having to show that BMW and the
dealers had acted with a common design.
Finally, it must be remembered that the
1981 allegations are not part of the antitrust injury complained of here; the Potamkins use those allegations to suggest a
pattern of dealing that supports their claim
of concerted action arising out of the
events of 1985.

<\ni\cr which th»» Potamkin* present is very
thin To «ugg»»<5t concerted action, the Potamkm* nffVr <>nl\ Robert Potamkin's
statement that Gene Hoffman had informed him on May 30. 19^0, that a BMW
NA repre«pntnti\e had visited Hoffman in
the fall of 198.1 and had asked Hoffman's
opinion about the proposed sale of TransAtlantic tn the Potamkin* Based on this
e\idence. the Potamkin* argue that dealer
oppocition from 1981 was reactivated in
1981 to dpfeat their aprpement in principle
with Caufield for the Trans-Atlantic dealership m Manhattan E\en if Hoffman had
complained to a BMW NA representative—
Hoffman denies that any representative of
BMW ever visited him regarding the possible *ale of a dealership in Manhattan to the
Potamkins—and even if a BMW NA representative heard similar complaints from
other dealers—there is no evidence supporting this point in the record—complaints
by competitors, standing alone, are not sufficient to show a conspiracy.5
As for other evidence of a 1985 New
York conspiracy, the majority notes that
BMW NA backed away from its strategy
of creating a factory store and instead
gave Martin BMW the exclusive Manhattan
dealership. However, the factory store
concept was not invented to cover up the
conspiracy. The uncontroverted documentary and deposition testimony suggests
that BMW came up with the idea at least
one year prior to the proposed sale of
Trans-Atlantic. In short, I find the evidence insufficient to deduce a conspiracy
between BMW NA and its New York dealers to deprive the Potamkins of a BMW
dealership in Manhattan.

With regard to those 1985 events surrounding the Potamkins' inability to obtain
a BMW franchise in Manhattan, the evi-

Finally, the evidence that BMW NA conspired with its Philadelphia dealers to prevent the Potamkins from purchasing the
Green dealership is equally scant. It stems
from one source: the statement of Bruce
Braverman, a Potamkin employee, recount'

3.

5.

4.

Because I am looking at this evidence in the
light most favorable to the Potamkins, I will not
consider the credibility of this affidavit or of
Hoffman's responding affidavit, which denies
Robert Potamkin's allegations.
* * * [one sentence deleted]

I do not suggest that evidence of complaints
has no probative value at all, but only that the
burden remains on the antitrust plaintiff lo introduce additional evidence sufficient to support a finding of unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy Monsanto, 465 UJS. at 764
n 8, 104 SCt. at 1471 n. 8.
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ing what Donald Mitchell allegedly had told
him. I do not agree with the majority's
conclusion that the Braverman statement is
admissible evidence. Nor can I conclude
that the district court abused its discretion
in excluding the Braverman statement.
See, e,g., United States v. Ga?nbino, 926
F.2d 1355, 1364 (3d Cir.1991). However,
even if his statement were admissible, I
find that it offers little evidence of the
alleged conspiracy.
The majority goes to g r e a t lengths to
find Braverman's testimony admissible.
Yet, I cannot agree with its reasoning for
several reasons. First, I find that Braverman's statement of what Mitchell told him
should not be admitted as an exception to
the hearsay rule because Mitchell does not
qualify as an agent of BMW NA acting
within the scope of his agency and employment. Second, I find t h a t Braverman's
statement also falls short of the exception
for the admission of hearsay statements by
co-conspirators. Furthermore, even if the
Braverman relation of the Mitchell statement is admissible evidence of a conspiracy, it relates only to a conspiracy between
BMW dealers, which is not the conspiracy
charged in the complaint. The statement
does not refer to BMW NA's role in any
such scheme.
The record suggests that
Mitchell
worked for BMW Credit f e n e r a t i o n * * *
[remainder of sentence deleted]. in his
work for BMW Credit, Mitchell had no
contact with BMW NA and nothing to do
with its decisions on dealer appointments.
Therefore, I do not believe that Mitchell's
statement to Braverman concerned a matter within the scope of his agency, such
that Braverman's retelling should he admissible under Rule 801(dM2>U>).
in any event 1 ilu not find that BMW NA
so dominates the activities uf BMW Credit
that Mitchell could act as BMW NA's
a^enl. The majority Inula this a close
question
I think the answer is clear
* * • [four sentences dele lev)]
Moreover, even if Mitchell could have
spoken as BMW NA s agent, the adnusai
bihty o( Hraw nnun's statement is cast into
doubt l»y the multiple layers i»I hearsay

contained within Mitchell's statement as
Braverman relates it. As the majority indicates, our case law allows secondary and
tertiary levels of hearsay to come in if
there is a basis for admitting the hearsay
statement. See Fed.R.Evid. 805. . Braverman testified in his deposition that he re-,
members Mitchell telling him that Don R Q :
sen was the source of Mitchell's news that
other Philadelphia area BMW dealers were
going to do what they could to make certain the Potamkins did not get a franchise.
However, I do not find that the out of court
statements purportedly made by other dealers to Rosen, who then repeated them to
Mitchell, should be admissible in light of
our concern for restricting declarations of
unidentified persons.
Even where we
might infer who such persons may be, such
supposition does not satisfy the heavy burden on the proponent of the evidence to
demonstrate its trustworthiness. See Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 F.2d
996, 1003 (3d Cir.1988). We do not know
the identity of the other dealers who presumably spoke to Don Rosen, nor do we
know whether it was Don Rosen himself or
someone else at his dealership who spoke
to Mitchell. I note that Mitchell indicated
that he did not usually talk to dealership
owners when he visited his accounts.
Moreover, the nonhearsay evidence contradicts Braverman's testimony. Mitchell denies having made the statements attributed
to him by Braverman, and Don Rosen denies having told Mitchell that Philadelphia
area BMW dealers had complained to BMW
NA about the possibility that the Potamkins would become a dealer.
i also conclude that the Mitchell "statemeni" is not admissible under the co-conspirator exception, Rule 80i(d)<2)(E). I do
not find, either within the statement or
independent of the statement, any evidence
<jf a conspiracy involving BMW NA and
the Philadelphia area BMW dealers. Nor
d^ 1 find that Mitchell held a position relative to BMW NA that could implicate BMW
NA in such a conspiracy through Mitchell's
UCtloiia

l o r each of the above reasons, I believe
the district court did not err in excluding
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Braverman'a statempnt
Hmmvrr. oso^ }' p,»»An-t^nc tn i'»Jr-,'hi«.» rb'^l^r^hips in Manthe trial court did abu«p it« d i s r r p * ^ by
)»v».nn an.| Philadelphia in th»> fait of 1985.
ruling that the Braverman t*«!;'por*y WT; [ find ^»' *-n»»«a! n^u<* hotwpen the 1981
inadmissible, our consideration of \>>* «tn»p- neurone and *h* ovt»nt* «»f l^"» too attenuatment in connection with the motion F'»M <vf en <'ff«p^rT thr rx!<jfrnr»» of the nileged
Th»*r** i« n»> evidentiary link
would not preclurle nummary judgment f»r mTiQp:ra«\v
the defendants on the antitrust claim In ?hn\wne that rhe alleged \9<[ agreement
|,pt W P o n Np W York area dealers and BMW
the statement. Braverman a.«?ert? that
Mitchell told him that tbp Philadelphia ar^a \\a* reactivated tn keep the Potamkins out
dealers did not want the Pntamkin? in have of Manhattan in 19S5. Even more appara franchise because they feared price com- ent is the lack of any evidence which suppetition. Yet, at his deposition. Braverman ports even an inference that the purported
responded in the negative to questions re- conspiracy fmm 19S1 to deny the Potamgarding whether he knew if Mitchell had kins the Great Neck open point could have
spoken to anyone at BMW NA and whether been reactivated \n 1985 to deny them the
Mitchell knew if the Philadelphia dealer? Green dealership in Philadelphia. Previhad spoken to anyone at BMW NA about ously, we have required of plaintiffs "proof
the proposed sale. These negative answers of a causal relationship between competitor
suggest that Mitchell was relating nothing complaints" and the decision not to deal.
more than the grumbling he heard in his Edward / Sweeney & Sons, 637 F.2d at
111. Plaintiffs have failed to meet this
conversations at BMW dealerships. Braverman's testimony provides no hint that same burden of proof here.
BMW NA acted other than unilaterally
Moreover, the relevant literature sugwhen it chose not to approve the sale of the gests that the defendant had credible busiGreen dealership to the Potamkins. Noth- ness reasons for rejecting the Potamkins1
ing in what Braverman says Mitchell told dealership applications. BMW NA had an
him suggests that the dealers communicat- interest in protecting its reputation and the
ed demands to BMW NA or that BMW NA image it has attempted to develop as a high
acquiesced in those demands or entered an quality car distributor. In order to comagreement with the Philadelphia area deal- pete with other brands in the market for
luxury automobiles, BMW NA had ample
ers to keep out the Potamkins.*
reason to want to insure that its products
I recognize, of course, that it is rare to
were offered with certain point-of-sale ser;
find overt evidence of a conspiracy. I note
vices. BMW NA could have feared that
as well that BMW NA may have been both
the introduction of a dealer who "sells at
slow and disingenuous in its handling of
the factory gate" would lead its other dealthe Potamkins' application for the Philadelers to lower the level of service they ofphia franchise. However, BMW NA's failfered in order to compete better with the
ure to consider the Potamkin's application
price-cutter and prevent the price-cutter
in a prompt and scrupulous fashion does
from free riding on the services they pronot constitute evidence of a conspiracy.
vided.7 Finally, BMW NA may have acted
, Beyond the evidentiary problems relating in a desire to protect the investments its
to concerted action, I believe the majority dealers had made in their own franchises'.
understates the four-year gap between the Had BMW NA's rejection of the Potamevents .surrounding BMW NA's failure to kins' applications lacked a sensible econom1
award the Potamkins the Great Neck open ic justification, plaintiffs' allegations • of
point in 1981 and the failed attempts by the concerted action would be more compelling.
6* In addition, I note that, while the majority
opinion focuses on the dealer interactions with
BMW NA, it overlooks the paucity of evidence
showing that the dealers had conspired together
to form an anticompetitive scheme.

7. A review of the depositions and exhibits
makes clear that both BMW and its dealers had
reason to fear a price cutting Potamkin franchise. The Potamkins had built a huge retail
business by selling cars in high volume at small
markup over the prices paid to various manufacturers.

Tab 18

May 6, 1992
Subject:

Ogden, Utah

Note to the File;
On today's date, Tim Martin called from Ogden, Utah to say that he was
in the Buick dealership and that Dave Koch the dealer had advised him
that he would be closing the dealership today and not re-opening until
Monday.
Sheila Powell and I discussed the situation with Dave Koch. Dave
advised that he would re-open the dealership on Monday with a skeleton
crew- He also advised us that the service manager had gone to work for
Rick Warner at the Mitsubishi dealership.
Tim Martin advised us that a representative from 6MAC would be taking
the keys for all the new cars with him and would keep us informed as to
the situation and occurences at the dealership.
I called Rick Warner after talking with Dave Koch to see if he was
aware of what was going on. Rick was not aware that Dave Koch was
closing the dealership but did say that he had received a phone call
from Dave Koch but was away from the dealership and had not returned
the call. However, he would call Dave Koch as soon as he and I
finished talking. Rick Warner said that he would get back with me to
let us know what we could expect from the Buick dealership. When asked
about the remaining paperwork needed to complete his proposal package,
Rick said that Dave Gibbs had everything. I have left two messages for
Dave Gibbs this afternoon but he has not returned my calls. I will
complete this note to file after hearing back from Dave Gibbs and Rick
Warner.
At 3:25PM on today, I received a call from Rick Warner and Dave Gibbs
to verify that we would have the necessary paperwork to complete the
proposal package on tomorrow by fax. Dave Gibbs asked how long the
approval would take. I advised him that once everything was completed
here and forwarded to Flint, that perhaps a week to a week and a half.
Dave Gibbs said they should be able to work out something to keep the
Buick dealership open for that amount of time.
End of note to the file.
Deft.,

Costing cf

'

ForkJer^iCaUo.i

. A Paoe(s)l
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r^nnnr-rko

NOTE TO FILE:

June 30, 1992

I called Sierra Buick-Jeep Eagle, Ogden, Utah today at 4pm and got a
recorded message Indicating that services had been temporarily
disconnected.

The number that I dialed was 801-394-1651.

I called Henry Mixon's office at approximately 4:10pm and left a
message for
or him
him to
t o ccall
a l l me.
me.

W^fTAit+\
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Vorn Woodley
/

EXHIBIT^ _._
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Tab 19

1

PREMISES?

2

A

YES, SIR.

3

Q

WHAT WAS SAID AND BY WHOM AT THAT MEETING?

4

A

WELL, IT WAS A LONG DISCUSSION.

THEY WANTED

5

TO MEET US, VISIT OUR FACILITY, LOOK THE FACILITY OVER.

6

THERE WAS DISCUSSION THAT THEY HAD LOOKED THE TOWN OVER

7

AND IN FACT KNEW WHERE THE POCKETS OF AUTO DEALERS WERE.

8

THEY WERE VERY —

9
10
11

Q

WHICH IS WALL AVENUE AND RIVERDALE ROAD, IS

THAT CORRECT?
A

12

YES, IT IS.
AND THEY WERE FAIRLY KNOWLEDGEABLE ON THOSE

13

TWO HIGH VISIBILITY AREAS AND THEY, IN FACT, SAT IN THIS

14

OFFICE AND, ONCE AGAIN, WERE QUITE IMPRESSED WITH THIS

15

FACILITY, IMPRESSED, AS THEY MENTIONED, WITH OUR ABILITY

16

TO POTENTIALLY BECOME THE BUICK DEALER AND THE WORDS THAT

17

CAME OUT OF MR. GAROVE'S MOUTH WERE THAT —

18

PREFACE THOSE REMARKS BY WE DID DISCUSS A LITTLE BIT OF

19

PROJECT 2000 WHILE THEY WERE IN THIS OFFICE.

20

THAT DISCUSSION MR. GAROVE SAID, AND I QUOTE, "I DON'T

21

WANT BUICK IN THAT MAZE OF FRANCHISES OUT ON RIVERDALE

22

ROAD."

23

INTERESTED IN US AND CERTAINLY GAVE US THE REASON TO

24

CONTINUE TO DO THE WORK THAT WE WERE REQUIRED TO DO ON

25

THE BUY-SELL OF DISMISSING THE —

LET ME

BUT WITH

THAT GAVE US A GOOD FEELING THAT THEY WERE

TRYING TO GET THE
64
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2

complete review of with respect to Project 2000.

3

But there is a recommendation as to one of those

4

documents which I will provide to you that does

5

indicate preferred locations Riverdale Road for

6

that Pontiac, Buick, GMC dealer.

7

Q

Do you recall making any statement in your

8

visit to Mr. Watson and Mr. Bean that you did not want to

9

go out into that maze on Riverdale Road or words to that

10

effect with the Buick franchise?

11

A

I may have made a statement similar to that.

12

Q

What was the basis for that statement?

13

A

Well, if the place would have been based on

14

the -- I assume I'd be referring to the Petersen

15

operation which housed, at that time, Nissan, Honda,

16

Pontiac and GMC Truck, I believe, give or take a few

17

franchises.

18
19
20
21

Q

And you think that's what you had made

reference to when you made that statement?
A

Correct.

Once again, I don't recall it, but

chances are it's a statement I may have made.

22

MR. BEAN:

Mark that for me, please.

23

(Whereupon, at this time, the reporter~

24

marked the-above mentioned two-page handwritten

25

document titled "Options I" as Plaintiff's Exhibit

ARISTA COURT REPORTING CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK
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Tab 20

ANDREINI

A.

& ASSOCIATES

(415)

952-8996

It's one of the exhibits here

(indicating).

That was a telephone call to one of the exhibits

here

that I recalled.
Q.

Other than that, have you talked

Mr. Koch, to your
A.

Q.

knowledge?

Not that I —

than what's noted

to

not that I can recall, other

in the exhibits.

Do you maintain in your office, Mr. W o o d l e y ,

a separate file on each of the Buick dealers in the
zone?
MR. STEPHENS:
THE WITNESS:
don't

Does he personally?
The zone office maintains

it; I

personally.
MR. BEAN:

Q.

The zone office maintains

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you have access to those

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Are you aware, Mr. Woodley, of any

applications

files?

for a Buick sales and service

And the time frame?

I guess I'm

other

agreement

that had been rejected to implement Project
A.

it?

2000?
—

would

you please characterize the time frame; excuse m e .
Q.

Yes.

that you served
manager
A.

Well, first of all, during the time
in the capacity as zone

for the San Francisco
No, I'm

not.

organization

zone.

I'm not aware of any.
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Q.

& ASSOCIATES

(415)

952-8996

Are you aware of any since that time

Buick has rejected the application
service agreement and exercised

for a sales

its right of

refusal for the purpose of implementing
A.

I'm aware of

MR. STEPHENS:
THE WITNESS:
MR. BEAN:

I'm

aware of one that's

That's in process

Is that within the San Francisco

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And where is that dealership
I'm

in p r o c e s s .

now?

Q.

zone?

located?

not so sure that -- let me

talk to the witness on this.

(Brief

2000?

sorry.

Yes, sir.

confidential

first

Project

A.

MR. STEPHENS:

and

—

Go ahead, I'm

Q.

where

This could

be

information.
recess.)

MR. STEPHENS:

Back on the record.

After

talking

with the witness, the process is not complete and the
information
I'll

is highly

confidential

and proprietary

have to instruct the witness not to answer

and

or

identify the dealership.
MR. BEAN:
applications

Q.

Are you aware, Mr. Woodley, of any

for sales and service agreement

Buick Motor Division that have been rejected
of first refusal exercised

with
and

to implement Project

anywhere else in any other zones in the United

right
2000

States?
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& ASSOCIATES

(415)

952-8996

A.

No, I'm

not aware of

Q.

Have you had any conversations with

—
Henry

Mixon other than as set forth in the memorandums
are part of the exhibits to this deposition

that

--

A.

None that --

Q.

-- that you can

A.

None that I can recall.

Q.

Have you had any conversations with

recall?

representing Henry Mixon, an attorney

anyone

or anyone

else

representing Henry Mixon, with regard to the sale of
the assets of Helsco dba Sierra Buick or the
application of any other party for that Buick point in
Ogden?
A.

None that I can recall.

Q.

Do you know a person named Sally

A.

No, I do not.

MR. STEPHENS:
Sally,

Why do we care?

Sally.

MR. WATSON:
being

Who is she?

Pearsol?

We met her last night.

No,

I'm

facetious.
MR. STEPHENS:

What's David's obsession

about

Sally?
MR. BEAN:
(Brief

Talk to John a minute.

recess.)

MR. BEAN:

I'm

MR. STEPHENS:

through.

That's all I have.

Thank you.
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